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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Trading in Myths 
In winter 2016, near the peak of Bernie Sanders’ bid for the 
Democratic presidential nomination, a new line became popular among 
the nation’s policy elite: Bernie Sanders is the enemy of the world’s poor. 
Their argument was that Sanders, by pushing trade policies to help U.S. 
workers, specifically manufacturing workers, risked undermining the 
well-being of the world’s poor because exporting manufactured goods to 
the United States and other wealthy countries is their path out of poverty. 
The role model was China, which by exporting has largely eliminated 
extreme poverty and drastically reduced poverty among its population. 
Sanders and his supporters would block the rest of the developing world 
from following the same course. 
This line, in its Sanders-bashing permutation, appeared early on in 
Vox, the millennial-oriented media upstart, and was quickly picked up 
elsewhere (Beauchamp 2016).1 After all, it was pretty irresistible. The ally 
of the downtrodden and enemy of the rich was pushing policies that would 
condemn much of the world to poverty. 
1  See also Weissman (2016), Iacono (2016), Worstall (2016), Lane (2016), and 
Zakaria (2016). 
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The story made a nice contribution to preserving the status quo, 
but it was less valuable if you respect honesty in public debate.  
The problem in the logic of this argument should be apparent to 
anyone who has taken an introductory economics course. It assumes that 
the basic problem of manufacturing workers in the developing world is the 
need for someone who will buy their stuff. If people in the United States 
don’t buy it, then the workers will be out on the street and growth in the 
developing world will grind to a halt.  
In this story, the problem is that we don’t have enough people in 
the world to buy stuff. In other words, there is a shortage of demand. But 
is it really true that no one else in the world would buy the stuff produced 
by manufacturing workers in the developing world if they couldn’t sell it 
to consumers in the United States? Suppose people in the developing 
world bought the stuff they produced raising their living standards by 
raising their own consumption.  
That is how the economics is supposed to work. In the standard 
theory, general shortages of demand are not a problem.2 Economists have 
traditionally assumed that economies tended toward full employment. The 
basic economic constraint was a lack of supply. The problem was that we 
couldn’t produce enough goods and services, not that we were producing 
too much and couldn’t find anyone to buy them. In fact, this is why all the 
standard models used to analyze trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership assume trade doesn’t affect total employment. 3  Economies 
adjust so that shortages of demand are not a problem.  
In this standard story (and the Sanders critics are people who care 
about textbook economics), capital flows from slow-growing rich 
countries, where it is relatively plentiful and so gets a low rate of return, 
2  As explained in the next chapter, this view is not exactly correct, but it’s what 
you’re supposed to believe if you adhere to the mainstream economic view.  
3  There can be modest changes in employment through a supply-side effect. If the 
trade deal increases the efficiency of the economy, then the marginal product of 
labor should rise, leading to a higher real wage, which in turn should induce some 
people to choose work over leisure. So the trade deal results in more people 
choosing to work, not an increased demand for labor.  
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to fast-growing poor countries, where it is scarce and gets a high rate of 
return (Figure 1-1).  
 
FIGURE 1-1 
Theoretical and actual capital flows 
 
Source and notes: See text. 
 
So the United States, Japan, and the European Union should be 
running large trade surpluses, which is what an outflow of capital means. 
Rich countries like ours should be lending money to developing countries, 
providing them with the means to build up their capital stock and 
infrastructure while they use their own resources to meet their people’s 
basic needs.  
This wasn’t just theory. That story accurately described much of 
the developing world, especially Asia, through the 1990s. Countries like 
Indonesia and Malaysia were experiencing rapid annual growth of 7.8 
percent and 9.6 percent, respectively, even as they ran large trade deficits, 
just over 2 percent of GDP each year in Indonesia and almost 5 percent in 
Malaysia.  
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These trade deficits probably were excessive, and a crisis of 
confidence hit East Asia and much of the developing world in the summer 
of 1997. The inflow of capital from rich countries slowed or reversed, 
making it impossible for the developing countries to sustain the fixed 
exchange rates most had at the time. One after another, they were forced 
to abandon their fixed exchange rates and turn to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for help. 
Rather than promulgating policies that would allow developing 
countries to continue the textbook development path of growth driven by 
importing capital and running trade deficits, the IMF made debt 
repayment a top priority. The bailout, under the direction of the Clinton 
administration Treasury Department, required developing countries to 
switch to large trade surpluses (Radelet and Sachs 2000, O’Neil 1999). 
The countries of East Asia would be far richer today had they been 
allowed to continue on the growth path of the early and mid-1990s, when 
they had large trade deficits (Figure 1-2). Four of the five would be more 
than twice as rich, and the fifth, Vietnam, would be almost 50 percent 
richer. South Korea and Malaysia would have higher per capita incomes 
today than the United States.  
In the wake of the East Asia bailout, countries throughout the 
developing world decided they had to build up reserves of foreign 
exchange, primarily dollars, in order to avoid ever facing the same harsh 
bailout terms as the countries of East Asia. Building up reserves meant 
running large trade surpluses, and it is no coincidence that the U.S. trade 
deficit has exploded, rising from just over 1 percent of GDP in 1996 to 
almost 6 percent in 2005. The rise has coincided with the loss of more 
than 3 million manufacturing jobs, roughly 20 percent of employment in 
the sector. 
There was no reason the textbook growth pattern of the 1990s 
could not have continued. It wasn’t the laws of economics that forced 
developing countries to take a different path, it was the failed bailout and 
the international financial system. It would seem that the enemy of the 
world’s poor is not Bernie Sanders but rather the engineers of our current 
globalization policies.  
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FIGURE 1-2 
Per capita income of East Asian countries, actual vs. continuing 
on 1990s growth path  
 
Source and notes: IMF (2016) and author's calculations. 
 
There is a further point in this story that is generally missed: it is 
not only the volume of trade flows that is determined by policy, but also 
the content. A major push in recent trade deals has been to require 
stronger and longer patent and copyright protection. Paying the fees 
imposed by these terms, especially for prescription drugs, is a huge burden 
on the developing world. Bill Clinton would have much less need to fly 
around the world for the Clinton Foundation had he not inserted the 
TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) provisions 
in the World Trade Organization (WTO) that require developing 
countries to adopt U.S.-style patent protections. Generic drugs are almost 
always cheap — patent protection makes drugs expensive. The cancer and 
hepatitis drugs that sell for tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars a year 
would sell for a few hundred dollars in a free market. Cheap drugs would 
be more widely available had the developed world not forced TRIPS on 
the developing world. 
Of course, we have to pay for the research to develop new drugs 
or any innovation. We also have to compensate creative workers who 
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produce music, movies, and books. But there are efficient alternatives to 
patents and copyrights, and the efforts by the elites in the United States 
and other wealthy countries to impose these relics on the developing 
world is just a mechanism for redistributing income from the world’s poor 
to Pfizer, Microsoft, and Disney. Stronger and longer patent and copyright 
protection is not a necessary feature of a 21st century economy.  
In textbook trade theory, if a country has a larger trade surplus on 
payments for royalties and patent licensing fees, it will have a larger trade 
deficit in manufactured goods and other areas. The reason is that, in 
theory, the trade balance is fixed by national savings and investment, not 
by the ability of a country to export in a particular area. If the trade deficit 
is effectively fixed by these macroeconomic factors, then more exports in 
one area mean fewer exports in other areas. Put another way, income 
gains for Pfizer and Disney translate into lost jobs for workers in the steel 
and auto industries. 
The conventional story is that we lose manufacturing jobs to 
developing countries because they have hundreds of millions of people 
willing to do factory work at a fraction of the pay of manufacturing 
workers in the United States. This is true, but developing countries also 
have tens of millions of smart and ambitious people willing to work as 
doctors and lawyers in the United States at a fraction of the pay of the ones 
we have now. 
Gains from trade work the same with doctors and lawyers as they 
do with textiles and steel. Our consumers would save hundreds of billions 
a year if we could hire professionals from developing countries and pay 
them salaries that are substantially less than what we pay our professionals 
now. The reason we import manufactured goods and not doctors is that 
we have designed the rules of trade that way. We deliberately write trade 
pacts to make it as easy as possible for U.S. companies to set up 
manufacturing operations abroad and ship the products back to the United 
States, but we have done little or nothing to remove the obstacles that 
professionals from other countries face in trying to work in the United 
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States. The reason is simple: doctors and lawyers have more political 
power than autoworkers.4  
In short, there is no truth to the story that the job loss and wage 
stagnation faced by manufacturing workers in the United States and other 
wealthy countries was a necessary price for reducing poverty in the 
developing world. 5 This is a fiction that is used to justify the upward 
redistribution of income in rich countries. After all, it is pretty selfish for 
autoworkers and textile workers in rich countries to begrudge hungry 
people in Africa and Asia and the means to secure food, clothing, and 
shelter.  
The other aspect of this story that deserves mention is the nature 
of the jobs to which our supposedly selfish workers feel entitled. The 
manufacturing jobs that are being lost to the developing world pay in the 
range of $15 to $30 an hour, with the vast majority closer to the bottom 
figure than the top. The average hourly wage for production and 
nonsupervisory workers in manufacturing in 2015 was just under $20 an 
hour, or about $40,000 a year. While a person earning $40,000 is doing 
much better than a subsistence farmer in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is difficult 
to see this worker as especially privileged. 
By contrast, many of the people remarking on the narrow-
mindedness and sense of entitlement of manufacturing workers earn 
comfortable six-figure salaries. Senior writers and editors at network news 
shows or at The New York Times and The Washington Post feel entitled to their 
pay because they feel they have the education and skills to be successful in 
a rapidly changing global economy.  
4  For those worried about brain drain from developing countries, there is an easy fix. 
Economists like to talk about taxing the winners, in this case developing country 
professionals and rich country consumers, to compensate the losers, which would be 
the home countries of the migrating professionals. We could tax a portion of the 
professionals’ pay to allow their home countries to train two or three professionals 
for every one that came to the United States. This is a classic win-win from trade. 
5  The loss of manufacturing jobs also reduced the wages of less-educated workers 
(those without college degrees) more generally. The displaced manufacturing 
workers crowded into retail and other service sectors, putting downward pressure 
on wages there.  
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These are the sort of people who consider it a sacrifice to work at 
a high-level government job for $150,000 to $200,000 a year. For 
example, Timothy Geithner, President Obama’s first Treasury Secretary, 
often boasts about his choice to work for various government agencies 
rather than earn big bucks in the private sector. His sacrifice included a 
stint as president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York that paid 
$415,000 a year. 6 This level of pay put Geithner well into the top 1 
percent of wage earners.  
Geithner’s comments about his sacrifices in public service did not 
elicit any outcry from the media at the time because his perspective was 
widely shared. The implicit assumption is that the sort of person who is 
working at a high level government job could easily be earning a paycheck 
that is many times higher if they were employed elsewhere. In fact, this is 
often true. When he left his job as Treasury Secretary, Geithner took a 
position with a private equity company where his salary is likely several 
million dollars a year.  
Not everyone who was complaining about entitled manufacturing 
workers was earning as much as Timothy Geithner, but it is a safe bet that 
the average critic was earning far more than the average manufacturing 
worker — and certainly far more than the average displaced 
manufacturing worker.  
 
Turning the debate right-side up: Markets are structured 
 
The perverse nature of the debate over a trade policy that would 
have the audacity to benefit workers in rich countries is a great example of 
how we accept as givens not just markets themselves but also the policies 
that structure markets. If we accept it as a fact of nature that poor 
countries cannot borrow from rich countries to finance their 
development, and that they can only export manufactured goods, then 
6  As a technical matter, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is a private bank. It is 
owned by the banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System in the New 
York District.  
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their growth will depend on displacing manufacturing workers in the 
United States and other rich countries.  
It is absurd to narrow the policy choices in this way, yet the 
centrists and conservatives who support the upward redistribution of the 
last four decades have been extremely successful in doing just that, and 
progressives have largely let them set the terms of the debate. 
Markets are never just given. Neither God nor nature hands us a 
worked-out set of rules determining the way property relations are 
defined, contracts are enforced, or macroeconomic policy is 
implemented. These matters are determined by policy choices. The elites 
have written these rules to redistribute income upward. Needless to say, 
they are not eager to have the rules rewritten — which means they also 
have no interest in even having them discussed. 
But for progressive change to succeed, these rules must be 
addressed. While modest tweaks to tax and transfer policies can 
ameliorate the harm done by a regressive market structure, their effect 
will be limited. The complaint of conservatives — that tampering with 
market outcomes leads to inefficiencies and unintended outcomes — is 
largely correct, even if they may exaggerate the size of the distortions 
from policy interventions. Rather than tinker with badly designed rules, it 
is far more important to rewrite the rules so that markets lead to 
progressive and productive outcomes in which the benefits of economic 
growth and improving technology are broadly shared.  
This book examines five broad areas where the rules now in place 
tend to redistribute income upward and where alternative rules can lead 
to more equitable outcomes and a more efficient market: 
1) Macroeconomic policies determining levels of employment and 
output. 
2) Financial regulation and the structure of financial markets. 
3) Patent and copyright monopolies and alternative mechanisms for 
financing innovation and creative work. 
10 Dean Baker 
 
4) Pay of chief executive officers (CEOs) and corporate governance 
structures. 
5) Protections for highly paid professionals, such as doctors and 
lawyers. 
 
In each of these areas, it is possible to identify policy choices that 
have engineered the upward redistribution of the last four decades.  
In the case of macroeconomic policy, the United States and other 
wealthy countries have explicitly adopted policies that focus on 
maintaining low rates of inflation. Central banks are quick to raise interest 
rates at the first sign of rising inflation and sometimes even before. Higher 
interest rates slow inflation by reducing demand, thereby reducing job 
growth, and reduced job growth weakens workers’ bargaining power and 
puts downward pressure on wages. In other words, the commitment to an 
anti-inflation policy is a commitment by the government, acting through 
central banks, to keep wages down. It should not be surprising that this 
policy has the effect of redistributing income upward. 
The changing structure of financial regulation and financial 
markets has also been an important factor in redistributing income 
upward. This is a case where an industry has undergone very rapid change 
as a result of technological innovation. Information technology has hugely 
reduced the cost of financial transactions and allowed for the development 
of an array of derivative instruments that would have been unimaginable 
four decades ago. Rather than modernizing regulation to ensure that these 
technologies allow the financial sector to better serve the productive 
economy, the United States and other countries have largely structured 
regulations to allow a tiny group of bankers and hedge fund and private 
equity fund managers to become incredibly rich.  
This changed structure of regulation over the last four decades 
was not “deregulation,” as is often claimed. Almost no proponent of 
deregulation argued against the bailouts that saved Wall Street in the 
financial crisis or against the elimination of government deposit insurance 
that is an essential part of a stable banking system. Rather, they advocated 
a system in which the rules restricting their ability to profit were 
Rigged 11 
 
eliminated, while the insurance provided by the Federal Reserve Board, 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and other arms of the 
government were left in place. The position of “deregulators” effectively 
amounted to arguing that they should not have to pay for the insurance 
they were receiving. 
The third area in which the rules have been written to ensure an 
upward redistribution is patent and copyright protection. Over the last 
four decades these protections have been made stronger and longer. In the 
case of both patent and copyright, the duration of the monopoly period has 
been extended. In addition, these monopolies have been applied to new 
areas. Patents can now be applied to life forms, business methods, and 
software. Copyrights have been extended to cover digitally produced 
material as well as the Internet. Penalties for infringement have been 
increased and the United States has vigorously pursued their application in 
other countries through trade agreements and diplomatic pressure.  
Government-granted monopolies are not facts of nature, and 
there are alternative mechanisms for financing innovation and creative 
work. Direct government funding, as opposed to government granted 
monopolies, is one obvious alternative. For example, the government 
spends more than $30 billion a year on biomedical research through the 
National Institutes of Health — money that all parties agree is very well 
spent. There are also other possible mechanisms. It is likely that these 
alternatives are more efficient than the current patent and copyright 
system, in large part because they would be more market-oriented. And, 
they would likely lead to less upward redistribution than the current 
system.  
The CEOs who are paid tens of millions a year would like the 
public to think that the market is simply compensating them for their 
extraordinary skills. A more realistic story is that a broken corporate 
governance process gives corporate boards of directors — the people who 
largely determine CEO pay — little incentive to hold down pay. 
Directors are more closely tied to top management than to the 
shareholders they are supposed to represent, and their positions are 
lucrative, usually paying six figures for very part-time work. Directors are 
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almost never voted out by shareholders for their lack of attention to the 
job or for incompetence. 
The market discipline that holds down the pay of ordinary 
workers does not apply to CEOs, since their friends determine their pay. 
And a director has little incentive to pick a fight with fellow directors or 
top management by asking a simple question like, “Can we get a CEO just 
as good for half the pay?” This privilege matters not just for CEOs; it has 
the spillover effect of raising the pay of other top managers in the 
corporate sector and putting upward pressure on the salaries of top 
management in universities, hospitals, private charities, and other 
nonprofits.  
Reformed corporate governance structures could empower 
shareholders to contain the pay of their top-level employees. Suppose 
directors could count on boosts in their own pay if they cut the pay of top 
management without hurting profitability. With this sort of policy change, 
CEOs and top management might start to experience some of the 
downward wage pressure that existing policies have made routine for 
typical workers.  
This is very much not a story of the natural workings of the 
market. Corporations are a legal entity created by the government, which 
also sets the rules of corporate governance. Current law includes a lengthy 
set of restrictions on corporate governance practices. It is easy to envision 
rules that would make it less likely for CEOs to earn such outlandish 
paychecks by making it easier for shareholders to curb excessive pay.  
Finally, government policies strongly promote the upward 
redistribution of income for highly paid professionals by protecting them 
from competition. To protect physicians and specialists, we restrict the 
ability of nurse practitioners or physician assistants to perform tasks for 
which they are entirely competent. We require lawyers for work that 
paralegals are capable of completing. While trade agreements go far to 
remove any obstacle that might protect an autoworker in the United States 
from competition with a low-paid factory worker in Mexico or China, 
they do little or nothing to reduce the barriers that protect doctors, 
dentists, and lawyers from the same sort of competition. To practice 
medicine in the United States, it is still necessary to complete a residency 
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program here, as though there were no other way for a person to become 
a competent doctor.  
We also have done little to foster medical travel. This could lead 
to enormous benefits to patients and the economy, since many high-cost 
medical procedures can be performed at a fifth or even one-tenth the U.S. 
price in top quality medical facilities elsewhere in the world. In this 
context, it is not surprising that the median pay of physicians is over 
$250,000 a year and some areas of specialization earn close to twice this 
amount. In the case of physicians alone if pay were reduced to Western 
European-levels, the savings would be close to $100 billion a year (@ 0.6 
percent of GDP). 
Changing the rules in these five areas could reduce much and 
possibly all of the upward redistribution of the last four decades. But 
changing the rules does not mean using government intervention to curb 
the market. It means restructuring the market to produce different 
outcomes. The purpose of this book is to show how. 
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Chapter 2 
The Landscape of Inequality 
Before getting into the specifics of these five areas it is worth 
reviewing some the basic facts about recent trends in inequality and also 
some simple economics. As Figure 2-1 shows, the share of income 
(without capital gains) going to the top 1 percent of tax filers was 
relatively stable between 1950 and 1980, starting out at 11.4 percent and 
bottoming out at 7.7 percent in 1973. It then turns around and begins to 
climb — 8.2 percent in 1980, 13.0 percent in 1990, 16.5 percent in 
2000, and 18.3 percent in 2007, just before the downturn. It has 
remained more or less at this plateau since 2008.7 
This means that the share of the 1 percent has more than doubled 
from its level during most of the period of the 1950s to 1980. Measured as 
a share of total income, this increase is roughly 10.0 percentage points. 
This would be sufficient to increase the income of everyone in the bottom 
7  The modest jump to 18.9 percent in 2012 is due to the tax increase put in place in 
2013. Many high-income earners arranged to have income show up in 2012 rather 
than 2013 so that they would pay a lower tax rate on it. This shifting also explains 
the drop in the 1 percent’s share in 2013, since some income from that year showed 
up in 2012. 
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90 percent of the income distribution by more than 20 percent. It would 
be almost enough to double the income of the bottom 40 percent. In 
short, this upward redistribution has had a substantial impact on the living 
standards of the rest of the population. 
 
FIGURE 2-1 
Income share of the top 1 percent  
 
Source and notes: Piketty and Saez (2016). 
 
The story is high-end wages, not profits 
 
There is a basic misconception about the pattern of rising 
inequality of the last four decades that is important to correct. The rise we 
have seen in the United States over this period is almost entirely a story of 
growing wage inequality. No shift from wage income to profits or other 
forms of capital income occurred until the Great Recession, and, while 
there have been substantial cyclical fluctuations, there has been no clear 
upward trend in the share of profits in corporate income from the mid-
1970s, as shown in Figure 2-2. The capital share does increase in the 
years of the housing bubble, but this rise was largely driven by an 
extraordinary increase in profit in the financial sector, much of which 
disappeared in the crash, when the mortgages issued lost much of their 
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value. In any case, the vast majority of the rise in the income share of the 
top 1 percent preceded this rise in the profit share, so it cannot be the 
explanation. The fact that the capital share of income, which 
disproportionately flows to the 1 percent, has stood at an unusually high 
level in the years since the crash while the income share of the top 1 
percent has remained stable raises the possibility that part of the upward 
redistribution in wage income had been reversed. But at this point it is too 
early to know. In any case, a shift in the profit share back to pre-recession 
levels as a result of tighter labor markets would certainly be good news for 
ordinary workers. 
 
FIGURE 2-2 
Capital share of corporate income  
 
Source and notes: BEA (2016). 
 
A likely reason for the misconception that the upward distribution 
of income is the result of a growing profit share is the news about 
relatively new companies, like Google (now Alphabet) and Facebook, 
becoming hugely profitable in a short period. However, the profits of 
these companies have primarily come at the expense of older, more 
established companies, not from workers’ wages.  
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The public debate has also likely been skewed by Thomas 
Piketty’s important and influential book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century. 
While there is a vast amount of useful data in this work, its explanation for 
inequality is not applicable to the United States, where rising income 
inequality is not associated with a greater capital share in national income.8 
To find the origins of rising inequality in the United States, we have to 
look to the factors that led to huge paychecks for CEOs, Wall Street 
traders, and other high-end earners, and it is not a story of corporate 
profits rising at the expense of wages.  
There is a second important issue that comes directly out of this 
point about the profit share not rising at the expense of wages. It implies 
that the conditions of competition have not changed in any fundamental 
way over this period. Due to competition, the reductions in pay seen by 
middle and lower income workers were for the most part passed on in 
lower prices, not pocketed by companies as higher profits. This means that 
if the pay of high-end earners is reduced, the cost savings will be passed on 
in lower prices in 2016, in pretty much the same way as would have been 
the case in 1976. It also means that real wages will rise for those workers 
at the middle and bottom of the income ladder who do not see their pay 
cut since the items they buy will cost less.  
 
Their money is our money 
 
The defenders of the status quo benefit enormously by the 
selective use of standard economics. For example, it is standard economics 
that generates the classic gains from trade story in which countries benefit 
8  The situation is somewhat different in Western Europe, which has seen more of a 
shift from labor income to capital income. Piketty intended his work to be a general 
theory of capitalist development, so the different experience of European countries 
is important for his thesis. Nonetheless, a theory that explains rising inequality 
through increasing shares of income going to capital is not appropriate as an 
explanation of trends in the United States over the last four decades. The one 
exception, which does not especially help Piketty’s case, is that there has been a 
notable rise in rental income as a share of national income throughout this period. 
This is primarily owners’ equivalent rent, the imputed value of rent for owner-
occupied housing. 
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on average from reducing trade barriers. Such a story may not be 
immediately obvious, since it is not apparent that the United States 
benefits when it loses large numbers of jobs to imports, but economic 
theory can be used to show that the country will benefit from removing 
trade barriers. Economists and columnists who are happy to cite economic 
theory when they push the benefits of trade deals tend to ignore the fact 
that the assumed benefits depend on full employment, and that all groups 
do not necessarily benefit.  
Standard economics is less likely to be invoked when the 
implications point in the opposite direction. For example, we almost 
never hear any discussion of the costs of patent and copyright monopolies, 
although these costs are almost definitional. If a drug would sell for $20 
per prescription in a free market but instead sells for $200 because of 
patent protection, there are costs associated with that protection.  
A basic point of economic theory that economists don’t like to 
talk about is that reducing the rents going to a high-income person is a gain 
for the rest of us. This is a crucial point, since it is necessary to recognize 
that policies designed to reduce the incomes of high-end earners are not 
just a matter of being gratuitously nasty to those who were lucky enough 
to be successful. Whether or not these policies are nasty, it is important to 
recognize that the money enjoyed by these high-end earners comes from 
somewhere; it is not manna from heaven. And where it comes from is the 
pockets of the rest of us. 
Imagine a person who has a huge annual income without doing any 
productive work. He is an extremely successful counterfeiter, supporting 
himself by printing $1 billion a year in high-quality counterfeit bills. No 
one recognizes the bills are counterfeit, and so he can spend this money in 
the same way as anyone else. At first glance, we might be inclined to think 
this counterfeiter is an asset to the economy. After all, he spends his 
money employing people to build and maintain his house and grounds. He 
provides jobs when he buys cars, boats, and other consumption goods or 
eats lavish meals at expensive restaurants. Perhaps he even starts a 
foundation that helps to finance children’s health care or other useful 
ventures. This counterfeiter looks like a great job creator and a socially 
minded person who gives poor children a chance.  
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If this story made sense then the best economic policy would be to 
train people to become effective counterfeiters. But it doesn’t make sense; 
there is a big problem in this picture.9 With his money, the counterfeiter 
is diverting resources that would have otherwise been available to the rest 
of us. The classic story would be that the counterfeiter is bidding up wages 
and the prices of various goods and services that are in short supply. This 
would lead to inflation. The Federal Reserve Board would then respond to 
this inflation by raising interest rates. Higher interest rates would reduce 
demand for housing and discourage investment and consumption. If we 
take the classic story strictly, the increased spending by our counterfeiter 
would be fully offset by reductions in other spending elsewhere in the 
economy. Our counterfeiter has effectively found a way to tax the rest of 
us with his fake bills. 
Keep the counterfeiter in mind when assessing any argument 
about the rents earned by CEOs, Wall Street traders, and other high-end 
earners. If these people actually contribute an amount of output equal to 
their earnings, then they are not pulling resources from the rest of us. In 
other words, if individual CEOs or Wall Street traders actually add $30 
million to the economy with their work, then we have additional output 
that corresponds to their $30 million annual income. They may even add 
more than $30 million to the economy, effectively making the rest of us 
wealthier. However, if they add less than $30 million, then their income 
comes to some extent at the expense of the rest of us. In the extreme case, 
where the highly paid CEO or Wall Street trader adds nothing to the 
economy’s output, they are in an identical situation to the counterfeiter. 
Their income is a pure drain on the economy, which must come out of the 
pockets of the rest of us. 
9  Actually, there is an important exception. When the economy is below full 
employment then our counterfeiter would be doing a public service. In that 
situation, we need increased demand in the economy. Ideally, the government 
would take responsibility for boosting demand and would increase spending in areas 
like infrastructure and education that provide benefits to the country as a whole. But 
if the government was unwilling to take steps to boost demand, then the 
counterfeiter would be providing a public service. His personal spending patterns 
may not be the best way to boost demand and create jobs, but it does have this 
positive effect. 
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As a practical matter, most high-end earners are probably not like 
the counterfeiter who does nothing productive, but insofar as they are paid 
more than is necessary for their services, their excess pay does come at the 
expense of the rest of us. This means that if a CEO is paid $30 million, but 
someone else would do as good a job for one half or one third of the pay, 
then the rest of us are effectively subsidizing this person’s pay. The 
channels through which the money goes from the rest of us to the high-end 
earners may not always be clear, but their good fortune nonetheless 
imposes a cost on the rest of us. 
The route through which the wealthy see the benefits from this 
redistribution is crystal clear, and, perversely, that clarity aids their 
argument. A company that presses its workers for lower wages knows that 
it will see benefits in higher profits and more money for its higher-end 
employees. A drug or entertainment company pushing for stronger and 
longer patent and copyright protection will receive higher profits. Doctors 
and dentists who insist on protectionist measures that limit competition 
will receive higher pay. It is generally less clear to ordinary workers that 
they stand to gain by measures that limit the incomes of those at the top. 
They may see such efforts as vindictive, rather than as an essential part of a 
policy to reduce inequality.  
If the high-end earners have enough market power to protect their 
income, then direct efforts to boost the incomes of those at the middle and 
bottom will ultimately prove largely futile by exactly the logic described 
above. Suppose that the CEOs, Wall Street traders, highly paid medical 
specialists and the rest are able to fully protect their income against any 
increase in prices. (In other words, their pay increases by enough to fully 
offset any additional expenses they must pay to sustain their standard of 
living.) Imagine in this case that unions are able to successfully add another 
10 percent of the workforce to their ranks and then push up wages for this 
big chunk of the workforce. Other things equal, this will lead to higher 
prices and therefore higher inflation. If the Fed is committed to an anti-
inflation policy, it will raise interest rates sharply. This will push people 
out of work and put downward pressure on the wages of a large segment 
of the workforce. 
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It is possible that newly unionized workers end up better off in 
this story, but that will not be the case for low- and middle-income 
workers generally. Insofar as the unionized workers benefit, it will be at 
the expense of other comparably situated workers. That is, unless there is 
an actual cut in the income of those at the top. For this reason, pushing 
down the incomes of the rich is not a question of vindictiveness; it is a 
necessary condition for creating the possibility of broadly based wage 
growth.  
If doctors, lawyers, CEOs, and Wall Street-types are paid less, 
then we should see lower prices for a wide range of goods and services. 
And this means higher real wages. It is every bit as good for a worker if the 
prices of the goods and services they buy each month fall by 10 percent as 
if they got a 10 percent boost in the size of their monthly paycheck. While 
the benefits from reducing the rents going to the rich are unlikely to be 
this dramatic (at least over any short period of time), if the annual pay of 
high-end earners is reduced by several hundred billion dollars, this will 
translate into several hundred billion dollars in the pockets of ordinary 
workers, whether it comes in the form of higher wages or lower prices.  
 
Really big numbers and the food stamp metric 
 
One way in which the news media complicate economic debates is 
by using large numbers without providing context. This issue comes up in 
most policy areas but likely has the greatest relevance in budget debates. 
The United States is a huge country with more than 320 million people, 
and as a result its government has a huge budget, at least in terms of the 
amount of money that ordinary people see in their daily lives. This means 
that when we hear that the federal government is spending, say, $17 
billion a year on Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the 
core government welfare program, we are likely to think it’s a great deal 
of money.10 After all, none of us will see $17 billion in our lifetime or 
anything remotely close to this sum.  
10  Data on recent trends in TANF spending can be found in CBO (2015a). 
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This could lead people to believe that TANF is a large portion of 
the federal budget. This belief would lead people to think that spending on 
TANF beneficiaries was a major part of their tax burden. It might also lead 
them to think that beneficiaries were receiving large amounts of money. 
These mistaken views could cause people to both resent the program as a 
source of strain on their own pocketbooks and to resent TANF recipients 
as being the beneficiaries of an overly generous program. 
In fact, the $17 billion spent on TANF each year is less than 0.4 
percent of the federal budget. Ending the program entirely would have 
only a trivial impact on the overall budget situation. It certainly would not 
provide enough savings to finance any substantial reduction in taxes. 
Furthermore, the average benefit of less than $500 a month would not 
likely fit anyone’s definition of generous.  
But few news listeners are aware of these facts. Polls consistently 
show that the public grossly overestimates the amount of money that goes 
to TANF and other programs that benefit the poor both in the United 
States and around the world. For example, a 2013 poll found that on 
average respondents thought that 28 percent of the budget went to foreign 
aid (Kaiser Family Foundation 2013). The actual figure is closer to 1.0 
percent.  
The media’s pattern of reporting is likely a major factor behind 
this misunderstanding, and it could be easily countered if reporters made 
it a standard practice to put huge numbers in a context that is 
understandable to their audience. The most obvious way would be to 
report the number as a share of the budget. In the case of TANF, if people 
continually heard it reported as 0.4 percent of the federal budget it is 
unlikely they would believe the program was a major factor in their tax 
bill. It could also be reported as a per person number ($80 per taxpayer 
per year) or as a share of the economy (0.1 percent of GDP).11 There are 
11  Probably some of the exaggerations on the size of the budget devoted to TANF or 
other programs helping poor people stem from a racist desire to blame the poor, 
who are disproportionately minorities, for the country’s problems. However, the 
percentage of people in polls who seriously overestimate the relative importance of 
these programs is far larger than the percentage that could plausibly be directly 
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many other ways in which this spending level could be expressed, but the 
point would be to put it in a context that is meaningful to readers. There 
is no one who will try to contend that $17 billion is a meaningful number 
to even the relatively well-educated readers of The New York Times or The 
Wall Street Journal. Yet reporters and editors continue to do budget 
reporting as though they were carrying through a fraternity ritual instead 
of trying to inform their audience.12  
The goal of this book is to provide information, and to advance 
this cause we will on occasion make reference to the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) metric. SNAP, more commonly 
known as food stamps, is the federal government’s largest anti-poverty 
program.13 Roughly 45 million people received benefits in 2015, and the 
average benefit per person is $127 per month or just over $1,500 per 
year. The government is projected to spend $75 billion on SNAP in 2016, 
or 1.9 percent of the budget (CBO 2016). Expressed as a share of GDP, 
the SNAP budget is roughly 0.4 percent.  
SNAP is a well-run and important program. The vast majority of 
the beneficiaries are children, seniors, or disabled people. It provides a 
modest but important supplement to family income that has helped tens of 
millions of people through difficult times. Since the program has been in 
the news frequently in recent years (often as a target of conservative 
budget cutters), it can provide a useful point of comparison for the sums 
mentioned in subsequent chapters. Comparisons to the size of the whole 
economy provide some context, but may still not be useful in informing 
readers how important the savings are from eliminating waste in the 
driven by racist views. In fact, given the overall support for these programs, many of 
the people who have exaggerated views of their size must nonetheless support them. 
12  Margaret Sullivan, the former public editor of The New York Times, took the paper to 
task for reporting large numbers without any context. She convinced David 
Leonhardt, then the Washington editor, that reporting numbers in context should 
be standard practice at the Times (Sullivan 2013). Unfortunately, it seems that little 
has changed. It is still possible to read articles on the budget and other topics in 
which numbers are expressed in a way that will be meaningless to the vast majority 
of Times readers.  
13  These data come from Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2016), which offers a 
fuller description of the program.  
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financial sector or from selling prescription drugs in a free market. Using 
spending on food stamps as a point of reference will allow readers to see 
how large prospective savings are relative to an important program that is 
often in the news.  
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Chapter 3 
The Macroeconomics of Upward 
Redistribution 
Many economists like to think that the distribution of income 
within society is independent of macroeconomic phenomena like 
unemployment and recessions. Part of the rationale for this view is that 
economists generally think of the economy as being near its full-
employment level of output most of the time. While economists recognize 
that the economy experiences recessions, these are usually thought to be 
relatively mild and followed by a quick bounce back to its full-
employment level of output.  
Another reason why economists like to think of distribution of 
income as independent of the level of output is that this view works out 
nicely with the morality stories people like to tell. The standard story is 
that the market has a certain naturalness through which people get paid 
based on their marginal product. If the market distributes income based on 
how productive people are, then we have a basis for distributing income 
that is independent of political decisions or moral judgments. We may 
choose to alter this distribution, for example, because we think the poor 
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have too little and the rich have too much, but the market distribution 
provides the initial point of reference. 
However, if the market distribution is indeed dependent on 
macroeconomic factors, like how close the economy is to its full-
employment level of output, then we lose this independent point of 
reference. The distribution of income is then dependent on 
macroeconomic policies that determine the nearness to full employment. 
The market distribution is then inherently a function of policy decisions — 
there is no independent point of reference. For someone steeped in 
traditional economics, this is equivalent to a true believer discovering 
there is no God. 
  
Full employment and income distribution: there is a connection 
 
There is a great deal of evidence that employment levels make a 
huge difference for income distribution. At the most basic level we know 
that minorities and those at the bottom of the income distribution suffer 
disproportionately from periods of high unemployment. By implication, 
they benefit disproportionately from periods of low unemployment. 
For example, the unemployment rate for blacks is consistently 
twice the unemployment rate for whites. In the first six months of 2016, 
when the unemployment for whites averaged 4.3 percent, the 
unemployment rate for blacks averaged 8.7 percent. In 2000, when the 
white unemployment rate averaged 3.5 percent, the black unemployment 
rate averaged 7.6 percent. Given this 2-to-1 relationship, if we can lower 
the unemployment rate for white workers by 1 percentage point we can 
count on lowering the unemployment rate for black workers by 2 
percentage points (Figure 3-1). 
The relationship between the white unemployment rate and the 
unemployment rate for black teens is even more striking. This ratio tends 
to be in the range of 6-to-1, although it moves around. Back in 2010, in 
the immediate aftermath of the Great Recession, when the white 
unemployment rate was peaking at 9.2 percent, the unemployment rate 
for black teens was almost 49.0 percent. In the first six months of 2016 
the rate for black teens averaged 26.3 percent. Though still a horrible 
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unemployment rate, it is a huge improvement from six years prior. To 
make this point more clearly, the employment rate for black teens — the 
percentage of black teens who have jobs — was just 14.5 percent in 2010 
but was 21.5 percent in the first six months of 2016. This means that black 
teens were almost 50 percent more likely to have jobs in the first half of 
2016 than they were in 2010. As a practical matter it is difficult to 
envision a social program that would have the same effect on the career 
and life prospects of young blacks as increasing their probability of getting 
a job by 50 percent. 
 
FIGURE 3-1 
Black and white unemployment rates, 1972–2016
 
Source and notes: BLS (2016a). Shaded areas represent recessions. 
 
The story is similar for other disadvantaged groups. The 
unemployment rate for workers without high school degrees was 14.9 
percent in 2010. For workers with just high school degrees it was 10.3 
percent. In the first half of 2016, the unemployment rate for workers 
without high school degrees had fallen to 7.4 percent, a drop of 7.5 
percentage points. For workers with just high school degrees it was 5.3 
percent, decline of 5.0 percentage points.  
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The logic of this relationship is pretty simple. When times are 
slow, employers tend to lay off manufacturing workers, retail workers, 
and custodians; they are slow to lay off senior management. Similarly, 
many professionals, like doctors and lawyers, are largely insulated from 
the effects of the business cycle. And the higher unemployment rates 
experienced by more disadvantaged groups in cyclical downturns are 
associated with a weak labor market more generally. This means that these 
workers are less well positioned to receive pay increases in periods of high 
unemployment.  
The only time in the last four decades in which workers at the 
middle and bottom of the wage distribution saw consistent gains in real 
wages was the period of low unemployment in the 1990s boom (Figure 
3-2).  
 
FIGURE 3-2 
Percent change in real hourly wages  
 
Source and notes: Economic Policy Institute (2012). 
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people who are otherwise disadvantaged is difficult to deny, as is the 
implication that a stronger economy will disproportionately benefit those 
who are less well off. However, it is necessary to carry this argument a 
step further in order to destroy the illusions of those who want to believe 
that we are arguing about whether the government should intervene in the 
economy or simply let the market do its work.  
The problem with this framing is that the second option does not 
exist. There is no scenario in which the market works alone. Government 
policies will affect the level of output in the economy. The only question is 
whether we want to design these policies explicitly to meet certain goals 
or if we want to pretend we don’t notice the impact of the policies we 
have put in place. Regardless of what we might decide about how fiscal 
and monetary policy can boost or slow the economy, government policy is 
playing an enormous role in determining the economy’s level of demand. 
We can start by looking at simple patterns of consumption in the 
marketplace, how they are affected by redistribution. We know that 
middle- and low-income people tend to spend a higher share of their 
income than high-income people. So if income is redistributed upward, 
other things equal, we will see less consumption in the economy. A paper 
from the IMF noted the upward redistribution of the last four decades and, 
based on differences in propensities to consume, calculated that annual 
consumption is now 3.5 percent lower as a result of the upward 
redistribution of income over the last four decades (Alichi et al. 2016).  
Since consumption is 70 percent of GDP, if taken at face value the 
paper’s findings mean that consumption demand has fallen by roughly 2.5 
percentage points of GDP due to the upward redistribution of income. 
This drop has the same negative effect on demand as a stimulus package 
equal to 2.5 percent of GDP ($460 billion a year in the 2016 economy) 
would have in boosting demand. It is a serious drag on the economy.  
Before the 2008 crash, economists generally believed that reduced 
consumption would quickly translate into increased investment and/or 
increased net exports. Fewer economists hold this view today. Instead, 
reduced consumption is likely to mean reduced demand, output, and 
employment, barring some offsetting factor. (One potential offsetting 
factor would be an asset bubble, such as the stock bubble in the 1990s or 
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the housing bubble in the 2000s. But asset bubbles are not a recipe for 
stable growth; see Baker (2008).)  
The implication of these consumption patterns is that the U.S. 
economy is likely to face a persistent shortfall in demand because of the 
upward redistribution of the last four decades. Furthermore, since the 
distribution of income itself depends in part on how close the economy is 
to full employment, there is a risk that the economy could face a 
downward spiral. Weak demand leads to higher unemployment and 
therefore more upward redistribution, which in turn weakens demand 
further.  
This upward redistribution had a variety of causes in deliberate 
policy; it was not a random outcome of market processes. In addition to 
the factors discussed in this book, a variety of other policy measures have 
contributed to the upward redistribution. 
 
Policies to weaken unions 
 
Perhaps the most deliberate policy on the list, since it affected 
almost everything else, was the weakening of labor unions. The National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was established in 1935 to ensure that 
workers’ right to organize was protected and to maintain a balance 
between labor and management. The protections provided by the NLRB, 
along with massive organizing efforts, allowed for an enormous expansion 
of union membership in the 1930s and 1940s. Union membership peaked 
in the mid-1950s at more than 28 percent of the total workforce and 35 
percent of non-agricultural employment (Mayer 2004). It declined slowly 
for the next quarter century and then experienced a much sharper decline 
in the years after 1980, falling from just over 20 percent of total 
employment to just over 11 percent in 2015.  
There were many factors behind this decline, not all of which 
were directly related to policy. For example, the share of employment in 
manufacturing and mining, two of the most heavily unionized sectors in 
the economy in earlier decades, dropped. But policy decisions were key. 
The ability of the NLRB to check abuses by management were always 
limited, and beginning in the late 1970s corporations adopted more 
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aggressive anti-union tactics to prevent unions from organizing at 
workplaces that did not have unions and to undermine unions in 
workplaces that did.14  
Challenging this more aggressive posture from management 
would have required more aggressive enforcement measures by the 
NLRB. Instead, under President Reagan the NLRB went in the opposite 
direction. In addition to being far friendlier toward management in its 
decisions, it also became woefully understaffed, leading to long backlogs 
for cases to be heard. This backlog mattered for organizing drives because 
one of the main powers of the NLRB is its ability to reinstate workers who 
are illegally fired for union organizing. If an employer is able to fire all the 
key workers in an organizing drive and it takes two years for them to have 
their cases heard, the drive is likely to be over by the time the workers are 
reinstated. 
Another big factor undermining the strength of unions has been 
the use of replacement workers as substitutes for strikers, thereby costing 
the strikers their jobs. While hiring replacement workers to replace 
striking workers was always legal, a set of norms had developed around 
labor-management relations in the three decades following World War II 
in which this was rarely done. The standard practice was that companies 
either shut down entirely during a strike or maintained some operations 
with skeletal staff of management personnel. This practice changed 
completely in the 1980s after President Reagan fired striking air traffic 
controllers and replaced them with controllers from the military. While 
Reagan had the legal authority to fire the controllers — federal law 
prohibited strikes by federal employees — up until that time strikes by 
public employees at both the federal and state levels had generally been 
resolved without mass dismissals. But soon many private employers took 
their cue from President Reagan. In the years immediately following the 
air traffic controllers’ strike, several major corporations, such as Eastern 
Airlines and the Greyhound Bus Company, hired replacements for striking 
workers.  
14  For examples of some of these tactics see Levitt (1993). 
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With the threat of termination heightened, the strike became a 
less effective weapon for unions. Going on strike meant not only that 
workers might miss a few days or weeks of pay, it meant that they could 
permanently lose their jobs. As a result, unions were far more hesitant to 
strike, which meant they had less ability to press their demands against 
management. This not only directly hurt workers who were already 
unionized, it made unions appear much weaker to non-members. The 
benefits of joining a union became much less apparent in a context where 
unions were repeatedly forced to make concessions in contracts. 
While unions have declined in importance in all wealthy 
countries, most have not seen as sharp a decline as in the United States. 
Canada provides a counter-example to the inevitability of union decline. 
Canada is similar to the United States in its economy and culture, yet its 
unionization rate has dropped only a few percentage points since the 1970s 
(Warner 2012) and sits at about 30 percent. The different path is 
explained by the fact that policy in Canada remained union-friendly over 
the last four decades, making it easier for unorganized workers to join 
unions and for unions to secure contracts. 
The weakening of unions has an impact beyond just their ability to 
secure gains in compensation and working conditions for their members. 
Union contracts often set standards for an entire sector, as non-union 
firms feel the need to offer comparable terms to their workers both to 
attract and retain good workers and discourage organizing efforts. In 
addition, unions have played a central role in securing a wide range of 
government benefits and worker supports that affect the larger working 
population. For example, unions played a huge role in pushing through the 
Affordable Care Act, even though the vast majority of union members 
already had health insurance. Unions have been central in efforts to raise 
the minimum wage, both nationally and in states and cities across the 
country. And unions have pushed for a variety of measures that make 
workplaces more family friendly, such as paid family leave and paid sick 
days, and for a recent change in overtime rules that extends coverage to 
tens of millions of previously uncovered workers. 
For these reasons, the sharp reduction since the late 1970s in the 
percentage of the workforce that is unionized has meant that workers are 
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far less well-situated to secure their share of the gains from productivity 
growth and keep them from rising up to people like CEOs and hedge fund 
partners. It is worth noting that, while there was some upward 
redistribution of income in Canada over the last four decades, the size of 
the redistribution was not nearly as large as in the United States.  
 
Other institutional factors affecting worker power 
 
The extent to which weak demand in the economy translates into 
higher unemployment and a weaker bargaining position for workers is 
very dependent on the institutional structure. Compared to the United 
States, almost all wealthy countries have more generous unemployment 
insurance systems, providing higher benefits for longer periods of time 
(OECD 2016). As a result, unemployment imposes a much greater 
hardship on workers and their families in the United States. Workers here 
are more desperate to take a new job after being laid off, even if the new 
job pays substantially less than the prior job and/or does not require the 
full use of the skills the worker has developed. If workers are more 
desperate for employment, the downward pressure on wages intensifies.  
There is not necessarily a link between a drop in output and a 
decline in employment. In the Great Recession, Germany experienced a 
steeper drop in output than did the United States — 6.9 percent from the 
first quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009 for Germany compared 
to 3.6 percent in the United States. But while unemployment rose in the 
United States, from 4.7 percent in November 2007 to 10.0 percent in 
October 2009, in Germany it fell, from 8.2 percent to 7.7 percent 
(Figure 3-3). 
The reason for the sharp divergence in labor market experiences is 
that Germany encouraged its employers to reduce work time rather than 
lay off workers in response to a reduction in demand. While there were 
difference across firms, the basic story was that if a company cut back 
workers’ hours by 20 percent, the government would make up 40 percent 
of the loss in pay (8 percent of total pay), the company would make up 40 
percent (8 percent of total pay), and the worker would accept a 4 percent 
pay cut. The basic logic behind this system was that, if the government is 
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willing make up lost pay of workers when they are completely 
unemployed, why not pay workers when they are partially unemployed as 
a result of a reduction in work hours?15 
 
FIGURE 3-3 
Changes in output vs. unemployment, Germany and U.S., 
2007/8–2009 (percentage points) 
 
Source and notes: OECD (2016). GDP from first quarter 2008 to second quarter of 
2009; unemployment rate from November 2007 to October 2009. 
 
This system of work sharing enjoys strong support in Germany 
across the political spectrum. (The government that originally 
implemented it was a coalition government of the Christian Democrats 
and the Social Democrats.) Businesses generally support it, since it allows 
them to keep skilled workers on staff and therefore available to work 
15  Twenty-six states now have work-sharing programs as part of their unemployment 
insurance systems, including several large states like California and New York. 
However, the take-up rate on these programs has been low. Most employers are not 
even aware that support for work sharing exists as an alternative to layoffs. In 
addition, the programs tend to be overly bureaucratic and in many cases have not 
been modernized since they were first put in place at the end of the 1970s or early 
1980s.  
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longer hours when demand picks up. German firms also have used other 
mechanisms to absorb a reduction in demand without laying off workers. 
In addition to having an unemployment insurance system that is 
both ungenerous and encourages layoffs, as a longer run matter we have an 
institutional structure in place that tends to encourage longer hours for 
workers. As a result, insofar as workers get benefits from productivity 
growth, they take them in the form of higher pay rather than more leisure. 
Specifically, because health care insurance is mostly an employment-based 
benefit, rather than universally provided through the government, 
employers typically see it as a fixed cost per worker. So rather than hiring 
additional workers and paying for their health insurance, employers would 
generally prefer their existing workforce to work more hours. The 
preference for longer hours is even greater in cases where employers 
provide defined benefit pensions in addition to health insurance.16  
Of course, the pattern of providing health insurance and pensions 
as employer-provided benefits was the result of government tax and 
regulatory policy that favored employer-based benefits. The result was a 
pattern of employment in which better-paying jobs are more restricted in 
number than would have otherwise been the case. Consider this basic 
arithmetic: if we produced the same number of cars but the average work 
year in the auto industry had 20 percent fewer hours, we would have 25 
percent more people working in the auto industry. The reality will always 
be more complicated, but the basic point is straightforward: for the same 
levels of output, shorter hours mean more workers. 
In other wealthy countries, the average number of work hours in a 
year has fallen sharply over the last four decades. Most countries in 
Western Europe mandate five to six weeks a year of paid vacation. 
Between six months and one year of paid parental leave is standard, as is 
some amount of paid leave for other family reasons. In some countries, the 
standard work week is less than 40 hours. By contrast, in the United States 
16  There is less of an issue of fixed costs in cases where the employers’ contribution for 
health insurance is pro-rated based on the number of hours a worker puts in or based 
on annual pay. While pro-rating benefits is becoming increasingly common, this is a 
relatively new development. Through most of the post-World War II era, pro-
rating benefits was rare.  
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the number of hours in the average work year has changed little over the 
last four decades, due almost certainly in large part to the benefit structure 
that creates substantial per-worker overhead costs. 
As a result of our different histories, workers in the United States 
average considerably more hours each year than workers in Europe. 
According to data from the OECD, the average work year in the United 
States is 1,790 hours, compared to 1,419 hours in the Netherlands, 1,482 
in France, and 1,371 in Germany. If the average work year in the United 
States were comparable to those in Western Europe, more workers would 
be employed at relatively well-paying jobs in sectors like manufacturing, 
construction, and communications instead of being forced to accept 
lower-paying jobs in sectors like retail and restaurants. By reducing the 
supply of workers in the lower-paying sectors, the reduction in average 
hours would lead to higher wages in low-paying sectors for the workers 
who were left behind. In short, it is reasonable to believe that the longer 
average work year in the United States has been a factor contributing to 
inequality.  
 
The role of fiscal policy 
 
These institutional factors, along with other major decisions that 
will be discussed in detail in the next four chapters, show ways in which 
policy has played an important role in determining the distribution of 
income. If in turn the distribution of income plays a major role in 
determining consumption levels, then the upward redistribution of the last 
four decades has been an important factor in weakening aggregate demand 
in the economy. In this context, the idea that the government should not 
intervene in the economy to increase output, but rather leave things to the 
market, makes no sense.  
We live in an interventionist economy, an economy where the 
government has intervened in a variety of ways that have had the effect of 
shifting income upward. If this intervention in turn lowers consumption, 
and therefore output and employment, a policy of “not intervening” is in 
fact a choice to let the earlier interventions go unchallenged. The 
beneficiaries of the upward redistribution may like the outcome, but it is 
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not because they prefer leaving matters to the market. Rather, they prefer 
government interventions that have the effect of giving them more money.  
As a practical matter, it is not even clear what someone can 
possibly mean when they argue that the government should not try to 
affect the economy and instead let the market work itself out. There is a 
large demand for government services, like Social Security, Medicare, 
education, national defense, and infrastructure construction and 
maintenance, which the government must in turn pay for. There is no 
magic process that tells the government how much it should tax to pay for 
the services the public wants. The only reasonable way to set tax (or 
deficit) levels is by reference to the overall state of the economy.  
It is possible to argue that the government should follow some 
arbitrary rule, like maintaining a balanced budget or constant debt-to-
GDP ratio. But picking a rule for fiscal policy is not the same as a policy of 
non-intervention. It just means that the fiscal policy would be determined 
by something other than the immediate needs of the economy. 
It is also worth noting that it is a relatively simple matter to evade 
whatever fiscal rules are put in place. There are many ways to hide 
expenditures, or at least to adjust their timing, in order to comply with a 
fiscal rule.17 Also, assets can be sold to generate revenue in the year in 
which they are sold even if the outcome may be a loss of revenue in future 
years. For example, in 2008, the City of Chicago sold off the right to 
revenue from its parking meters for 75 years. This sale, which earned the 
city $1.2 billion, was booked as revenue for the year. This allowed the city 
to balance its budget in 2008 even though it was at the cost of losing a flow 
of revenue for more than seven decades. There is an infinite variety of 
17  One frequently used method is to adjust payments on multiyear projects, like a 
highway or airport, in order to meet a fiscal target. Another mechanism that can be 
used to circumvent fiscal rules is deferred compensation payments, like defined 
benefit pensions. These liabilities are generally treated as payments in the years they 
are actually made rather than for the years in which the liability was accrued. If a 
pension is properly funded, the annual payments into the pension fund will be 
sufficient to cover the eventual liability, but there have been a number of state and 
local governments that have not made sufficient payments, effectively adding to the 
state’s debt even while it could be reporting a balanced budget.  
                                               
38 Dean Baker 
 
other mechanisms through which governments can sell off assets or 
revenue streams in order to reduce a current year deficit. 
The government can also turn to non-tax mechanisms for funding 
public purposes, which impose tax-like burdens in the future. Grants of 
patents and copyrights are an obvious example. These government-
granted monopolies are mechanisms through which the government 
provides incentives to innovate and do creative work, and in this sense can 
be thought of as alternatives to direct government payments for these 
purposes. The government could pay people and corporations to research 
new drugs, software, or other items, and to do creative work. In fact, it 
already does, paying over $30 billion a year to finance research at the 
National Institutes of Health and funding (modestly) creative work 
through the National Endowments for the Arts and Humanities and the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting.  
This direct funding appears as an expenditure in the government’s 
budget and contributes to the deficit. However, if the government pays 
for this work with a patent or copyright monopoly, then the cost never 
appears on the government’s books. In effect, the government is 
committing the public to paying a higher price for the protected item for 
the duration of the patent or copyright. This is a form of taxation that need 
never show up in the government’s accounts.  
A push to limit government spending can lead to longer and 
stronger patent and copyright protections as alternatives to direct 
spending, even if these monopolies are less-efficient mechanisms for 
financing innovation and creative work. As shown in Chapter 5, these 
government-granted monopolies can impose substantial costs on the 
public. In the case of prescription drugs alone the cost is in the 
neighborhood of $380 billion a year (equal to 2.0 percent of GDP). 
Washington is filled with politicians and organizations that hyperventilate 
about government debt and the burden it imposes on our children, but 
they ignore the burdens imposed by patent and copyright monopolies 
granted by the government.  
The scenarios graphed in Figure 3-4 illustrate this story by 
focusing on prescription drugs. Suppose that we were spending another 
$50 billion a year on medical research in order to replace patent-
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supported research, and all the findings were placed in the public domain 
so that all drugs were sold as generics. The annual deficit would be $50 
billion higher due to the additional spending on research, but we would 
save $380 billion a year on drugs due to generic pricing. In Washington 
policy circles, the high-drug-price scenario would be the path of fiscal 
prudence and caring about our children. It might pull far more money out 
of their pockets, but money going to drug companies doesn’t bother 
Washington-policy-types anywhere near as much as money going to the 
government.  
 
FIGURE 3-4 
Scenario 1: $400 billion deficit and $440 billion in prescription 
drug spending  
 
Scenario 2: $450 billion deficit and $60 billion in prescription 
drug spending 
 
Source and notes: Author’s calculations, see text. 
$400  
$440  
Deficit Prescription Drug Spending
B
ill
io
n
s 
o
f d
o
lla
rs
 
$450  
$60  
Deficit Prescription Drug Spending
B
ill
io
n
s 
o
f d
o
lla
rs
 
40 Dean Baker 
 
In sum, there is no natural or neutral fiscal policy in which the 
government does not affect the level of output in the economy. We can 
try to structure accounting rules so that the public and possibly even the 
people making policy are unaware of the ways in which the government’s 
actions are having an impact, but that doesn’t mean it’s not happening. 
Banning the study and dissemination of information on human-caused 
global warming would not change the fact that human activity is leading to 
global warming. That is the effect of various types of budget rules. They 
are not imposing some principle of neutrality or non-intervention, they 
are just making it more difficult to understand the government’s role in 
the economy. 
 
Monetary policy 
 
Just as there is no fiscal policy that is simple and neutral in its 
effect on levels of output, neither is there a simple and neutral monetary 
policy. In principle we can pick a rule and take away from the central bank 
the decision on how stimulative monetary policy will be. We could tie the 
issuance of money to gold, or let it rise at a fixed rate, as was long 
advocated by Milton Friedman, the famous conservative economist. 
However, both approaches are arbitrary, and still require that the central 
bank and other regulators make some judgments.  
This is clearest in the case of the monetary rule. The Federal 
Reserve Board and other central banks briefly experimented with 
targeting money supply growth in the early 1980s. However, the problem 
they encountered was that it wasn’t clear which measure of the money 
supply they should target. As the Fed restricted the growth of the M2 
measure of money, the banking system developed new systems of 
payments that were not counted in M2.18 As a result, the Fed could meet 
its targets for M2 but not accomplish its goal of restricting the effective 
supply of money.  
18  M2 is a relatively narrow definition of the money supply that counts money in 
savings and checking accounts and physical bills in existence. At the time, it was the 
preferred target for most supporters of a money supply rule.  
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This problem leaves the Fed with the peculiar task of constantly 
redefining money, a task that runs directly against Friedman’s idea of 
placing the money supply on autopilot and taking away discretion from 
central bankers. In choosing a new definition of money, the central bank 
can opt for one that allows for more or less expansionary policy. 
Friedman’s ghost might hope that such considerations are never a factor in 
determining how the money supply is defined, but that is not the way 
central bankers or anyone else functions.  
There would be a similar challenge in applying a gold standard. 
We can legislate that the Fed tie its issuance of money to the amount of 
gold in its possession, a mandate that has the obvious problem of making 
the growth of the money supply subject to the randomness of discoveries 
of deposits as well the development of technology in the mining industry. 
The result can be a period of prolonged deflation, as the United States and 
other industrialized countries experienced in the decades from 1870 to 
1890 (Bordo and Filardo 2005), or, if there are new gold finds, of 
inflation, as happened in the 1890s. If the point of the gold standard is to 
ensure price stability, it is not up to the task. 
Furthermore, the gold standard does not remove the regulatory 
issues with which central banks must inevitably contend. Banks, or bank-
like financial institutions, will always try to increase their volume of loans 
relative to their capital and reserves; it’s how they maximize profits. 
Central banks can choose to ignore the excessive growth of credit, but 
then they will have no control over the rate of inflation and the price level. 
Such a system is also a virtual guarantee of the sort of boom-and-bust 
cycles and bank runs that characterized the decades before the creation of 
the Federal Reserve Board and deposit insurance.  
It may be appealing to believe that we can just leave monetary 
policy to run its own course, without central bankers making conscious 
choices about the level of output and employment, but this is an illusion. 
The decisions by central banks and other financial regulators influence the 
levels of employment and output, and there is no way around this fact.  
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Fiscal and monetary policy without the illusion of non-
intervention 
 
If we move beyond the illusion of non-intervention — the idea 
that there is some natural fiscal and/or monetary policy that doesn’t 
involve policy choices — then we realize that we decide, as a matter of 
policy, whether to have an economy with high or low levels of 
unemployment. The decision in the United States and most other wealthy 
countries over the last four decades has been to maintain relatively high 
levels of unemployment. 
This policy has been seen most directly in the explicit decision by 
the Federal Reserve Board and other central banks to focus mainly, or 
even exclusively, on keeping inflation low. This is a sharp shift from prior 
decades, when central banks saw one of their main functions as promoting 
high levels of employment.  
A simple way of measuring the policy shift in the United States is 
comparing the actual levels of unemployment to the estimated NAIRU, or 
non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment. The NAIRU is supposed 
to be the level of unemployment where there is no tendency for the 
inflation rate to either decrease or increase. In principle, this is the lowest 
level of unemployment that the economy can have without the inflation 
rate continually accelerating. If, for example, the NAIRU is 5.0 percent 
but we keep the unemployment rate at 4.5 percent, then the inflation rate 
will keep rising and we will experience hyperinflation.  
Many theoretical and empirical questions have been raised about 
the concept of the NAIRU; nonetheless the estimates of the NAIRU can 
provide a quick measure of the extent to which economic policy has 
focused on maintaining full employment. Figure 3-5 shows the average 
gap between the actual unemployment rate and the Congressional Budget 
Office’s (CBO) estimate of the NAIRU from 1949 to the present. As can 
be seen, the unemployment rate was on average 0.5 percentage points 
below the estimate of NAIRU from 1949 to 1980. But in the years since 
1980, the unemployment rate averaged 1.0 percentage point above the 
estimates of NAIRU, even if we take out the years since the beginning of 
the Great Recession. This pattern suggests a much greater commitment to 
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fighting inflation, even at the expense of higher unemployment, in the 
years since 1980.  
 
FIGURE 3-5 
Gap between actual unemployment rate and estimates of the 
NAIRU, 1949–present  
 
Source and notes: CBO (2016) and BLS (2016a). 
 
As bad as the Fed has been in its quest to keep inflation low at the 
expense of unemployment, it actually remains more committed to high 
employment policies than some other central banks. The European 
Central Bank stands out in this respect. At the time of his retirement in 
October 2011, Jean Claude Trichet, who served as president of the bank 
through the bubble years and the subsequent crash, was proud of the fact 
that he kept the euro zone’s inflation rate under the bank’s 2.0 percent 
target, even though unemployment rates in the euro zone were in double 
digits and several countries were on the edge of defaulting on their debt 
(The Telegraph 2011). 
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Currency policy 
 
An issue that is related to monetary policy is the U.S. policy 
towards the value of the dollar. This is related to monetary policy because, 
other things equal, raising and lowering interest rates sends the value of 
the dollar in the same direction. In other words, if the Federal Reserve 
Board decides to raise interest rates, it generally will also lead to a rise in 
the value of the dollar. Foreign investors will be more interested in 
holding dollar denominated assets if they can get a higher rate of interest in 
the United States than elsewhere. The opposite is true if the Fed lowers 
interest rates. In general, this means that foreign and domestic investors 
will look to pull their money out of dollars and instead put it in countries 
where they can get a higher rate of interest. 
Many factors complicate this simple story, but the most obvious 
one is a deliberate attempt by a country to target the value of its currency 
at a level that is substantially above or below its market level. This has 
been an important issue in the last two decades as many developing 
countries, most importantly China, have acted to keep down the value of 
their currencies relative to the dollar by buying up massive amounts of 
dollars.  
As noted in Chapter 1, developing countries as a whole have been 
running large trade surpluses since the East Asian financial crisis, reversing 
the textbook pattern where capital is supposed to flow from rich countries 
to poor countries. We would expect the value of their currencies to rise 
relative to the currencies of countries with trade deficits, like the United 
States, and we would expect these countries to sell the dollars they have 
accumulated from their trade surpluses in international currency markets, 
pushing down the value of the dollar.  
However, these countries have chosen not to sell their dollars but 
are instead holding them, leading to extraordinary accumulations of 
reserves. In early 2014, China’s reserves peaked at almost $4 trillion, 
equivalent to more than 40 percent of its GDP. (A standard rule of thumb 
is that reserves should be equal to three to six months of imports, which 
would have been $500 billion to $1 trillion in China’s case.) Its reserves 
fell somewhat over the next year and a half, but were still more than $3.2 
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trillion in the summer of 2016, with another $1.5 trillion held in the form 
of sovereign wealth funds. This money could also be tapped if China were 
in need of foreign exchange for some reason. 
The issue of currency matters because it is the main factor keeping 
the U.S. trade deficit high. The U.S. trade deficit had been just over 1.0 
percent of GDP before the East Asia financial crisis, and while it is down 
from its peak of 6.0 percent in 2005, in 2016 it was still close to 2.8 
percent of GDP. The trade deficit corresponds to spending that is creating 
demand elsewhere rather than in the United States. A $500 billion trade 
deficit (its level in 2016) means that there is a gap in demand of $500 
billion that must be filled by other sources if the economy is going to 
operate near full employment.  
This deficit is the result of policy, not just the natural workings of 
the market. When government officials sit down with their counterparts 
from China and other countries, they can negotiate over the currency 
policies that these countries are pursuing. If negotiators opt to make 
currency a priority, they can likely get these countries to agree to increase 
the value of their currencies relative to the dollar.19 There will be a trade-
off for focusing on currency values, meaning that other items will be given 
lower priority. For example, the United States has pressed China for 
increased access for the financial industry, the telecommunications 
industry, and retailers, and it has pressed China and other developing 
countries to devote more resources toward enforcing U.S. patents and 
copyrights. In order to get more concessions on currency values, the 
United States might accept fewer concessions in these areas, or agree to 
more demands that China makes on it. 
19  It is often claimed by Obama administration officials that China refuses to make any 
concessions on the value of its currency. This is difficult to believe. Currency values 
don’t raise issues of fundamental sovereignty, like China’s claim to Taiwan. 
Furthermore, China has indicated its intention to further raise the value of its 
currency and shift to a more domestically oriented growth path. It already has done 
this to a substantial extent, reducing its trade surplus from 10.0 percent in 2007 to 
2.7 percent in 2015 (IMF 2016). In effect, the demand from the United States 
would be that China pursue this route somewhat more quickly than it may have 
planned.  
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But powerful interests directly benefit from an over-valued dollar. 
Many major U.S. manufacturers have set up operations in China and other 
developing countries for the purpose of exporting back to the United 
States. They aren’t eager to see the cost of the items produced in these 
countries rise by 20 to 30 percent if the dollar falls by that amount. 
Similarly, major retailers like Walmart have established low-cost supply 
chains in the developing world, and they would prefer not to see the 
prices of the goods they import rise along with the value of developing 
country currencies. 
Thus, there are substantial political obstacles working against 
major efforts from the U.S. government to force down the value of the 
dollar and bring the trade deficit closer to balance. For this reason, we can 
see the large trade deficit as a policy choice, not just a natural outcome of 
the workings of the market. The outcome of this policy is a large shortfall 
in demand, making it harder to get to full employment. The trade deficit 
also takes a heavy toll on manufacturing workers, since it is 
overwhelmingly manufacturing jobs that are lost as a result of it. As noted 
in Chapter 1, the loss of manufacturing jobs puts downward pressure on 
the wages of workers without college degrees, as displaced manufacturing 
workers crowd into other sectors in search of employment. 
 
Fiscal policy in an economy pushed toward secular stagnation 
 
We have argued in the prior sections that the United States has 
pursued a variety of policies that have the effect of reducing demand in the 
economy. In the case of trade policy the impact is quite direct. We have 
supported policies that lead to large trade deficits, which create a gap in 
aggregate demand from other sources. However, we have also pursued a 
variety of policies that have the effect of redistributing income upward. As 
research from the IMF and elsewhere indicate, this upward redistribution 
leads to lower consumption, other things equal, since the wealthy spend a 
smaller share of their income than do the poor and middle class. Without 
deliberate government policy to boost demand, the result is a shortfall in 
demand.  
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In this context, a “fiscally prudent” policy that insists on balanced 
budgets or low deficits is a policy designed to keep unemployment high. 
Given the distributional impact of high unemployment, it is also a policy 
that has the effect of disproportionately hurting minorities and less-
educated workers, both by denying them employment and by putting 
downward pressure on the wages of those who have jobs.  
Figure 3-6 shows the path for GDP that was projected by the 
CBO in 2008, before the economy collapsed, compared with the actual 
growth path (in 2016 dollars). By 2015 the gap was $2.3 trillion. Much of 
this output is now permanently lost. We can’t make up for the 
investments that were not made or the education and experience that 
workers did not receive, but we can still move the economy closer to its 
projected path by increasing demand.  
 
FIGURE 3-6 
Real gross domestic product, 2007–2015, actual and CBO’s 2008 
projection  
 
Source and notes: CBO (2016). 
 
Figure 3-7 shows the gap between projected and actual output in 
2015 measured in units of annual spending on SNAP, along with a bar 
showing half of the gap being closed through more stimulative fiscal 
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and/or exchange-rate policy. The full gap is equal to 30 times annual 
spending on SNAP, while filling half of the gap, which may still be a 
reasonable target with aggressive expansionary policy, would imply a 
boost to incomes equal to 15 times annual spending on SNAP. In other 
words, getting the economy back to full employment is a really big deal. 
 
FIGURE 3-7 
Income foregone in 2016 as result of Great Recession, in units of 
SNAP spending  
 
Source and notes: Author’s calculations, see text. 
 
Furthermore, as noted at the start of this chapter, the benefits of 
moving to full employment will go disproportionately to those at the 
middle and bottom of the income ladder. They will benefit from having 
increased employment, having the opportunity to work more hours (many 
are now working part time but would like full-time employment), and 
also having higher pay on the job. High unemployment is an important 
policy to redistribute wage income from those at the middle and bottom 
to those at the top. In addition, a policy of sustained high employment 
would likely reverse the shift from wage income to profits that took place 
in the downturn, amounting to an aggregate increase in labor 
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compensation of more than 6.0 percent, in addition to the impact of the 
increase in the level of output and employment. 
 
Conclusion: The level of employment is a policy choice 
 
In policy debates, the idea of boosting demand to increase 
employment is often viewed as intervention, and the option of allowing a 
high rate of unemployment to persist is viewed as non-intervention. This 
is a convenient framing for those who are content with continuing an 
unnecessarily high rate of unemployment, but it does not correspond to 
reality. There is a long list of government interventions going on right 
now that directly or indirectly affect the level of demand in the economy 
(see Box 3-1).  
 
BOX 3-1 
Ways in which policy affects employment  
1) Distributional policies that affect consumption 
a) Union policy 
b) Minimum wage 
c) Regulatory policy 
d) Structure of unemployment benefit system 
2) Incentives for longer or shorter work-years 
3) Fiscal policy (more or less expansionary) 
4) Monetary policy (more or less expansionary) 
5) Currency policy (affects trade deficit or surplus) 
 
It is hypocritical to bless the policies that have the effect of 
reducing demand as non-intervention and condemn the policies designed 
to counteract these effects as intervention. We can choose government 
policies that will be more or less stimulative of growth and employment, 
but we can’t escape the fact that government policies are affecting 
employment. The presence of large numbers of people who are unable to 
find work as a result of inadequate demand is the result of policies we have 
chosen that keep these people from working. This is not laissez faire or the 
free market; this is operating the government to benefit a select group.   
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Chapter 4 
The Financial Sector: Ground Zero for 
High Incomes and High Waste 
There is a great deal of confusion about the nature of the financial 
sector in a modern economy. The financial industry plays an essential 
function in processing payments, providing insurance, allowing families to 
save for the future, and allocating capital to those who want to invest or 
borrow. However, the services it provides are almost entirely 
intermediate goods in that they facilitate economic activity; they are not 
end products that provide benefits in and of themselves, like housing, 
health care, or education.  
In this regard the financial sector is like the trucking industry. 
Trucking, like finance, is essential to the economy. We need it for moving 
raw material to factories and finished products to stores. But an efficient 
trucking industry is a small trucking industry: we want to have as few 
resources as possible devoted to getting goods from point A to point B. 
This means that we don’t want to see a huge expansion in employment in 
the trucking industry or an explosion in the number of trucks and 
warehouses just to move the same quantity of goods.  
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The same story applies to the financial industry. We should want 
to see as few resources as possible committed to it, or the minimum 
needed to enable it to support the productive economy. Instead, we have 
seen a massive expansion of the financial sector, from 4.5 percent of GDP 
in 1970 to 7.4 percent in 2015. 20  The more narrow securities and 
commodities trading sector increased from 0.49 percent of GDP in 1970 
to 2.03 percent in 2015, 21  corresponding to $290 billion a year in 
additional spending in the 2016 economy.  
Reversing this expansion in the size of the financial sector without 
damaging its ability to serve the productive economy would be a pure gain 
to the economy, just as eliminating waste in the trucking industry would 
be a gain. We don’t benefit from having more types of financial 
instruments and derivatives unless these instruments make it easier to 
accomplish one of the sector’s functions. Similarly, we don’t benefit from 
more frequent trading of stocks, bonds, or other assets unless the 
additional trading somehow leads to better allocation of capital or makes 
our savings more secure.  
These simple points are often left out of discussions of financial 
regulation and policy. Opponents of efforts to restructure the industry 
tend to point to the prospect of job loss — not in the productive 
economy, but within the industry itself — as though it is a compelling 
reason to leave the status quo in place. In effect, they are arguing that we 
want waste in the financial sector. 
20  This figure includes both employee compensation and proprietors’ income in 
finance, insurance, and real estate as well as corporate profits in finance and 
insurance. The number would be slightly higher if we were to include corporate 
profits from real estate. 
21  The size of the sector was calculated from BEA (2016) by taking the lines for 
compensation in the securities and commodities trading industry and also investment 
funds and trusts (Table 6.2D, lines 59 and 61 for 2015 and Table 6.2B, lines 55 and 
59 for 1970). The calculation attributes income in the financial sector from 
proprietorships (Table 6.12D, line 14 for 2015 and Table 6.12B, line 14 for 1970) 
and corporate profits (Table 6.16D, line 12 for 2015 and 6.16B, line 12 for 1970) in 
proportion to the narrower trading sector’s share of employee compensation to 
employee compensation in the financial industry as a whole.  
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Finance is different from trucking, however, in that waste in the 
financial sector provides income for some of the highest earners in the 
economy. Bakija et al. (2012) found that 18.4 percent of primary 
taxpayers in the top 0.1 percent of the income distribution were employed 
in finance. When we downsize the industry, we are likely to reduce the 
number of very high earners within it, as well as the amount of money 
they take home.  
The financial sector earns rents at the expense of the rest of the 
economy in five main areas: 
1) As the cost of trading stocks, bonds, and other financial assets has 
declined over the last four decades with the development of 
computers and the Internet, trading volume has exploded and a 
variety of complex financial instruments have been created. 
Despite the sharp decline in costs, the amount of money spent on 
trading has nearly quintupled relative to the size of the economy. 
The increased volume and complexity of trading have not in any 
obvious way improved the allocation of capital or made financial 
markets more stable. They have, however, made many hedge 
fund partners and traders at large banks extremely wealthy. 
2) Since lenders assume the government will act to support large 
financial institutions if they get into trouble, large banks enjoy the 
benefits of implicit too-big-to-fail insurance, which enables them 
to borrow at lower interest rates than would be justified by their 
financial situations. The IMF recently valued the implicit subsidy 
at $25 billion to $50 billion annually (IMF 2014).  
3) Often, tasks that could be performed more efficiently by the 
government or by a monopoly private provider are instead 
parceled out to the financial sector. If the privately run defined 
contribution pension system were run as efficiently as the Thrift 
Savings Plan for federal employers, perhaps $50 billion a year in 
rent — a low-range estimate — could be put to productive uses.  
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4) The financial industry is able to take advantage of consumers 
through complex and deceptive contracts. At one time many debit 
card issuers charged large overdraft fees without telling customers 
they faced these charges. Though this practice has since been 
banned by the Federal Reserve Board (customers must now opt 
for overdraft coverage, knowing the fees they face), there are 
many other areas where the industry imposes terms that most 
consumers would likely not agree to if they understood them.  
5) Tax shelters have long been a mechanism for corporations and 
wealthy individuals to escape tax liability. But often overlooked is 
the tax shelter industry itself, where the individuals and 
corporations that engineer the tax shelters receive large rents. 
This is a major source of profits for the private equity industry, 
which has great expertise in gaming the tax code. 
 
Before getting into more detail on these sources of rent and 
possible remedies, it is worth pointing out that many of the people who 
have gotten extremely rich in the last four decades have been in the 
financial sector. If their fortunes corresponded to great benefits they 
provided to the economy there would be little grounds for complaint, but 
for most of the very rich people in finance, this does not seem to be the 
case. 
 
Speed trading and financial transactions taxes 
 
Unlike most other sectors, finance is generally exempt from sales 
taxes (IMF 2010). Excessive trading is the greatest source of rents in the 
financial sector, and subjecting it to a financial transactions tax (FTT) 
would go a long way toward bringing taxation in the financial sector in 
line with the rest of the economy.  
As mentioned earlier, as trading costs plummeted over the last 
four decades due to computerization, trading volume exploded and the 
amount of money spent on trading nearly quintupled relative to the size of 
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the economy. The additional money spent on trading is all income for the 
industry. 
There is no doubt that a non-trivial FTT will substantially reduce 
the size of the financial sector. The key question in assessing the merits of 
the tax is whether this downsizing results primarily from eliminating 
wasteful transactions that don’t affect the ability of the financial sector to 
serve the productive economy. This would be comparable to finding a way 
to monitor truckers to ensure that they only take the most direct routes to 
get to their destination. Alternatively, if the downsizing seriously impedes 
the financial sector’s ability to effectively allocate capital or ensure the 
security of household savings, then the FTT would be imposing a 
substantial cost.  
It is worth contrasting the impact for consumers and producers of 
a tax on the financial sector and a tax on normal consumption goods. 
Figure 4-1 shows how a tax on new cars that raises $100 billion a year in 
annual revenue would affect the car market and how the tax burden might 
be distributed between car buyers and car manufacturers. 
The top horizontal line shows the effective price to consumers 
once the tax has been imposed. Consumers will pay more per car, but 
they will buy fewer. As a result, car sellers will receive less money both 
because they are selling fewer cars, but also because the reduction in 
demand as a result of the tax will lead to a situation where they get less 
money per car. So the reduction in revenue to the auto industry will be 
the combined effect of selling fewer cars and getting less money for each 
car they sell.  
The extent to which the before-tax price falls and the quantity is 
reduced depends on the relative shape of the supply and demand curves. 
(These curves are drawn in an arbitrary manner for purely illustrative 
purposes.) In this case, the tax of $5,000 per car is assumed to be evenly 
shared between consumers and producers. The average price paid by a 
consumer rises from $25,000 without the tax to $27,500 with it, and the 
average price received by auto manufacturers falls from $25,000 to 
$22,500. The gap of $5,000 per car is the tax revenue raised by the 
government.  
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FIGURE 4-1 
Changes in supply and demand for cars with the addition of a 
tax 
 
Source and notes: Author’s calculations. 
 
The tax is associated with a drop in sales from 22 million to 20 
million, and the loss in revenue to manufacturers comes to $100 billion a 
year, the difference between selling 22 million cars at $25,000 each, or 
$550 billion, and selling 20 million cars at $22,500 each, or $450 billion. 
Consumers are paying $2,500 more per car but buying 2 million fewer, so 
their total spending on cars is unchanged at $550 billion.  
In terms of assessing winners and losers, consumers are worse off 
to the extent that they had valued the 2 million cars they end up not 
purchasing. Also, the consumers who do buy cars will have less money to 
spend on other items as a result of having to pay $2,500 more for the cars 
they buy.  
Car manufacturers, now producing fewer cars, will employ fewer 
workers and need a smaller amount of parts, materials, and capital 
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equipment. Fewer people will be employed both directly in the auto 
industry and indirectly in the various industries that produce inputs. The 
manufacturers are also likely to see a reduction in profits due to the 
decline in prices and sales. 
The extent of the negative impact on the displaced workers will 
depend on their ability to get other jobs at comparable pay. If the pay at 
auto manufacturers and their suppliers is comparable to the pay in other 
sectors where these workers can find jobs, then the decline in car sales will 
have little impact on their standard of living once the adjustment process is 
complete. However, if the auto industry is a source of relatively high-
paying jobs, then the decline in sales would imply a reduction in their 
standard of living when they are forced to accept lower-paying jobs in 
other sectors. 
The same story would apply to any other industry producing 
consumer goods or services, but the situation is fundamentally different in 
an industry like finance that is primarily producing intermediate goods. 
Figure 4-2 shows the impact of a tax of $100 billion a year in the financial 
sector. (Again, these lines are drawn arbitrarily for illustrative purposes.) 
Figure 4-2 shows a decline in trading volume that is the same as 
the decline in car volume, with the increase in the after-tax cost per trade 
equal to the increase in the after-tax cost of a car. (To be more realistic, 
perhaps think of these as blocks of 1 million trades.) This leaves all the 
dollar sums the same as in Figure 4-1; however the meaning on the 
consumer side is qualitatively different in a very important way. 
In Figure 4-1, consumers saw a cost from the tax both because 
they paid more per car as a result of the tax, and also because they bought 
fewer cars. Cars are a consumption good, so the expectation is that if 
consumers end up buying fewer cars as a result of the tax, they are in some 
way worse off. By contrast, trading is not a good that directly provides 
value for consumers. They are not made worse off by engaging in fewer 
trades.22  
22  There is a possibility that some people view trading as a form of recreation like 
casino gambling. This discussion assumes that the bulk of trading is not done for 
recreational purposes.  
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FIGURE 4-2 
Changes in supply and demand for financial trades with the 
addition of a tax 
 
Source and notes: Author’s calculations. 
 
In Figure 4-2 the decline in trading volume fully offsets the impact 
of the tax in raising the cost per trade. This means that consumers spend 
no more on trading, including the tax, than they did before the tax was 
put into place; in other words, the consumer feels no direct impact of the 
tax. For cars, the impact of the tax depends on the extent to which the 
price to consumers rises due to the tax. For trading, there is no reason to 
care about the price per trade, because all we care about is the total 
amount spent on trading. If that doesn’t increase, as assumed in Figure 4-
2, consumers will see an impact from the tax only if a lower volume of 
trading reduces the ability of the financial sector to serve the productive 
economy.  
This point is important. If the higher volume of trading was not 
leading to greater efficiency of the productive economy, then consumers 
on aggregate were not gaining from the extra trades. There will be 
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winners and losers on any individual trade, but in aggregate this will net 
out to zero, and so many of the trades currently being undertaken by the 
people managing our 401(k)s, our IRAs, and our pension funds are 
wasteful. The people in the financial industry who undertake these trades 
earn money off of them, but, on average, investors do not. In this case, if 
we can reduce the volume of trading, as would be the case with an FTT, 
we are saving investors money and reducing the amount of resources 
wasted in the financial sector.  
The impact of the tax from the standpoint of producers is 
unambiguous. It leads to both a reduction in trading volume and less 
money on each trade, implying that fewer people will be employed in the 
industry and that those who remain employed are likely to receive lower 
incomes. Like for the displaced autoworkers, the impact on the workers 
displaced from the financial sector will depend on the difference between 
pay in the industry and pay in other sectors. Since the financial sector pays 
considerably more on average than other industries, displacement is likely 
to mean a substantial loss of income, at least for higher-paid workers. 
(Displaced custodians and office assistants might not see much of a 
reduction in pay.)  
The key point is that a tax on the financial sector is generally not 
borne directly by consumers. The immediate impact will be on suppliers 
of financial services; consumers will be affected only if the downsizing of 
the industry reduces its ability to serve the productive economy. If a 
smaller financial sector can serve the productive economy as well as a 
larger one, then the burden of the tax will be felt mostly or entirely by the 
industry. 
 
Is a large financial sector a burden on the economy? 
 
The idea that a large financial sector might be a drag on growth 
has been supported by recent research from the Bank of International 
Settlements and the IMF. Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) and Sahay et al. 
(2015) find an inverted U-shaped relationship between the size of the 
financial sector and the rate of productivity growth. For countries with 
underdeveloped financial sectors, they find that a bigger financial sector is 
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associated with more rapid growth. However, once the financial sector 
reaches a certain level, further expansion relative to the size of the 
economy is associated with slower growth. This is consistent with the idea 
that large financial sectors pull resources away from productive uses. 
These analyses imply that people who could be employed 
productively in other sectors of the economy are doing tasks that provide 
little or no value in the financial sector. Excessive trading, which is the 
immediate focus of an FTT, is one example of how resources could be 
wasted. However, the proliferation of complex financial instruments 
would be another aspect of the same problem. An FTT will make some 
types of financial instruments more costly and possibly eliminate the 
market for them altogether. If these instruments provide little benefit to 
the productive economy, then the tax would be making the financial 
sector more efficient. 
If an FTT were to impose costs on the productive economy, it 
would be because higher transaction costs make it more difficult to raise 
capital. The most immediate way in which higher transaction costs could 
affect the economy is through higher interest rates. The tax will reduce 
effective returns on assets, with the impact dependent on the volume of 
turnover. To take a simple case, if the before-tax return on an asset is 5.0 
percent annually (net of other turnover costs) and the holding time is on 
average six months, a tax of 0.1 percent will reduce the return (holding 
turnover constant) by 4.0 percent.23 (Since the asset turns over twice in a 
year, the tax is equal to 0.2 percent of the price.) If the holding time 
increased more than proportionately in response to the tax (as implied by 
the assumption of a trading elasticity greater than 1), then the effect of the 
tax on returns would actually be positive. As noted above, the total 
amount spent on trading is actually less as a result of the tax, which means, 
other things equal, total returns would increase. 
However, investors might be willing to forego a substantial 
portion of their returns in exchange for increased liquidity. This possibility 
would imply that interest rates are lower in 2016 than would otherwise be 
23  Burman et al. (2016) includes a useful table (Table 3) showing the impact of tax 
rates on the rate of return for different holding periods.  
                                               
60 Dean Baker 
 
the case precisely because investors have the option to trade frequently at 
low cost.  
The impact of trading costs on returns could be substantial. For 
example, if there has been a reduction in average trading costs in the stock 
market of 0.5 percentage points over the last four decades (probably a low 
estimate of the actual reduction) and shares are traded on average twice a 
year, then the reduction in trading costs would be equivalent to 20 
percent of annual returns, using an assumption of 5.0 percent real returns. 
(Two times 0.5 percentage points equals 1 percentage point, which is 20 
percent of the 5.0 percent real annual return.) Comparable reductions in 
trading costs for bonds and other instruments would imply a similar 
impact on returns.  
While this sort of impact cannot be ruled out a priori, few if any 
economic models of interest rate determination include transaction costs 
as a major factor. If trading costs did have a substantial impact on interest 
rates, we would expect real interest rates in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s 
to be far higher, other things equal, than they are today. But there has 
been no obvious downward path for real interest rates in the United States 
and other countries as transaction costs have fallen. 
One reason that there may not be a return premium 
corresponding to the fall in average trading costs is that the typical investor 
is not an active trader. If most investors traded little, while a small 
minority traded a lot, then average trading costs would have little 
relevance for most investors. In that case, a rise in transaction costs 
matters a great deal to the active trader but little to a more typical 
investor. 
In addition to the question of liquidity, there is also the question 
of whether the rise in transaction costs resulting from the tax would 
impair the ability of financial markets to allocate capital to its best uses. 
Could higher transaction costs cause the market price of assets and their 
“true” price based on economic fundamentals to diverge, and could this 
divergence have measurable consequences for the allocation of capital? The 
answer to the first question is possibly yes, but the extent of the 
consequences is more questionable. 
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The answer to the first question depends on the impact of trading 
costs on volatility. There has been some research on this topic, and a fair 
reading of the literature would probably support the view that lower 
trading costs are associated with reduced volatility.24 However, most of 
the research on the relationship between trading costs and volatility is 
focused on short-term movements in asset prices, such as the average 
change in the price of a share of stock over the course of a day. But 
examining short-term fluctuations is really providing more information on 
the liquidity of markets rather than the ability of markets to direct capital 
to its best uses. Larger intra-day fluctuations in the price of stock or other 
assets may increase the risk that the investor buys the asset at a temporarily 
inflated price or sells it at a temporarily depressed price (these deviations 
should average out, so on net the typical investor is neither helped nor 
hurt). But it is difficult to believe that these risks would have a measurable 
impact on the effective allocation of capital. For instance, would a 
company undertake an investment it would not otherwise make or pass on 
an investment that would have been profitable just because its stock price 
was a half of a percentage point above or below its fundamental value 
(assuming that the market tends toward the fundamental value) for an 
hour or two? The same question would apply to other assets like oil or 
corn. If the price of a barrel of oil is 0.5 percent higher than the 
fundamentals would imply for a few hours, is the capital committed to 
drilling fundamentally less profitable? 
It is worth noting that, even with a sharp reduction in trading 
volume, there is still likely to be far more liquidity in the market than 
existed just two decades ago. Figure 4-3 shows a measure of market 
depth, the average value of shares available to be bought or sold, since 
2003. It shows that depth has more than tripled for the most highly traded 
stocks, and if it fell back by two-thirds it would still be higher than it was 
in 2003. In other words, even with an FTT we are likely to see more 
market depth in 2017 than we saw in the 2003 market without an FTT. 
 
24  Matheson (2011) has a good summary of the research on the relationship between 
trading costs and volatility.  
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FIGURE 4-3 
Displayed market depth (bid+ask volume), largest stocks (95th 
percentile) 
 
Source and notes: From Angel et al. (2013), Figure 2.7. 
 
While longer-term and larger divergences between prices and 
fundamentals can affect the allocation of capital, the evidence in this area is 
uncertain. On several occasions in the last three decades sharp movements 
in price bore no obvious relationship to the fundamentals in the economy. 
The most obvious was the “flash crash” in 2010, which was due to a 
misreported price that triggered a sell-off by programmed trading. The 
main market indexes plunged by close to 10 percent over the course of 30 
minutes. While the drop was reversed in a matter of hours, it is difficult to 
envision such swings being driven by human trading. 
Similarly, no one ever found an explanation in market 
fundamentals for the crash in October 1987, which was also driven by 
programmed trading. It took close to two years to completely reverse the 
slide, although half of the loss was recovered in most markets within a 
week. It’s not clear that the modest increase in trading costs associated 
with proposed FTTs would reduce the likelihood of large price swings 
caused by flukes, but in any case these large swings arguably have more 
impact on the efficiency of markets in serving the productive economy 
than would the modest deviations from fundamental values that may be 
associated with a decline in market volume and a corresponding reduction 
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in liquidity wrought by an FTT. In other words, it is not clear that an FTT 
of the size being proposed here would have a sizable impact on 
destabilizing speculation. However, the fact that we have seen 
extraordinary and unexplained swings in prices in periods of low trading 
costs and high volume suggests that reducing trading volume with a FTT is 
unlikely to destabilize financial markets. 
On the issue of the relationship between transactions costs and 
growth, it is worth noting that modeling practices among macroeconomic 
forecasters generally do not assume that future growth will be faster as a 
result of declines in transaction costs in the financial sector. That practice 
may be mistaken, but modelers in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s did not 
project an acceleration in growth rates in their forecasts as a result of 
predictable declines in transactions costs in financial markets.  
Table 4-1 shows projections of revenue and trading expenses 
from an FTT of 0.2 percent on stock trades, 0.05 percent per year 
outstanding on bond trades, and 0.01 percent on derivatives. Based on 
2015 trading volumes, the tax could raise between $112 billion and $158 
billion a year, equivalent to 0.6 and 0.9 percent of GDP. It could also 
reduce the amount of resources spent on carrying through trades by $158 
billion to $188 billion annually. These are vast resources that could be 
used elsewhere in the economy.  
Figure 4-4 compares the range of tax revenue and the resources 
freed up to the size of the SNAP budget. The revenue range equals 1.5 to 
2.1 times the SNAP budget for 2016, and resources freed up are 
equivalent to 2.1 to 2.5 times the SNAP budget. In many ways, the 
amount of resources freed up and used in the productive economy instead 
of in the shuffle of stocks and other financial assets back and forth is the 
more important issue. 
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TABLE 4-1 
Projected revenue gains and expense reductions from a 
financial transactions tax 
(billions) 
 Tax rate (percent) 
Pre-tax  
trading 
volume 
Post-tax  
trading 
volume 
Revenue 
Reduction 
in trading 
expenses 
Elasticity = -1.0 
  Stocks 0.200% $48,000 $24,000.0 $48.0 $48.0 
  Bonds 0.050% $180,000 $90,000.0 $45.0 $45.0 
  Derivatives 0.010% $1,300,000 $650,000.0 $65.0 $65.0 
        Total $158.0 $158.0 
Elasticity = -1.25 
  Stocks 0.200% $48,000 $20,181.5 $40.4 $55.6 
  Bonds 0.050% $180,000 $75,680.7 $37.8 $52.2 
  Derivatives 0.010% $1,300,000 $546,582.7 $54.7 $75.3 
        Total $132.9 $183.1 
Elasticity = -1.50 
  Stocks 0.200% $48,000 $16,970.6 $33.9 $62.1 
  Bonds 0.050% $180,000 $63,639.6 $31.8 $58.2 
  Derivatives 0.010% $1,300,000 $459,619.4 $46.0 $67.2 
        Total $111.7 $187.5 
Source and notes: Author's calculations, see text. 
 
FIGURE 4-4 
Benefits of a financial transactions tax for revenue and trading 
expenses, in units of SNAP spending 
 
Source and notes: Author’s calculations. 
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While it has not led to faster economic growth, the explosion in 
the size of the financial sector since 1970 has been associated with an 
explosion in industry compensation. Compensation has always been higher 
in the financial sector than elsewhere, but in 1970 the average 
compensation for a full-time financial sector employee was less than 50 
percent higher than the average for the economy as a whole, while in 2014 
it was almost 270 percent higher (Figure 4-5).25 As noted earlier, Bakija 
et al. (2012) found that 18.4 percent of primary taxpayers in the top 0.1 
percent of the income distribution were employed in finance. 
 
FIGURE 4-5 
Annual compensation in financial sector per full-time 
equivalent employee  
 
Source and notes: BEA (2016), see text. 
 
It is likely that the downsizing of the industry that would be 
associated with a moderately sized FTT would lead to a substantial 
reduction in pay for many of its high earners. Many would undoubtedly 
25  These figures are obtained from BEA (2016) by dividing total employee 
compensation (Table 6.2B, lines 55 and 59, and Table 6.2D, lines 59 and 61) by the 
number of full-time equivalent workers in the sector (Table 6.5B, lines 55 and 59, 
and Table 6.5D, lines 59 and 61).  
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move to other sectors, where their skills may still command a high wage, 
though likely less than they are currently earning in finance. The workers 
who remained in the sector may still earn more than the average for 
workers in other sectors, but the gap would likely be less than before the 
tax. In effect, to maintain their share of a shrinking market the workers in 
the financial sector will be forced to forego a substantial portion of their 
compensation. 
Finally, reducing the volume of trading in financial markets will 
reduce the value of some of the services sold to financial markets. Michael 
Bloomberg, the former mayor of New York and one of the richest people 
in the world, made his fortune selling subscriptions to his Bloomberg 
Terminals,26 highly valued because they are one of the fastest information 
sources available for news like crop forecasts or disruptions in oil fields. 
Getting this information as quickly as possible is essential to anyone who 
hopes to profit from trading in these markets, yet it matters little for the 
overall functioning of the economy. A large decrease in trading volume 
could reduce the income for Bloomberg LP and other companies that 
provide similar services. 
 
Too-big-to-fail insurance 
 
After the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in 
2008, the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board stepped in 
to ensure that none of the other major banks would fail. In his 
autobiography, Timothy Geithner, Treasury Secretary during President 
Obama’s first term, repeatedly stated the administration’s commitment 
that there would be “no more Lehmans,” meaning that the administration 
was committed to doing what was necessary to ensure that another major 
bank did not fail. This was about as explicit a statement of “too big to fail” 
(TBTF) insurance as one could imagine. In other words, it was not just a 
rumor circulating in financial circles that the Treasury would not allow a 
bank to fail; it was the Obama administration’s policy. 
26  In 2013, a one-year terminal subscription sold for $24,000 (Seward 2016). 
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The Dodd-Frank financial reform law was supposed to both create 
better oversight so that the large banks did not expose themselves to 
excessive risk and put in place mechanisms so that even the largest banks, 
if troubled, could be put through a resolution process without causing 
major harm to the economy. In principle, these changes would put an end 
to TBTF insurance, since lenders would now understand that they faced 
some risk of losses when making loans to major banks. 
It is not clear that the reforms have succeeded in their goal. 
Though a Government Accountability Office (GAO) analysis in 2014 
found that the risk-adjusted gap in interest rates between TBTF banks and 
smaller banks had largely disappeared (GAO 2014), the evidence was less 
compelling than it seemed on its face. Since the recovery from the 
downturn was weak, interest rates remained extraordinarily low, and the 
persistence of these low rates in a relatively stable economy led to a 
collapse in the size of spreads for more risky bonds, i.e., the difference 
between interest rates for very risk bonds and government bonds or other 
bonds considered extremely safe. In this context, it would be difficult to 
pick up the impact of a belief in TBTF even if most investors continued to 
believe that the government would not let a major bank collapse. And the 
GAO study actually provided direct evidence on this issue. By most of the 
methodologies it used there was also no TBTF premium in 2006, another 
period of relative financial stability, suggesting that the benefits of TBTF 
insurance are difficult to measure in more stable times but may 
nonetheless exist. Since only one major bank was allowed to fail, the 
government clearly had a TBTF policy in effect during the financial crisis; 
therefore, investors would not have been wrong to anticipate that the 
government would act to save major banks. (Using a somewhat different 
methodology, the IMF (2014) put the size of the TBTF premium in the 
United States at $25 billion to $50 billion a year). 
No doubt many investors will be prepared to make the same bet 
going forward. While regulators are being more cautious now, it is far 
from clear they have the ability or the will to rein in the major banks. For 
example, in 2012 JP Morgan concealed from regulators several billion 
dollars of trading losses connected with the “London Whale” incident 
(Hurtado 2016). Its losses were not large enough to jeopardize its financial 
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health, but it’s perhaps possible that the bank could have concealed them 
even if they had been large enough to make it insolvent. And this was two 
years after the passage of Dodd-Frank. 
There is also the question of whether regulators are and will be 
able to accurately assess risk. In the financial crisis an asset that regulators 
assumed to be safe — residential mortgages — turned out to be highly 
risky. Regulators relied on historical default and recovery rates in assessing 
risks from bad mortgages and didn’t imagine a situation in which plunging 
house prices could send default rates soaring and radically reduce the 
portion of the mortgage that could be recovered post-default. They also 
could not envision a nationwide fall in house prices, since in the past price 
declines had been restricted to specific markets.27 Since regulators missed 
all the signs of the housing bubble, which was the basis for the collapse of 
house prices and the subsequent surge in mortgage delinquencies and 
defaults, is there reason to believe that they will be much better in 
recognizing the next pattern of growth that poses a threat to the economy 
and the financial system?  
The surest way to end TBTF insurance is to break up the big 
banks, a proposal that is not very far-fetched considering that today’s huge 
banks are a relatively new phenomenon. Interstate banking was seriously 
limited until 1994, the year the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking Act opened 
the door to an enormous wave of bank consolidation. This resulted in 
much greater concentration in the banking industry than existed in prior 
decades. The concentration became even greater as a result of the financial 
crisis, as the Fed and Treasury actively encouraged mergers that would 
have raised serious antitrust concerns at other times.  
To end TBTF, the largest banks need to be downsized to the 
levels of the 1990s or even the 1980s. There is considerable research 
showing that these banks were already big enough by then to enjoy all the 
economies of scale available to large banks today (see, e.g., Davies and 
Tracey 2014 and Mitchell and Onvural 1996). Certainly, it would be hard 
27  The potential for a nationwide drop in house prices stemmed from an 
unprecedented run-up in prices, which was easy to see from publicly available data. 
See, for example, Baker (2002). 
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to argue that companies in the 1990s or even the 1980s were seriously 
hampered by their inability to get access to bank loans.  
The argument most often advanced by opponents of breaking up 
the banks is that our banks would be disadvantaged relative to large banks 
in other countries. In effect, this is an argument that other countries are 
providing TBTF insurance and that we should do the same in order to 
keep up.  
But that would be bad economics. Suppose other countries 
subsidize their car industries. The standard economics argument is not that 
we should also subsidize ours, but rather that we should take advantage of 
the cheap cars that are being made available to our consumers and focus on 
producing different goods and services. If we were being consistent, we 
would have the same attitude toward the banking industry. Of course, 
bankers have considerably more political power than autoworkers. 
Power aside, it would be good economics to break up the large 
banks and restore market discipline to finance. Contrary to what is often 
claimed, breaking up the banks would not be a complex administrative 
task. The government should not be micromanaging the project; the banks 
could do it themselves. The banks know their business and have an 
incentive to break themselves up in a way that maximizes shareholder 
value. The government need only set size caps and a timeline, as well as 
penalties for not meeting the timeline. The banks can figure out how best 
to downsize themselves.  
 
Waste by privatization 
 
The financial industry draws rents when tasks that could be 
performed more efficiently by the government or by a monopoly private 
provider are instead parceled out to financial firms. Social Security is an 
obvious example, since the economics of privatization there have been 
examined extensively. A large body of literature shows that the 
administrative costs of running a decentralized privatized system are far 
greater than the costs of the current Social Security system due to the 
economies of scale in a single large system; the costs that inevitably 
accompany competition, such as marketing; the cost of government 
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oversight; the higher pay that top management earns in the financial 
sector; and the profits earned by the industry (see, e.g., Orszag and 
Stiglitz 2001; National Academy for Social Insurance 1998). 
The same findings about Social Security would apply to many 
sectors that are privatized now, like the privately run system of defined 
contribution pensions. Its average cost of 0.95 percent of assets under 
management (Munnell et al. 2011) compares quite unfavorably to costs of 
the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) for federal employers — just 0.29 percent of 
assets (TSP 2015). Even if one allowed for a doubling of the TSP baseline 
to account for the greater costs associated with contributions from a 
diverse set of employers, the rents accruing to the financial sector would 
still be 0.37 percentage points of the $13.62 trillion in assets of defined 
contribution plans, equivalent to $50 billion a year.28  
Defined benefit pension plans are in a similar situation. They often 
pay excessive fees to managers who provide no better returns than could 
be obtained from investments in index funds. Some pension funds are 
efficiently managed, of course, but many are avenues for cronyism, with 
politically connected managers able to tack on fees that far exceed market 
rates.29 Reducing excessive fees by just 0.1 percent to 0.3 percent of these 
plans’ $11.36 billion in assets30 would free up $12 billion to $35 billion 
annually. 
Another major source of waste is the cost associated with the 
private health insurance industry. Administrative costs in this sector are 
equal to 13.7 percent of benefits paid out compared to less than 2.0 
percent in a government-run system like Canada’s, 31  and getting to 
28  The figure for defined contribution plan assets is from Federal Reserve Board 
(2015).  
29  For example, Steven Rattner, an investment fund manager who later oversaw the 
bailout of the auto industry in the Obama administration, agreed to make a payment 
of $6.2 million to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Gallu et al. 2010) for 
allegedly making payoffs to gain control of a portion of New York State’s pension 
funds.  
30  As of end of first quarter 2015; Federal Reserve Board (2015), Flow of Funds Table 
L.117, line 25.  
31  The calculation for the United States is taken from the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, National Health Care Expenditures Historical Data for 2013 
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Canadian levels would save us over $100 billion annually (based on $120 
billion of costs in 2014). Even if the costs were twice as high as Canada’s, 
the savings would still have been over $80 billion in 2014. A universal 
Medicare-type system would also provide large administrative savings to 
providers who would no longer have to deal with a variety of complex 
insurance rules and forms, to employers who would no longer have to 
handle the administrative work associated with choosing plans and 
managing workers’ benefits, as well to patients. Plausible estimates of the 
size of the first two sources of savings are comparable to the savings on the 
administrative cost in the insurance industry, implying total potential 
savings of $160 billion to $200 billion (Woolhander et al. 2003).  
 
Waste by deception 
 
Many industries, but especially finance, have profited by writing 
contract terms deceptively so as to extract money from customers. One of 
the clearest examples of this practice is the overdraft fees that banks 
charged to debit card holders. Until the Fed stopped the practice in 2010, 
people making payments with debit cards would not be told at the time of 
payment that they had insufficient funds and therefore would pay an 
overdraft fee. A $2.00 cup of coffee could cost $25 or $35 extra from the 
fees. The overdraft bill could get quite large if a person made repeated 
charges because he or she didn’t realize there was no money in the account 
— for example, because a paycheck wasn’t credited properly. 
Before the Fed’s rule, banks were collecting $20 billion a year in 
overdraft fees on debit cards (Martin 2010). While in some cases, people 
may have considered the service of having a payment covered worth the 
overdraft fee, in the vast majority of cases people would likely forego the 
cup of coffee. The rule simply requires that people be notified of the 
overdraft fee at the time of their purchase, unless they explicitly opt out of 
notification (Federal Reserve Board 2009).  
(CMS 2014). Net insurance expenditures from private insurers are taken from Table 
4; insurance payments from Table 2. The estimate for administrative costs in Canada 
is taken from Woolhander et al. (2003).  
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Note that this rule is not just a question of protecting naïve 
consumers from predatory banks. It involves a basic issue of economic 
logic. If it is possible to make large profits by finding devious ways to trick 
customers, then banks and other corporations will devote substantial 
resources to finding devious ways to trick customers. Instead of devoting 
resources to figuring out how to better serve customers, banks will devote 
resources to finding ways to put rules in contracts that allow them to 
profit at their customers’ expense.  
The “buyer beware” argument in this story means that consumers 
would have to spend much more time reviewing contracts and that firms 
would devote more resources to deceiving customers. That is hardly an 
economically optimal outcome.  
It is not easy to get a good measure of the amount of payments 
that might be subject to deceptive terms like overdraft fees. Penalties 
associated with late payments on mortgages have this character, as would 
some credit cards fees and bank mortgage practices during the housing 
bubble.32 Of course, some of these fees are legitimate charges for real 
services to customers who have been clearly notified of the costs. In any 
case, for purposes of further calculation, the $20 billion that banks had 
been receiving in 2009 as overdraft fees on debit cards will be used as a 
placeholder.33  
 
 
 
32  The enormous costs associated with the collapse of the bubble can be blamed in 
large part on the recklessness of the financial industry. Competent regulators could 
have stopped the growth of the bubble. It can be argued that the power of the 
financial industry prevented regulators from acting, but this is at best only part of 
the story. Almost no economists saw the bubble and recognized the danger it 
presented prior to its collapse. This failure applies not only to economists who had 
ties to the financial industry, but to the majority who did not.  
33  These sorts of deceptive practices are not restricted to financial companies. For 
example, Verizon charges customers without a calling plan around $3.50 per minute 
for calls to most European countries (Verizon 2016). Since these calls can be made 
for a few cents a minute on most calling cards, it is unlikely that anyone would ever 
spend more than two or three minutes on a call at these rates. However, Verizon 
does not inform customers of the cost at the time they place their call.  
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The tax shelter industry 
 
Both progressives and conservatives have long supported reforms 
to the tax code that would eliminate loopholes. For most progressives the 
goal is to both raise revenue and to make the tax code fairer. But one 
aspect of the tax code that is underappreciated is the tax shelter industry 
itself, which is a major source of inequality.  
This is perhaps mostly clearly visible in the case of private equity. 
While many private equity companies do what their promoters claim — 
providing capital and managerial expertise to companies that need both — 
much of the gains from private equity stem from the industry’s ability to 
game the tax code (Appelbaum and Batt 2014). For example, it is standard 
practice for private equity companies to load up acquisitions with debt. 
The interest on this debt is deducted from taxable profits, as opposed to 
the dividends that would otherwise be paid to shareholders, which are not 
deductible. Private equity companies will typically also take advantage of 
other loopholes in the tax code. After all, they have access to accountants 
who are experts in gaming the tax code while the small companies they 
acquire generally do not.  
There are ways to reduce the complexity of the corporate income 
tax without jeopardizing it as a revenue source. A simple route would be 
to have firms turn over non-voting shares to the government as a 
replacement for the income tax. For example, if the targeted tax rate is 30 
percent, firms can be required to make a one-time transfer of stock equal 
to 30 percent of their outstanding shares.  
Since they are non-voting, the shares would give the government 
no control: the goal is to secure a claim to corporate profits, not to run 
companies. Apart from issues of control, the government’s shares would 
be treated just like other shares of common stock. If the company pays a 
dividend of $2 a share on its common stock, then it would also pay $2 a 
share on the stock held by the government. If it buys back 10 percent of 
outstanding shares at $100 per share, then it would buy back 10 percent of 
the shares held by the government at $100 per share. If a private equity 
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firm buys out the company, paying $120 per share, then it would pay 
$120 for each share held by the government.34 
It should be possible to design a share system like this as a 
replacement for the corporate income tax and thereby hugely reduce the 
complexity of the current tax code and drastically reduce the 
opportunities for gaming. For this reason it would also reduce the 
potential profits in the tax-gaming industry.  
If it is too great a lift politically to adopt a system of share 
issuance, it should be possible to create a share issuance alternative on a 
voluntary basis. In other words, businesses that opted to issue non-voting 
shares to the government could permanently end their tax liability. This 
should be a major money-saving move for companies that are not trying to 
game the system, since they would no longer have to pay as much to 
accountants for calculating their taxes. This voluntary system would also 
reduce enforcement costs, since enforcement should be a relatively simple 
matter for the firms that issue shares. (The only question for the Internal 
Revenue Service is whether these shares are being treated the same way as 
the firm’s common shares.) The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) could 
focus its attention on the companies that are actively trying to game the 
system, presumably making gaming more difficult.  
The private equity industry provides some measure of the 
potential savings from reducing the gaming of the tax system. The industry 
had almost $3.5 trillion in assets under management in 2013 (Prequin 
2014), and at a management fee of 3.0 percent, including incentive pay, 
the industry’s income would be $105 billion annually. If closing the tax 
and regulatory loopholes that it exploits eliminated one-third of its 
income, the savings would be $35 billion annually. Eliminating half would 
provide annual savings of $53 billion. This is undoubtedly a conservative 
estimate of the potential savings from reducing access to tax shelters, since 
there are many law and accounting firms that are unconnected to private 
34  There would be issues of international coordination and coordination of state and 
federal income taxes. (Presumably state governments could also require some 
percentage of non-voting shares. Of course, these issues of coordination exist under 
the current system as well.) 
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equity that also profit from exploiting these shelters. Since many private 
equity partners are among the richest people in the country, reducing the 
ability for this sector to profit would be an effective way to reverse the 
upward redistribution of the last three decades.  
Because the returns on private equity have fallen sharply in recent 
years, it is no longer clear that even with the gaming private equity is 
beating the relevant stock indexes (Appelbaum and Batt 2016). In this 
case, the fees being paid out to private equity partners are pure waste. 
This drag on the productive use of resources can be addressed by forcing 
pension funds to fully disclose fees and investment returns and by 
withdrawing money from investments where returns do not justify the 
risks. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Eliminating the various sources of rents in the financial sector has 
the potential to free up $460 billion to $636 billion in 2015, or between 
2.6 and 3.5 percent of GDP (Table 4-2). This total does not include 
some potentially large sources of rents that we have not discussed. For 
example, in the last two decades many workers’ compensation programs 
have been wholly or partially privatized, a change that almost certainly 
adds to their administrative costs. It is likely that a centralized system of 
auto insurance, life insurance, and annuities could be administered at 
lower cost than the current one.  
Figure 4-6 illustrates that the potential savings from eliminating 
waste in the financial sector are equal to 6.2 to 8.6 years of SNAP 
spending.35 
Any reductions in revenue going to the financial sector will be to a 
substantial extent at the expense of the wealthy. As noted before, the 
financial sector accounts for a grossly disproportionate share of the 
individuals in the top 1 percent of the income distribution, and many of 
35  There are other estimates of waste in the financial sector that are substantially 
higher. For example Epstein and Montecino (2016) put the cost at almost $1 trillion 
a year. 
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the very highest earners can be found at hedge funds, private equity 
companies, and major Wall Street banks. 
 
TABLE 4-2 
Potential savings in 2015 from reducing rents in financial 
sector 
(billions of 2015 dollars) 
 Low estimate High estimate 
Reduced trading revenue, financial transactions tax  $158 $188 
Ending TBTF subsidy $25 $50 
Centralized defined contribution pension system $51 $91 
More transparent defined benefit pension system $11 $34 
Centralized health insurance system $160 $200 
Predatory practices $20 $20 
Private equity and tax shelter industry $35 $53 
   
Total $460 $636 
Source and notes: Author’s calculations, see text. 
 
FIGURE 4-6 
Financial sector rents, 2015, in units of SNAP spending 
 
Source and notes: Author’s calculations. 
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Chapter 5 
The Old Technology and Inequality Scam: 
The Story of Patents and Copyrights  
One of the amazing lines often repeated by people in policy 
debates is that, as a result of technology, we are seeing income 
redistributed from people who work for a living to the people who own 
the technology. While the redistribution part of the story may be mostly 
true, the problem is that the technology does not determine who “owns” 
the technology. The people who write the laws determine who owns the 
technology.  
Specifically, patents and copyrights give their holders monopolies 
on technology or creative work for their duration. If we are concerned 
that money is going from ordinary workers to people who hold patents 
and copyrights, then one policy we may want to consider is shortening and 
weakening these monopolies. But policy has gone sharply in the opposite 
direction over the last four decades, as a wide variety of measures have 
been put into law that make these protections longer and stronger. Thus, 
the redistribution from people who work to people who own the 
technology should not be surprising — that was the purpose of the policy. 
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If stronger rules on patents and copyrights produced economic 
dividends in the form of more innovation and more creative output, then 
this upward redistribution might be justified. But the evidence doesn’t 
indicate there has been any noticeable growth dividend associated with this 
upward redistribution. In fact, stronger patent protection seems to be 
associated with slower growth. 
Before directly considering the case, it is worth thinking for a 
minute about what the world might look like if we had alternative 
mechanisms to patents and copyrights, so that the items now subject to 
these monopolies could be sold in a free market just like paper cups and 
shovels. 
The biggest impact would be in prescription drugs. The 
breakthrough drugs for cancer, hepatitis C, and other diseases, which now 
sell for tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars annually, would instead 
sell for a few hundred dollars. No one would have to struggle to get their 
insurer to pay for drugs or scrape together the money from friends and 
family. Almost every drug would be well within an affordable price range 
for a middle-class family, and covering the cost for poorer families could 
be easily managed by governments and aid agencies. 
The same would be the case with various medical tests and 
treatments. Doctors would not have to struggle with a decision about 
whether to prescribe an expensive scan, which might be the best way to 
detect a cancerous growth or other health issue, or to rely on cheaper but 
less reliable technology. In the absence of patent protection even the most 
cutting edge scans would be reasonably priced.  
Health care is not the only area that would be transformed by a 
free market in technology and creative work. Imagine that all the 
textbooks needed by college students could be downloaded at no cost over 
the web and printed out for the price of the paper. Suppose that a vast 
amount of new books, recorded music, and movies was freely available on 
the web.  
People or companies who create and innovate deserve to be 
compensated, but there is little reason to believe that the current system 
of patent and copyright monopolies is the best way to support their work. 
It’s not surprising that the people who benefit from the current system are 
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reluctant to have the efficiency of patents and copyrights become a topic 
for public debate, but those who are serious about inequality have no 
choice. These forms of property claims have been important drivers of 
inequality in the last four decades.  
The explicit assumption behind the steps over the last four 
decades to increase the strength and duration of patent and copyright 
protection is that the higher prices resulting from increased protection will 
be more than offset by an increased incentive for innovation and creative 
work. Patent and copyright protection should be understood as being like 
very large tariffs. These protections can often the raise the price of 
protected items by several multiples of the free market price, making 
them comparable to tariffs of several hundred or even several thousand 
percent. The resulting economic distortions are comparable to what they 
would be if we imposed tariffs of this magnitude.  
The justification for granting these monopoly protections is that 
the increased innovation and creative work that is produced as a result of 
these incentives exceeds the economic costs from patent and copyright 
monopolies. However, there is remarkably little evidence to support this 
assumption. While the cost of patent and copyright protection in higher 
prices is apparent, even if not well-measured, there is little evidence of a 
substantial payoff in the form of a more rapid pace of innovation or more 
and better creative work.  
 
Stronger and longer: The path of patent and copyright protection 
since 1970 
 
In recent decades, both political parties have been largely 
supportive of measures to increase the length of patent and copyright 
protection, increase the scope of these protections, increase penalties for 
violations of the law, and extend protections internationally through trade 
agreements and political pressure. As a result, protections in both areas 
are far stronger in 2016 than in prior decades, and a much broader set of 
products are subject to protection.  
Prior to 1995, patents in the United States extended for 17 years 
after the date of issuance. In that year, Congress passed and the president 
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signed legislation changing the length to 20 years from the date of filing to 
be in compliance with the TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights) provisions of the Uruguay Round of the WTO (USPTO 
2015). This law also included provisions allowing for the extension of the 
duration of patents in the event the approval process took more than three 
years, the average length of the process. Patents issued prior to 1995 were 
extended to 20 years from filling or 17 years from issuance, whichever 
was longer. In 2015 the duration of design patents — those that apply to 
the design of a product like furniture or appliances — was extended from 
14 years to 15 years from the date of issuance (U.S. Government 
Publishing Office 2012).  
Prior to 1976, copyrights lasted 28 years from the date they were 
secured, with the possibility of an extension for another 28 years (U.S. 
Copyright Office 2011). The 1976 Copyright Act increased the length of 
the extension to 47 years, for a total possible duration of 75 years, and the 
1998 Copyright Term Extension Act increased it to 67 years, for a total 
possible duration of 95 years. In both cases, the extensions were applied 
retroactively to works whose copyright was still in effect. In 1992, 
Congress made renewal of copyrights automatic for works copyrighted 
after 1964. This is noteworthy because in the United States copyright 
holders do not have to formally register, a change introduced in the 1976 
law. As a result, it can be difficult and time-consuming for someone 
seeking to make use of copyrighted material to track down the copyright 
holder. In fact, in many cases potential users would have no way of 
knowing the material was copyrighted. Legislation in the 1990s extended 
copyrights further to 95 years. 
In addition to duration, the scope of patent and copyright 
protection has been expanded as well. In the 1980s, patents were 
extended to cover DNA sequences and life forms, and in the 1990s it 
became possible to patent software and business methods. The Bayh-Dole 
Act of 1980 allowed for universities, research institutions, private 
companies, and individuals operating on government contracts to gain 
control of patents derived from their work, thereby creating the 
opportunity for universities to earn large rents from patents and for 
researchers to form their own companies, all relying on knowledge and 
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expertise obtained on government contracts. In 1982, Congress created a 
designated court to hear patent appeals cases, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, and it has been substantially more patent friendly 
than prior appellate court panels. In cases where a patent’s validity was in 
question, the new court has ruled in favor of the patent holder in two-
thirds of cases, compared to one-third of cases in prior appellate courts 
(Scherer 2009).  
The scope of copyright protection has been extended to 
accommodate digital technology. The most important development in this 
area was the Digital Millennial Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA), which 
applied explicit rules for digital reproduction and transmission of 
copyrighted work. The act allows for large fines and extensive prison 
sentences for willful violations (U.S. Copyright Office 1998). While it is 
reasonable to have rules for digital reproductions, the act was in effect a 
decision to preserve a form of publication rather than allow it to fall victim 
to changing technology (Kodak film wasn’t so lucky). Even with the 
passage of the DMCA, the entertainment industry remains unhappy with 
the extent to which copyrighted material is reproduced without 
authorization. It has repeatedly sought measures in Congress, such as the 
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the PROTECT IP Act (PIPA), and in 
trade agreements to strengthen copyright enforcement. These measures 
would require Internet intermediaries like Google, Facebook, and millions 
of smaller sites to proactively police postings by third parties to prevent 
copyright violations. These rules would shift the responsibility and cost of 
enforcement from the copyright holder to someone else.  
As technology increases the ease of reproducing and transferring 
copyrighted material, copyright enforcement becomes more costly and 
difficult. Efforts to continue enforcement inevitably impose greater costs 
on society.  
Administrations of both political parties have placed a high 
priority on extending patent and copyright protection to other countries 
through trade agreements and political pressure. The most important item 
in this area was the inclusion in the WTO of TRIPS, which required 
developing countries to adopt U.S.-style patent and copyright laws, albeit 
with a substantial phase-in period (which has been repeatedly extended) 
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for the poorest countries. Other trade deals, like the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, the Central America Free Trade Agreement, and the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, have included “TRIPS-plus” provisions such as 
data exclusivity, which prohibits generic drug manufacturers from using 
test data submitted by brand manufacturers to establish the safety and 
effectiveness of their drugs, and marketing exclusivity, which prohibits 
generic competitors from competing during the period of exclusivity even 
if they conducted their own clinical trials. These treaties have also 
broadened the scope of patentable items; for example, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership requires patents be issued for new uses of existing compounds 
and for combination drugs (many widely used new drugs involve new 
combinations of existing molecules, rather than the development of a new 
chemical entity).  
The United States has also pursued stronger and longer patent and 
copyright protections in bilateral negotiations. For example, the Obama 
administration has been quite public about its efforts to force the Indian 
government to allow patents for combination drugs. It also has sought to 
discourage countries from exercising their right to require compulsory 
licenses for drugs, as explicitly allowed under the TRIPS provisions.  
Stronger patent protections in developing countries serve two 
purposes. The first is the obvious one of increasing the profits of drug 
companies. But the industry also is concerned about the large gap between 
the price of patent-protected brand drugs in the United States and their 
generic equivalents in developing countries. For example, the hepatitis C 
drug Sovaldi has a U.S. list price of $84,000 for a three-month course of 
treatment, while in India high-quality generic versions are available for 
$300 to $500 (Gokhale 2015). For new cancer drugs selling for over 
$100,000 per year, the gap with generic prices could be even larger. 
These enormous differences create a large incentive for patients to seek 
out the generic version, whether by finding a way to bring the drugs into 
the United States or by traveling to a country where the generic is 
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available.36 If the pharmaceutical industry can succeed in taking away the 
generic option, it will eliminate a major threat to its marketing model. 
In short, we have seen considerable strengthening of intellectual 
property rules in the last four decades, as summarized in Table 5-1. The 
result has been a sharp increase in the size of rents for the protected items, 
most notably prescription drugs and medical equipment, which grew from 
0.4 percent and 0.17 percent of GDP in 1975, respectively, to 2.3 
percent and 0.51 percent in 2015. (In the 2016 economy, these increases 
would be equal to $350 billion and $63 billion, respectively.) The increase 
in the economic importance of patents also led to a sharp increase in 
patenting and in patent suits, as the growing value of these rents provided 
more incentive to companies and individuals to pursue and contest 
patents. These costs would be justified if the incentives also led to more 
innovation and creative work, but it is questionable that this has been the 
outcome.  
Before examining some of the recent literature in this area, it is 
worth describing the nature of the possible rents in patent and copyright. 
With both, the government grants individuals or corporations a monopoly 
for a period of time as an incentive to innovate or produce creative work. 
The question of rents comes up in the context of whether such monopolies 
are the most efficient way to provide incentives and whether the system as 
currently structured is optimal. The rents would be the additional cost 
that society incurs as a result of this system being less than optimal. As the 
literature shows, this question does not have a simple answer because it 
can’t be known whether alternative mechanisms will be as effective in 
promoting innovation and creative work. However, it is possible to get 
good estimates of the extent to which these monopolies compared with a 
competitive market raise costs. And there is some basis for assessing the 
36  Pharmaceutical companies have sought to place extraordinary restrictions on the use 
of low-cost drugs in developing countries. For example, Gilead Sciences, the patent 
holder on Sovaldi, authorized a generic version for Egypt. However, a condition of 
this license is that the government carefully police the distribution of the generic. 
Patients are supposed to pick up the drug themselves, and open the container and 
take the first pill in the presence of the pharmacist selling the drug. See McNeil 
(2015). 
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efficiency of alternative funding mechanisms for innovation and creative 
work. These calculations can provide a basis for assessing whether 
alternative mechanisms are likely to be more efficient. 
 
TABLE 5-1 
Legal changes affecting patents and copyrights since 1970 
  
Year Change 
1976 Copyright duration extended to 75 years from 58 years (applied retroactively). End of registration requirement for copyright protection. 
1980 
Bayh-Dole Act allows universities, research institutions, private 
companies, and individuals operating on government contracts to gain 
control of patents derived from their work. 
1980 In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, Supreme Court rules that life forms are patentable. 
1981 
In Diamond v. Diehr, Supreme Court sets rules under which computer 
software can be patented, formalized by U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office in 1996. 
1982 
Congress creates the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit to handle patent claims, a court that proves to be more patent-
friendly. 
1995 
TRIPS provisions of the WTO require member countries to adopt U.S.-
style patent law. Congress extends duration to 20 years from date of 
issuance, with automatic extensions in cases where approval process was 
delayed. 
1998 Copyright duration extended to 95 years (applied retroactively). 
1998 Digital Millennial Copyright Act extends copyright to digital materials. Also establishes liability for third-party intermediaries. 
1998 In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group Inc., Supreme Court rules that business methods are patentable. 
2006 
Central America and Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement and 
Dominican Republic — includes “TRIPS Plus” provisions requiring 
countries to have lengthy periods of data exclusivity when a drug is 
approved by licensing authority. This excludes generics from the market 
even when no patents are applicable. 
Source and notes: Various sources, see text. 
 
Rents from patents and copyrights: What the literature shows 
 
There is a vast literature on the benefits and the costs of patent 
and copyright protection. The case against such protections is best 
summarized in a series of works authored or co-authored by David Levine 
and Michele Boldrin. They note that the number of patent approvals more 
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than quadrupled between 1983 and 2010 with no obvious benefits in 
terms of either expenditures on research and development (R&D) or total 
factor productivity growth. R&D expenditures have been near 2.5 percent 
of GDP since the 1970s, with no upward trend associated with the 
proliferation of patents. The same is the case with total factor productivity 
growth. It averaged 1.2 percent from 1970–1979, while falling below 1.0 
percent in the decade from 2000–2009. (It has been even lower in the last 
six years.) Their work also includes more detailed analyses of multifactor 
productivity growth by sector. They find little relationship between the 
number of patents in a sector and the rate of productivity growth (Boldrin 
et al. 2011). The fit is not improved when measures like frequency of 
patent citations are used instead of the number of patents. In short, they 
find little evidence in this work of the positive benefits of patents. 
These findings are consistent with a series of cross-country 
regressions testing whether GDP growth or productivity growth, by a 
variety of measures, is increased as a result of stronger patent protection 
(Baker 2016). The overwhelming majority of tests find no evidence of a 
positive relationship. In fact, in many of the specifications there is a 
statistically significant negative relationship, implying that stronger patent 
protection is associated with slower productivity growth. While these 
tests are far from conclusive, the implication is that the additional waste 
associated with stronger patent monopolies more than offsets any benefits 
from incentivizing innovation.  
Levine and Boldrin cite a range of evidence that patents can be a 
major source of waste and a hindrance to productivity growth. For 
example, the vast majority of patents are never used, and old, established 
companies often stockpile them to use as competitive weapons against 
smaller upstarts. Examining the upsurge of patents in the semiconductor 
industry in the 1980s and 1990s, Hall and Ziedonas (2001) found that the 
main motivation was to use patents as weapons in lawsuits against 
competitors and as bargaining chips in the settlement of cases. Because 
litigation involves large costs, an established firm is much better situated 
to contest a patent than an upstart with few resources. As a result, a patent 
can be used to force the upstart to share much of the benefits of its 
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technology, even if there is no actual dependence on the patent of the 
established firm.  
This sort of reasoning was widely cited as the main explanation for 
Google’s decision to buy the Mobility division of Motorola in 2011 for 
$12.5 billion. At the time, as a relatively new company, Google did not 
have a large portfolio of patents that could be used as retaliatory weapons 
if it were sued. The purchase of Mobility gave Google a large portfolio.  
The extreme example of using patents for legal harassment is that 
of a patent troll, a company that exists only to push claims of patent rights 
against profitable companies. Boldrin and Levine (2013) note the case of 
NTP Inc., a patent holding company that won a patent infringement case 
against Research in Motion (RIM) over the Blackberry. In order to avoid 
having its system shut down at a point where its service was expanding 
rapidly, RIM agreed to pay NTP $612.5 million to license the use of the 
patent. On appeal, the original ruling was overturned, but RIM did not 
get its money back. The implication is that more than $600 million was 
taken from what at the time was a thriving and innovative company, due 
to a mistaken judicial ruling. Of course, this ruling provided an enormous 
incentive for other companies to follow NTP’s example.  
A study by Bessen and Meurer (2012), which relied on a survey of 
corporate executives, put the direct cost to firms of litigation with patent 
trolls (including settlements) at $29 billion in 2011. An earlier study 
involving the same authors looked at the impact on stock prices and put 
the cost at $80 billion a year (Bessen et al. 2012). Most of the cost in these 
estimates stems from payments made to the patent trolls or the need to 
alter a business plan in response to a patent suit. Insofar as these payments 
reflect compensation for legitimate innovations (a claim disputed by 
Bessen and Meurer), they would not constitute rents associated with the 
patent system; they would simply be redistributions among patent 
holders. But even with this generous interpretation, Bessen and Meurer 
still attribute more than $5 billion of their $29 billion estimate to direct 
litigation costs.  
These litigation costs are pure waste from an economic 
standpoint, and the actual waste to the economy would have to be several 
times this size, because the patent trolls undoubtedly spent a comparable 
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amount on litigation. In addition, this study is only looking at suits with 
patent trolls (formally, non-practicing entities (NPEs)), which account for 
roughly 60 percent of all patent suits. While suits brought by companies 
that actually use the technology may be more meritorious on average, the 
legal expenses are still a cost to the economy. Extrapolating from the $5 
billion estimate of litigation costs, total litigation costs related to patents 
for 2011 could have easily been close to $17 billion, or 7.3 percent of 
total R&D spending for the year.37 And this does not even account for the 
extent to which payments resulting from these suits may not be merited, 
as was the case with the NTP suit and which Bessen and Meurer argue is 
the case with most suits involving NPEs.  
Boldrin and Levine (2013) also note the substantial legal costs 
associated with patent protection. Almost 250,000 patents were filed in 
2010, at an average legal cost of more than $7,000 per patent, implying 
spending of $2 billion in legal fees in 2010 just to file patents. 
Furthermore, with the ratio of litigation to patents remaining roughly 
constant while the ratio of patents to R&D spending has risen considerably 
over the last three decades, the ratio of litigation to R&D spending has 
clearly increased. From the standpoint of the economy, these additional 
legal costs are a pure deadweight loss. 
The legal issues surrounding the proliferation of patents can 
obstruct innovation in a variety of ways. Shapiro (2001) notes the problem 
of “patent thickets,” situations where innovations often involve the use of a 
large set of patents. Patent thickets can result in large transaction costs, 
which may stifle innovation, and the problem can be even more serious if 
inadvertent infringement results in penalties. The paper notes that the 
problem of patent thickets has become especially serious in important 
sectors like semiconductors, biotechnology, computer software, and the 
Internet, since all have experienced a proliferation of patents in recent 
years. In the same vein, patents on research tools, such as transgenic 
animals and biological receptors, have become increasingly common in the 
37  This calculation assumes that the patent trolls’ litigation costs are equal to the 
defendants’ ($5 billion). It then assumes that the $10 billion in litigation costs 
involving trolls accounts for 60 percent of total litigation costs.  
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last three decades. The royalty payments and transaction costs associated 
with these tools can make the research to develop new drugs and medical 
diagnostic products considerably more expensive and thereby slow the 
process. 
Recent research has also found considerable evidence that the 
threat of patent litigation distorts the direction of research and is a 
powerful weapon of larger firms against smaller firms and start-ups. 
Examining the patenting behavior of biotech firms, Lerner (1995) found 
that firms facing higher legal costs, due to their small size, are less likely to 
patent in subclasses where there are many other patents. This is especially 
likely if the firms holding the other patents in the subclass are larger firms 
with substantial legal resources.  
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001a) found evidence of a strong 
reputation effect in which patent holders are more likely to file suits in 
areas where many new patents are being issued. The motivation may be 
that companies want to show their willingness to contest patents to 
intimidate competitors. Suits were also more likely if the patent had fewer 
backward citations. The study takes this as evidence that in new areas 
where the bounds of existing patents are less well established there will be 
a larger basis for contesting claims. 
Both of these findings are troubling from the standpoint of 
promoting innovation. Insofar as a reputation effect is important for 
protecting a claim, it means that larger firms will be better situated than 
smaller ones that may have difficulty covering litigation costs. The finding 
that patent suits are more likely in new areas implies that litigation will 
more frequently be needed to protect patents that are opening new 
ground, and that patents will be of less value to smaller upstarts than to 
well-established firms. 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001b) found that smaller firms and 
individual patent holders are far more likely to be involved in patent suits 
than large firms. The disproportionate negative effect on start-ups is made 
worse by the fact that large patent portfolios seem to provide protection 
from suits. Firms with large patent portfolios are less likely to be involved 
in patent suits even when controlling for the size of the firm itself. The 
conclusion of this analysis is that litigation costs are greater to smaller 
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firms because they are less well situated to pursue litigation avoidance 
strategies. Patents are thus a less valuable asset to smaller firms because 
they are more costly on average for smaller firms to enforce. 
Lanjouw and Lerner (2001) found that larger firms were 16 to 25 
percent more likely to gain a preliminary injunction in a patent suit than 
smaller firms. This figure likely understates the bias in favor of large firms 
because lower litigation costs would mean that they would be more likely 
to pursue weak patent claims than smaller firms. The advantage indicates a 
substantial tilting toward large firms, because a preliminary injunction 
allows the patent holder to effectively maintain a monopoly in the market 
for the duration of the injunction and prevents the defendant from 
receiving a return on its investment.  
There has been considerable study on the importance of patents as 
a subsidy for research. Most of the studies find that in most areas the 
subsidy provided by patents is in the range of 5 to 15 percent of 
expenditures on research (e.g., Jaffe 2000, Schankerman and Pakes 1986, 
Lanjouw 1998, and Schankerman 1998). The major exception is in 
pharmaceuticals, where the subsidy could be 30 percent. These studies 
find a tremendous skewing of patents, with a relatively small share 
accounting for the vast majority of the value. Also, the value of most 
patents seems to dissipate quickly. In several European countries in the 
1970s and 1980s, patents were subject to renewal after five years; that the 
vast majority were not renewed suggests that companies usually did not 
consider the process worth the fees and associated expenses.  
Cohen at al. (2000) surveyed a large number of R&D labs in the 
United States to gain insights into the relative importance of patents as a 
mechanism to support research. The study found that patents were viewed 
as a relatively unimportant mechanism in allowing firms to profit from 
their research. The respondents cited lead time advantages, secrecy, and 
the use of complementary manufacturing and marketing as more 
important than patents. The survey also found substantial differences in 
answers by firm size, with large firms most frequently citing patents as a 
major way to protect their investment in R&D. 
Patents can raise the cost of R&D by making the use of research 
tools costly. This is a growing problem in areas like biotechnology, where 
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many of the tests, tools, and biological materials used by researchers are 
themselves subject to patents. The costs stem not only from the 
compensation paid to patent holders, but also the transaction costs 
associated with all the necessary agreements. The same sort of problem 
comes up with the development of new drugs or software, where several 
patents may be involved in the finished product. The innovator must then 
negotiate with a number of patent holders in order to market its product. 
This process may prevent many products from ever being marketing. In 
cases where firms opt for joint licensing agreements, Lerner and Merges 
(1998) find that the larger firm is most likely left in control of the 
marketing, leaving the newer firm less likely to reap the full benefit of the 
innovation. 
There is also evidence that the publication of patents does not 
serve the intended purpose of diffusing knowledge. Boldrin and Levine 
(2013) argue that firms deliberately write up their patents in ways that 
make them as unintelligible as possible precisely to avoid giving their 
competitors any advantage. This practice is certainly what would be 
predicted as profit-maximizing behavior. As a practical matter, there is no 
real downside for a firm to write its patent in a way that makes it difficult 
to understand — it’s unlikely that a patent will be rejected for poor 
writing. In addition, competitors often deliberately avoid having their 
researchers review patents in order to protect themselves from 
infringement suits (Gallini 2002). For these reasons, the publication of 
patents under current intellectual property rules may do less for the 
diffusion of knowledge than would be hoped. 
In sum, evidence suggests that patents and their enforcement 
impose considerable costs on the economy. There are substantial legal 
expenses associated with patents, as they are increasingly used as weapons 
in a competitive strategy. They are used more often as a tool to harass 
competitors than as a tool to protect innovation. The legal expenses are 
themselves a substantial drain on the economy, but the larger drain is the 
extent to which the expenses distort the innovation process, causing 
companies to abandon promising areas of research and instead look for 
segments of the market where they are less likely to confront a deep-
pocketed competitor. This is likely to be an especially serious problem for 
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smaller companies and start-ups that are less well positioned to engage in 
costly patent litigation. 
The research shows that the effective research subsidy provided by 
patents in most sectors is limited, usually in the range of 5 to 15 percent of 
research expenditures. The major exception is with biomedical research, 
where the subsidy has been estimated at 30 percent. The evidence from 
this research raises serious questions as to whether patents are a net 
positive for innovation and productivity growth. 
The body of work produced and compiled by Levine and Boldrin 
and their collaborators presents an impressive list of the problems 
associated with the patent system. They argue for weakening or 
eliminating patents in most areas. Assuming that the patent system is not 
eliminated in its entirety, they argue for tailoring patent length to the 
specifics of competition in a sector.38 They note the need for some public 
mechanism for funding the R&D of pharmaceuticals, because a free market 
system is unlikely to support the cost of this work. 
Turning now to copyright, a review by Handke (2011) of the 
empirical research on the cost and benefits of the copyright system begins 
by noting that claims by Intellectual Property Owners Association (the 
industry trade group) on the importance of copyright to the economy are 
grossly exaggerated. The industry group estimates the size of the core 
copyright industries at $890 billion in 2007 (6.4 percent of GDP). 
However, this is not a measure of the value of copyrights themselves but 
rather of the size of the industries, like those involving computer software 
or newspapers, that make substantial use of copyright protection. The 
group also exaggerates measures of growth by assuming a constant price 
on products that are in fact rapidly falling in price (e.g., software).  
Handke notes that the evidence with copyrights, like the evidence 
with patents, is ambiguous as to whether they are a net economic positive. 
It cites examples of creative work, such as open-source software, that does 
not depend on copyright protection. It also points out that copyrights can 
38  This suggestion goes directly counter to the thrust of recent trade agreements, 
which have sought to create uniformity in patent duration and enforcement across 
sectors. 
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impede creative work by raising the cost of using copyrighted material in 
derivative work. This can be an especially large problem in the case of 
copyright, because there is no official registry. It is incumbent on the user 
to first determine if a copyright protects material, to find the person or 
corporation in possession of the copyright, and then to make arrangements 
for non-infringing use of the material.  
These transaction costs can be prohibitive in the case of limited 
uses of copyrighted material in books or movies, leading in many cases to a 
decision to simply avoid using the work in question. This issue has often 
been a problem for musicians doing live performances. In principle, the 
venue where the performance is taking place (typically a restaurant or bar) 
should be paying a licensing fee for use of songs to the relevant licensing 
organizations. However, many smaller places with only occasional 
performances may not want to incur this expense. To avoid potential 
liability on their part, they would have to ask performers not to include 
copyrighted material in their sets. This could be difficult for singers or 
musicians who typically use some amount of copyrighted material in a 
standard set. As a result, these musicians may find themselves excluded 
from some of the venues that would otherwise be available to them. 
Because the vast majority of performing artists will receive far more 
money from live performances than the sale of recorded music, copyright 
is more likely to be a hindrance than a support to their work.39  
This can also be a problem for someone interested in using dated 
material that could still be subject to copyright protection in a book or 
movie. For example, a 50-year-old photograph of a not especially 
memorable event, would have near zero value for commercial purposes. 
However, it may be a useful artifact for a book on the time period. An 
author worried about infringing on copyright would most likely opt to 
forego using the picture rather than devote the resources necessary to 
track down the copyright holder for permission. The same would apply 
for a dated piece of music that almost no one has listened to for decades. 
39  In an extreme case, ASCAP, the recording rights organization, once requested that 
the Girl Scouts pay fees for singing copyrighted songs at their campfires. See 
Bumiller (1996). 
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The costs of arranging permissions would dwarf the potential benefits 
from using it in a movie.  
To get an idea of the magnitude of the expenses associated with 
copyright, many companies find it necessary to buy digital assessment 
management systems, which cost about $20,000, just to keep track of the 
items to which they have purchased access. 40  Legal fees from even 
inadvertent infringements can easily run into the tens of thousands of 
dollars.41 
In the case of recorded music, the development of digital 
technology has had a substantial negative effect on revenue. This is 
arguably a positive development for the economy as a whole. Two studies 
(Rob and Waldfogel 2006 and Waldfogel 2010) examining the welfare 
effects of unauthorized copying of recorded music found net short-run 
welfare gains from unauthorized file sharing. While this may seem 
obvious, Handke cites several studies showing that the supply of recorded 
material actually increased following the widespread practice of file 
sharing. By looking at measures of “greatest hits,” Waldfogel (2011) found 
no evidence of deterioration in quality as a result of widespread file 
sharing.  
Another key question with copyrights is the appropriate duration. 
Most analysis tends to find that older works have relatively little value. 
Rappaport (1998) found that most copyrighted works were of little 
commercial value at the time of expiration, though a minority were still 
generating considerable revenue. Landes and Posner (2004) found that 
most copyright holders did not file to extend their copyright after the 
initial 28-year period expired. They note that in 2001 only 1.7 percent of 
the books published in 1930 were still in print. 
Handke observes some unintended effects of copyright. For 
example, copyright restrictions may slow the spread of new hardware that 
could be complementary to recorded material. Also, copyrights may affect 
the mix of work that people consume in ways that favor more established 
40  See, for example: https://www.thirdlight.com/articles/dam-cost. 
41  See, for example: https://webdam.com/blog/true-costs-of-copyright-
infringement/.  
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performers. The review cites several studies showing that less well known 
musicians had better sales and more attendance at live performances after 
file sharing became common. These studies are far from conclusive, but 
such an effect is plausible. In an experimental analysis, Salganik et al. 
(2006) found that people listened more frequently to music that they were 
told was popular. The implication is that marketing certain songs or 
musicians will increase the extent to which the public listens to them at 
the expense of musicians who are not favored. If copyright gives 
entertainment companies an incentive to promote certain performers, the 
public’s choice in music will be skewed toward a narrower group of 
performers.  
Copyright protection in the digital age has required increasingly 
punitive law enforcement measures and extraordinary efforts to inculcate 
respect for copyright monopolies. A Minnesota woman was fined 
$222,000 in 2007 for allowing 24 songs to be downloaded off of her hard 
drive through a peer-to-peer file-sharing system. 42  A provision of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership requires that countries adopt criminal penalties 
for copyright infringement. In order to promote respect for copyright 
laws, an industry trade group even created a patch for Girl Scouts and a 
merit badge for Boy Scouts.43 
These costs are in addition to the deadweight losses, which are 
definitionally associated with copyright monopolies, that raise the price 
above the marginal cost of production, and they are likely to be substantial 
relative to the amount paid to performers, writers, songwriters, and other 
creative workers. A recent analysis of the impact of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership’s copyright provisions in New Zealand placed the elasticity of 
demand for books at -1.77 and the elasticity of demand for recorded music 
at -1.41 (New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment 
2015). These estimates imply that for every dollar that copyright raises the 
price of books and recorded music, the effective cost to consumers in 
42  See: http://abcnews.go.com/US/supreme-court-lets-verdict-stand-recording-
industry-case/story?id=18765909.  
43  See: http://www.ipoef.org/?page_id=30 and 
http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2006/10/8044/.  
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higher prices and deadweight loss is $1.39 in the case of books and $1.22 
in the case of recorded music. If creative workers gets 70 percent of the 
copyright margin in the case of recorded music (in other words, 70 
percent of the mark-up associated with copyright goes to creative workers 
as opposed to promoters, marketing, and profits), this implies that the 
cost to consumers is $1.74 for every dollar that goes to creative workers. 
If the share going to creative workers is 50 percent, then the cost to 
consumers is almost $2.00 for every dollar going to creative workers.  
Patents and copyrights are often used to protect software. 
Analyzing the success of open-source software, Lerner and Tirole (2000), 
focusing on the motivations of the individual developers, found that many 
of them are prepared to devote large amounts of time without any direct 
monetary reward. Instead, they perform the work out of intellectual 
curiosity or as a way to advance their reputation.  
Bessen (2005) focuses on the willingness of companies to support 
open-source systems. The study argues that this support can be an efficient 
way to gain a number of programmers’ insights into difficult problems that 
would not be addressed by standardized software. In this way, open-
source software may be a useful complement to proprietary software and 
other services provided by a company. These insights help in assessing how 
technology can advance in the absence of patent or copyright protection. 
In sum, there are clearly substantial costs associated with 
copyright protection, costs that have increased substantially as a result of 
digital technology. The response of the U.S. government has been to 
promote stronger and more punitive laws and to require third parties to 
share in enforcement costs. 
 
Alternatives to the current patent system 
 
The prior sections provide solid grounds for questioning the 
extent to which patent and copyright protection are efficient mechanisms 
for supporting innovation and creative work. While some research 
suggests that there is no need for any form of explicit government 
intervention to support innovation and creative work, it is likely that the 
market would undersupply both in the absence of some form of 
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government support. This is especially likely to be the case in the areas 
where patents were found to provide the greatest subsidy for research: 
pharmaceuticals and medical equipment.44 In these areas, survey results 
typically found that patents provided an effective subsidy in the range of 
30 percent of the cost of research. By contrast, research on the value of 
patents in other sectors suggested that the subsidy provided by patents was 
generally in the range of 5 to 15 percent.  
The higher implicit subsidy found for the pharmaceutical and 
medical supply industries suggests the need for different mechanisms to 
support research and innovation in these sectors. In these two industries, 
the patent is typically responsible for the bulk of the price of the product, 
often creating a large gap between the patent-protected price and the cost 
of production. The discussion below outlines a mechanism for direct 
public funding of research in these two industries, and then describes a 
modified patent system for all other sectors. 
 
The rationale for public financing for pharmaceutical and medical 
equipment R&D 
 
The importance of patents in the pharmaceutical and medical 
equipment industry is reflected in the large gap between patent-protected 
prices and the cost of production. As noted earlier, patent-protected drugs 
can sell at prices a hundred times higher than their generic equivalents. 
Medical equipment follows a similar pattern. The cost of manufacturing 
even the most complex scanning devices or other cutting-edge equipment 
will rarely be more than a few thousand dollars, yet patent protection 
allows these products to sell for hundreds of thousands or even millions of 
dollars. This cost is recouped in high prices paid by patients (or their 
insurers) for procedures that may have a trivial marginal cost. 
44  Some studies have found large implicit subsidies for patents in the chemical industry, 
raising an argument for treating chemicals the same way as pharmaceuticals and 
medical equipment. However, because chemicals are mostly sold as an intermediate 
good, they do not raise the same set of issues as pharmaceuticals and medical 
equipment.  
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The large gap between price and marginal cost has exactly the sort 
of consequences that economic theory predicts. The first and most obvious 
is that many people are forced to get by without drugs that are actually 
produced at a low marginal cost.45 Patients will also take less than the 
recommended dosage or skip days in order to reduce the cost of their 
drugs. 
A simple calculation of the deadweight loss associated with patent 
protection of drugs indicates that patients incur substantial costs as a result 
of not being able to pay free market prices. 46  Table 5-2 shows the 
deadweight loss based on 2016 expenditures of $450 billion, assuming 
alternatively that drugs would sell for 10 percent and 20 percent of their 
current prices if there were no patent or related protections.47 The table 
applies elasticities of 15 percent, 25 percent, and 50 percent.  
 
TABLE 5-2 
Annual deadweight loss due to patent protection of drugs, 
based on 2016 expenditures of $450 billion 
(billions of 2016 dollars) 
 Elasticities 
 0.15 0.25 0.5 
Free market price = 10 percent of current prices $90.8 $171.2 $475.7 
Free market price = 20 percent of current prices $60.1 $109.0 $271.9 
Source and notes: BEA (2016) and author's calculations, see text. 
 
In the case where the elimination of patent protections reduces 
average drug prices by 80 percent, and elasticity is just 0.15, the 
deadweight loss from current protection would still be over $60 billion 
45  Some patients don’t take drugs due to their costs, resulting in adverse health 
outcomes. A recent study found substantial negative health effects of drug 
copayments in Canada among older people, even though the expected payments 
were relatively limited compared to what most patients would face in the United 
States. See Anis et al. (2005). 
46  The deadweight loss represents the potential benefits that patients would have 
received from taking the drug, who did not do so because they had to pay the 
patent-protected price rather than the free market price. 
47  The $450 billion is taken from BEA (2016), Table 2.4.5U, line 120. It increases the 
2015 figure by 9.5 percent, the same increase as occurred between 2014 and 2015. 
The calculations assume a constant elasticity of substitution consumption function.  
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given 2016 demand and prices. In the case of a 90 percent drop the 
deadweight loss would be $90.8 billion at 0.15 elasticity and $171.2 
billion at 0.25 elasticity.48 These are substantial losses by any measure. 
The $90.8 billion loss would equal almost 0.5 percent of 2016 GDP, and 
the $171.2 billion loss would equal more than 0.9 percent.  
In addition to the deadweight losses, patent protection also 
imposes substantial costs in the form of time and resources that are wasted 
as a result of patent protected prices. These costs take a variety of forms. 
First, even where patients have insurance that covers the cost of 
expensive drugs, the high price often will lead the insurer to demand 
additional proof that the patient needs the drug in question. Insurers may 
require additional tests or a second opinion. The high cost of patent-
protected drugs has created a whole industry of intermediaries — 
pharmacy benefit managers — who negotiate with drug companies on 
behalf of insurers, hospitals, and other institutions. There would be no 
need for this industry if drugs sold at free market prices.  
Because the government is a big payer for drugs through 
Medicare, Medicaid, and other public health care programs, it can set 
standards that effectively determine how much private insurers pay. Thus, 
the pharmaceutical industry is heavily involved in lobbying, both through 
its own agents and through the consumer groups it mobilizes. 49  The 
48   These calculations would understate the loss substantially insofar as the price 
declines are uneven. In effect, the assumption in the calculations is that the price of 
all drugs declines by 80 percent or 90 percent. The Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) puts the reduction in the price of brand drugs in a mature generic market at 
more than 90 percent (FDA 2015). While many drugs are already available as 
generics, even these would often see large price declines in a free market. Some 
generics have the benefit of the six-month period of exclusivity as the first generic in 
the market. Also, in many cases generic manufacturers will still face licensing fees of 
various types, even if the main patent on a drug is no longer applicable. On the 
other side, the price decline for the most expensive drugs may be in excess of 99 
percent. Using averages would understate the loss. Taking these differences into 
account would almost certainly lead to a larger measure of deadweight loss.  
49  Pharmaceutical companies are often major funders of organizations established as 
support groups for victims of specific diseases and their families. These support 
groups are often encouraged to lobby insurers and the government to pay for 
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pharmaceutical industry ranked fifth in campaign contributions to 
members of Congress in 2016 (Center for Responsive Politics 2016a). The 
broader category of health-related industries ranked second, behind only 
finance, insurance, and real estate in total contributions to politicians 
(Center for Responsive Politics 2016b). 
The efforts of drug companies to secure patent protection are not 
just a question of them getting more money at the expense of competitors 
or the general public. They may also be pursuing policies that are 
detrimental to public health. For example, pharmaceutical companies that 
produce pain relief medication have been leading the fight against medical 
marijuana, which has been shown to be an effective substitute for 
prescription pain medications (Ingraham 2016). There can be major 
consequences for public health as patients take stronger and more 
addictive medications when marijuana may be an effective treatment. 
Similarly, the industry uses its ties to patient advocacy groups to try to 
keep generic competitors from being covered by the government or 
insurers (Pollack 2016). This is the sort of corruption one would expect to 
find when there is a huge gap between the monopoly price and the cost of 
production. 
Because so much money is at stake, pharmaceuticals are a prime 
target for litigation. Drug companies routinely bring suits to harass 
competitors, discourage generic competition, or gain a slice of the patent 
rents associated with a highly profitable drug. The pharmaceutical and 
medical equipment industries together accounted for almost a quarter of 
patent-related lawsuits from 1995 to 2014. The suits in the pharmaceutical 
sector had the highest median damage settlement, with medical equipment 
a close third just behind telecommunications (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2015).  
In any legal battle over pharmaceuticals, where the brand drug 
manufacturer is defending the right to sell at a monopoly price for the 
duration of the patent and the potential generic entrant is looking for the 
right to sell in a competitive market, there is a fundamental asymmetry: 
expensive drugs sold by the sponsoring pharmaceutical company. See, for example, 
Nuñez (2006). 
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the brand manufacturer stands to lose much more than the generic 
producer stands to gain. As a result, the brand producer has an incentive 
to spend much more on legal expenses, and it may be tempted to offer 
side payments to discourage entry by the generic competitor. Such 
collusion is illegal, but it is hard to detect, especially if the payment takes 
the form of a contract (e.g., the generic producer is paid to manufacture 
one of the brand manufacturer’s drugs) that could have been reached 
without any collusion. A 2010 study by the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) estimated the annual cost to consumers of these “pay to delay” 
agreements at $3.5 billion (FTC 2010).50  
Another problem with the large gap between price and marginal 
cost is that it provides an incentive for drug companies to conceal evidence 
that reflects poorly on its drugs. If they find evidence that their drug may 
not be as effective as claimed or possibly even harmful for some patients, 
the enormous gap between price and marginal cost gives them an incentive 
not to disclose this information. This was the allegation in the case of the 
arthritis drug Vioxx, where the manufacturer allegedly concealed evidence 
that the drug increased the risk of heart attack and stroke among patients 
with heart conditions. Drug companies also have an incentive to promote 
the use of their drug in situations where it may not be appropriate. Efforts 
to promote drugs for “off-label” use are a regular source of scandal in the 
business press.  
A recent analysis that looked at five prominent instances in which 
it was alleged that drug companies either concealed information about 
their drugs or marketed them for inappropriate uses found that the cost 
born by patients was in the range of $27 billion annually over the years 
1994–2008 (Katari and Baker 2015). While this estimate is far from 
precise, it suggests that the cost associated with improper drug use due to 
deliberate misrepresentations and mis-marketing is substantial, quite likely 
in the range of the amount spent by the industry on drug research. It is 
worth repeating that these costs, in terms of bad health outcomes, are the 
result of deliberate actions stemming from the perverse incentives created 
50  The Public Interest Research Group compiled a list of 20 of the most important 
cases of this sort of pay for delay; see U.S. PIRG (2013).  
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by patent monopolies, not costs from the sort of mistakes that are an 
inevitable part of the research process. 
Another issue with patent monopolies is that they distort the 
research process by encouraging drug companies to pursue patent rents 
rather than find drugs that meet urgent health needs. If a pharmaceutical 
company produces a drug for a particular condition that earns large 
amounts of revenue, its competitors have a strong incentive to try to 
produce similar drugs for the same condition, in order to capture a share 
of the rents. 
For example, Merck and AbbVie, along with several smaller drug 
manufacturers, are rushing to market alternatives to Sovaldi as a treatment 
for hepatitis C.51 In the context in which Gilead Sciences, the maker of 
Sovaldi, has a monopoly on effective treatments for hepatitis C, this sort of 
competition is highly desirable because it will lead to lower prices. 
However, if Sovaldi were being sold in a free market at $500 to $1,000 
for a course of treatment, there would be little incentive to invest research 
dollars finding treatments for a condition for which an effective drug 
already exists. If drugs were sold without protection, research dollars 
would usually be better devoted to developing a drug for a condition 
where no effective treatment exists than developing duplicative drugs for a 
condition that can be well-treated by an existing drug.  
Patent protection also is likely to slow and/or distort the research 
process by encouraging secrecy. Research advances most quickly when it is 
open. However, companies seeking profits through patent monopolies 
have incentive to disclose as little information as possible in order to avoid 
helping competitors. This pressure forces researchers to work around 
rather than build upon research findings. Williams (2010) found that the 
patenting of DNA sequences in the Human Genome Project slowed future 
innovation and product development by between 20 and 30 percent. 
Finally, relying on patent incentives to support medical research 
encourages drug companies to direct research toward finding a patentable 
product. If, for example, evidence suggests that a condition can be most 
51  See, for example: http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/052215/who-are-
gilead-sciences-gild-main-competitors.asp.  
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effectively treated through diet, exercise, environmental factors, or even 
old off-patent drugs, a pharmaceutical manufacturer would have no 
incentive to pursue this research.52 Ideally, the manufacturer would make 
this evidence publicly available so that researchers supported by the 
government, universities, or other nonprofit organizations could pursue 
it, but there is little incentive for them to go this route. In fact, if they are 
concerned that such research could lead to an alternative to a patentable 
product that they might develop or be in the process of developing, their 
incentive is to conceal the research. 
For all of these reasons, patent-supported research is particularly 
ill-suited for the pharmaceutical sector, as well as for the medical 
equipment sector.53 It is likely that a system of directly funded research, 
paid for by the government, would be considerably more efficient for the 
development of new drugs and medical equipment. Such a system is 
outlined in the next section.54 
 
 
52  The United States and many other countries now allow for the patenting of a new 
use for an existing drug; however, there are still likely to be limits to the extent to 
which this might provide incentives for researching new uses of a drug. If it turned 
out that a common drug, like aspirin, was an effective treatment for some other 
condition, it would be very difficult to keep people from using the cheap generic 
versions for the newly discovered treatment, even if it violated the patent.  
53  All the arguments made above on pharmaceuticals would also apply to research to 
develop medical equipment.  
54  This discussion pursues the logic of directly funded research. There have been 
several proposals for creating a prize system for buying out patents and placing them 
in the public domain. While a prize system would have enormous advantages over 
the current system, most importantly because drugs would be available at their free 
market price, it shares some of the major drawbacks with the current patent system. 
Mainly, it would still encourage secrecy in the research process, because companies 
would have the same incentive as they do now to prevent their competitors from 
gaining the benefit of their research findings. The awarding of prizes may also prove 
problematic. The company that manages to patent a drug may not be the one 
responsible for the key scientific breakthroughs responsible for its development. In 
principle, prizes could be awarded for important intermediate steps, not just 
achieving a final endpoint, but this is likely to make the prize process complicated 
and contentious.  
                                               
Rigged 103 
 
Publicly financed medical research 
 
The basic logic of a system of publicly financed medical research 
would be that the government expand its current funding for biomedical 
research, which now goes primarily through the National Institutes of 
Health, by an amount roughly equal to the patent-supported research now 
conducted by the pharmaceutical industry. PhRMA, the industry trade 
group, puts this funding at roughly $50 billion a year, or 0.3 percent of 
GDP, a figure that is also consistent with data from the National Science 
Foundation. That would be a reasonable target, with the idea that public 
funding would eventually replace patent-supported funding.55 Adding in 
research on medical equipment and tests would increase this figure by 
$12–15 billion (National Science Foundation 2012). 
In order to minimize the risk of political interference and also the 
risk that excessive bureaucracy could impede innovation, the bulk of this 
funding should be committed to private firms under long-term contracts 
(e.g., 10–15 years). 56 This practice would allow for the imposition of 
clear rules that apply to all research directly or indirectly funded by the 
public sector, without a need for micro-management. The contracts 
would be subject to regular oversight for their duration, but the 
contractors would be free to set priorities for which lines of research to 
support. The contractors could freely subcontract, and they could use 
55  It would be necessary to have some system of international coordination so that the 
United States was not funding research for the whole world. This would presumably 
involve some payments scaled to GDP, with richer countries paying a larger share of 
their income. While there would undoubtedly be some problems working through 
such a system, the current system of imposing patent and related protections on 
U.S. trading partners has been quite contentious.  
56  The use of private drug companies also has a potentially valuable benefit from a 
political economy standpoint. There is no reason that the existing pharmaceutical 
companies could not bid for public research money, as long as they are prepared to 
abide by the conditions placed on this funding. This means that insofar as they are 
efficient in their conduct of research, they would be able to continue to exist and 
profit on this sort of system. This should reduce their political opposition to an 
alternative funding mechanism. But insofar as their expertise is primarily in 
marketing rather than developing drugs, they would run into difficulties under this 
alternative system.  
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their funds to buy research produced by other companies, just as the major 
pharmaceutical companies do now. As the period for a contract 
approached its end, the contractor could attempt to gain a new long-term 
contract. It would argue its case based on its track record with the prior 
contract.  
The rules governing these contracts would dictate that all results 
stemming from publicly financed research be placed in the public domain, 
subject to “copyleft”-type restrictions. 57  Thus, any patents for drugs, 
research tools, or other intermediate steps developed by contractors or 
subcontractors would be freely available for anyone to use, subject to the 
condition that any subsequent patents would also be placed in the public 
domain. Similarly, test results used to get approval for a drug from the 
Food and Drug Administration would be available for any generic 
producer to use to gain approval for their own product.  
In addition to requiring that patents be placed in the public 
domain, there would also be a requirement that all research findings be 
made available to the public as quickly as practical. This means, for 
example, that results from pre-clinical testing be made available as soon as 
they are known. This requirement should prevent duplication and allow 
for more rapid progress in research, and would apply to both direct 
contractors and any subcontractors.58  
This disclosure requirement would not be a negative for 
participants in the context of this open-source contract system. Because 
the goal is to generate useful innovations rather than procure a patent, a 
contractor would be able to make an effective case for the usefulness of its 
work even if competitors were the ones that ultimately used the work to 
develop a useful drug or medical device. The incentive in this system is to 
57  Copyleft is a type of copyright developed by the Free Software Movement, under 
which a copyrighted software can be freely used as long as any derivative software is 
also put in the public domain subject to the same condition. See: 
 https://www.gnu.org/licenses/copyleft.en.html.  
58  This is the sort of issue that would be examined in periodic reviews of contractors. 
Excessive delays by a contractor in posting findings on an ongoing basis would be 
grounds for revoking the contract. Contractors would also be held responsible for 
the behavior of any subcontractors, which would also be bound by the requirement 
to post findings in a timely manner.  
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disseminate any interesting findings as widely as possible in the hope that 
other researchers will build upon them. 
The contracting system in the Defense Department offers a model 
for contracting in pharmaceutical research. When the Defense 
Department is planning a major project, such as a new fighter plane or 
submarine, it will typically contract with a major corporation like General 
Electric or Lockheed Martin that in turn subcontracts much of the project, 
because it is not prepared to do all the work in-house. Contractors 
conducting research developing pharmaceuticals or medical equipment 
could do the same, although the expected results will be somewhat less 
clearly specified. While less well-defined outcomes are a disadvantage of 
contracting with medical research, a major advantage is that there would 
be no excuse for secrecy. Military research requires secrecy to prevent 
access to the latest technology by potential enemies, but biomedical 
research will be advanced by allowing the greatest possible access. Secrecy 
has often been an important factor allowing military contractors to conceal 
waste or fraud, because only a very select group of people would have 
access to the specific terms of a contract and the nature of the work a 
company is doing. In the case of bio-medical research, there is no reason 
that the terms of the contract would not be fully public. And, all research 
findings would have to be posted in a timely manner. With such rules, it 
should be possible to quickly identify any contractor whose output clearly 
did not correspond to the money they were receiving from the 
government. In spite of the instances of waste and fraud in military 
contracting, it is important to remember that it has been effective in giving 
the United States the most technologically advanced military in the 
world.59 In other words, direct contracting has accomplished its purpose 
even in a context that should be much less favorable to it than bio-medical 
research. 
Because the system of patent protection and rules on data 
exclusivity are now enshrined in a large number of international 
agreements that would be difficult to circumvent, it is important that an 
59  This is not a comment on the actions of the U.S. military; it is simply noting its 
technological capabilities. 
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alternative system work around this structure. As proposed here, patent 
protection under current rules would still be available to drug companies 
conducting research with their own funds. However, they would run the 
risk that at the point when they have a drug approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), there is a new drug available at generic prices 
that is comparably effective. This sort of competition would likely force 
the company to sell its drug at a price comparable to the generic, leaving it 
little margin for recouping its research costs.  
The risk of this sort of generic competition should make the 
current system of patent-financed drug development unprofitable, 
especially if the industry’s claims about its research costs are anywhere 
close to being accurate. So the existing rules on patents could be left in 
place, even as a new system of publicly financed research comes to 
dominate drug development. 
 
The cost-benefit arithmetic of an alternative system 
 
The arithmetic summing the extra costs, deadweight losses, and 
wasteful rent-seeking behavior associated with patents, compared with the 
amount of actual research that is funded, suggests the opportunity for large 
gains through an alternative system. The first and most obvious advantage 
is that all the drugs and medical equipment developed through this process 
would be immediately available at free market prices. Instead of costing 
hundreds of thousands of dollar a year, breakthrough cancer drugs might 
cost $1,000 a year, or even less. The cost would be the price of safely 
manufacturing these drugs and with very few exceptions, that cost would 
be quite low. With drugs selling at prices that even middle-income 
families could readily afford, the whole industry of middle-men that has 
grown up around mediating between the drug companies and insurers, 
hospitals, and patients would disappear. There would be no need for it. 
This would also end the horror stories that many patients must 
now endure as they struggle to find ways to pay for expensive drugs even 
as they suffer from debilitating or potentially fatal diseases. Doctors also 
would not be forced to compromise in prescribing a drug they consider 
inferior because it will be covered by a patient’s insurance when the 
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preferred drug is not. Also, doctors would likely make better informed 
prescribing decisions because no one would stand to profit by having them 
prescribe a drug that may not provide the best treatment for their patient.  
A similar story would apply to the use of medical equipment. In 
almost all cases, the cost of manufacturing the most modern medical 
equipment is relatively cheap. The cost of usage is even less. For example, 
the most modern screening equipment only involves a small amount of 
electricity a limited amount of a skilled technician’s time, and the time of a 
doctor to review the scan. Instead of a scan costing thousands of dollars, 
the cost would likely be no more than $200–300. Here also, the price 
would then be a minor factor in deciding how best to treat a patient. A 
doctor would naturally recommend the device that best meets the 
patient’s needs. And in a context where no one has an incentive to mislead 
about the quality of the equipment, the doctor is likely to make better 
choices. The same would be the case with various lab tests, all of which 
would be available at their free market price. With few exceptions, this 
would be a trivial expense compared to the current system. 
Table 5-3 shows the potential gains from replacing patent-
supported research with direct public funding under three sets of 
assumptions. The most optimistic scenario, shown in column 1, assumes 
that 75 cents of public spending on research is roughly equivalent to $1 of 
spending financed by patent monopolies. The greater efficiency is based on 
the idea that increased openness and the elimination of unnecessary 
duplication will lead to more effective research. It also assumes that 
prescription drugs would sell for 10 percent of their current price if there 
were no patent or related protections.60 In this case, the implied annual 
savings would be $349.5 billion. Adding in the reduction in deadweight 
loss from the high elasticity case shown in Table 5-2 brings the total 
benefits to more than $800 billion a year, equal to 4.3 percent of GDP.  
 
60  With some drugs the price may be high not because the compound itself is subject to 
patent protection but because one of the inputs is. The implicit assumption in this 
discussion is that the inputs would also be in the public domain because they would 
have been produced with public funding. 
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TABLE 5-3 
Gains from ending patent protection for pharmaceuticals 
and medical equipment 
(billions of 2016 dollars) 
 High savings Middle savings Low savings 
Drugs    
     Current spending $430.0 $430.0 $430.0 
     Patent-free cost $43.0 $64.5 $86.0 
     Additional research $37.5 $50.0 $75.0 
 
   
     Net savings $349.5 $315.5 $269.0 
     Reduction in deadweight loss $475.7 $140.1 60.1 
     Total savings $825.2 $455.6 $329.1 
 
   
Medical equipment    
     Current spending $50.4 $50.4 $50.4 
     Patent-free cost $15.1 $15.1 $15.1 
     Additional research $11.2 14.9 $22.4 
 
   
     Net savings $24.1 $20.4 $12.9 
Source and notes: BEA (2016) and author's calculations; see text. For medical 
equipment, the 2016 spending level is a projection from the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS). The estimate for current research spending is taken from 
data for 2012 from the National Science Foundation and increased by 20 percent to 
account for growth between 2012 and 2016. 
 
Column 2 shows an intermediate scenario in which $1 of public 
money for research is needed to replace $1 of patent-supported research. 
This case assumes that prescription drugs would cost 15 percent as much 
to produce as they do today if all patent and related protections were 
eliminated. In this case the savings would be $315.5 billion. Adding in the 
reduction in deadweight loss brings the total net benefit to more than 
$450 billion a year. 
Column 3 shows a scenario in which it takes $1.50 of public 
money to replace $1 of patent-supported research. This ratio implies that 
because money is going through the government, the research process 
becomes hugely less efficient than is currently the case. This is in spite of 
the fact that the research is now fully open, so that all researchers can 
benefit quickly from new findings, and a main motivation for unnecessary 
duplicative research has been eliminated. This scenario assumes that it 
would cost 20 percent as much to manufacture drugs in a world without 
patent and related protections as is the case at present. In this scenario, the 
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savings would still be $269 billion annually or 1.5 percent of GDP. 
Adding in the reduction in deadweight loss from the most inelastic 
scenario would put the total net benefit at $329 billion annually.  
The next set of rows shows the benefits from publicly funded 
research for medical equipment. The assumption in all three cases is that 
the cost of buying and using this equipment would fall by 70 percent if it 
were sold in a free market. The optimistic scenario assumes that 75 cents 
in publicly funded research is equivalent to a dollar of patent-supported 
research, the middle scenario assumes they are equally effective, and the 
pessimistic scenario assumes that $1.50 in publicly funded research is 
needed to replace $1.00 in patent-supported research. In these cases, the 
net annual savings would range from $12.9 billion to be $24.1 billion.61 
While publicly financed research would require the government 
to directly commit funding for research, additional tax revenue should not 
be necessary. The government already directly or indirectly pays for a 
large portion of prescription drug expenditures through Medicare, 
Medicaid, and various other health care programs. In addition, it 
effectively subsidizes private spending on drugs as a result of the tax 
deductibility of employer-provided health insurance and other expenses. 
Table 5-4 shows the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
projections for 2016 spending on prescription drugs and medical 
equipment by source (CMS 2014) as well as the assumed savings.  
For Medicaid and other government programs, the assumed 
savings are 50 percent on both drugs and medical equipment, based on the 
fact that these programs typically pay substantially lower prices for drugs 
than do private insurers. In the case of Medicare, the savings are 70 
percent on drugs and 50 percent on medical equipment, under the 
assumption that insurers within the program pay somewhat lower prices 
for drugs than do insurers not connected with Medicare. In the case of 
61  Even these calculations don’t fully capture the potential benefits from selling drugs 
in a free market. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) projects that 
private insurers will pay just over $150 billion for prescription drugs and medical 
equipment in 2016. With insurance expenses averaging more than 20 percent of 
benefits paid out, a fall in these combined payments of $100 billion would imply 
savings of more than $20 billion in the administrative costs of insurers.  
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private insurers and out-of-pocket payments, it is assumed that savings to 
the government will equal 16 percent of current payments for drugs and 
14 percent for medical equipment, based on drug prices falling 80 percent 
if not subject to patent protection and prices for medical equipment falling 
70 percent. The calculation further assumes that 20 percent of this savings 
accrues to the government in the form of higher tax revenue, because 
taxpayers will deduct less money for health care expenditures.  
 
TABLE 5-4 
Savings to the government from publicly supported research 
for pharmaceuticals and medical equipment 
(billions of 2016 dollars) 
 Health insurance  
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Drugs         
     Spending $342.1 $48.3 $291.8 $142.0 $105.2 $33.8 $10.8 $2.0 
     Savings $126.4 $7.7  $22.7 $73.6 $16.9 $5.4  
         
Medical 
equipment         
     Spending $50.4 $24.7 $25.0 $8.9 $8.5 $7.4 $0.1 $0.6 
     Savings $12.7 $3.5  $1.2 $4.3 $3.7 $0.1  
         
Total 
savings $139.1        
Source and notes: CMS (2014) and author's calculations, see text. 
 
Even with these relatively conservative assumptions, the savings to 
the government based on the 2016 projections would still be over $139 
billion,62 which substantially exceeds the amount of public funding that 
62  These calculations are based on CMS projections of spending on prescription drugs. 
Data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) show spending levels that are 
more than 30 percent higher. A calculation of savings based on BEA spending levels 
would therefore be correspondingly higher.  
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would be needed to replace patent-supported research in even the most 
pessimistic scenario described above. In other words, there would be no 
need for additional tax revenue even in a relatively pessimistic scenario.  
It is possible that there could be some short-term need for 
additional funding due to the lag between research spending and the 
development of new drugs. At least initially, there would be no savings 
from publicly funded research because all the drugs being sold would still 
be subject to the same protections as they enjoy today. The savings would 
accrue over time, as new drugs were produced through the public system 
and were sold at free market prices. For this reason, a switch to direct 
public funding of research may initially increase budget deficits while 
leading to substantial savings soon and over a period of time. 
 
Publicly funded clinical trials 
 
Switching all at once to a system of publicly funded research 
would likely be a difficult step politically and practically, involving a 
radical transformation of a massive industry of a kind rarely seen in the 
United States or anywhere else. Fortunately, there is an intermediate step 
toward a system of fully funded research that would offer enormous 
benefits in its own right. 
There is a simple and basic divide between the pre-clinical phase 
of drug development and the clinical phase. The pre-clinical phase involves 
the development of new drugs or new uses of existing drugs and 
preliminary tests on lab animals. The clinical phase involves testing on 
humans and, if results warrant, proceeding to the FDA approval process. 
The clinical testing phase accounts for more than 60 percent of spending 
on research, although this number is reduced if a return is imputed on the 
pre-clinical testing phase, because there is a considerably longer lag 
between pre-clinical expenditures and an approved drug than with clinical 
tests. 
The clinical testing process involves standard procedures and is 
therefore far more routinized than the pre-clinical phase. For this reason, 
it could be easily adapted to a program of direct public funding. The 
model could be the same as discussed earlier, with the government 
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contracting on a long-term basis with existing or new drug companies, but 
the contracts would specify the testing of drugs in particular areas. All 
results would be fully public, and all patent and related rights associated 
with the testing would be put in the public domain subject to copyleft-
type rules. This procedure would likely mean that contracting companies 
might have to buy rights to a compound before initiating testing. 
Separating out the clinical testing portion of drug development 
rather than fully replacing patent-supported research all at once has several 
advantages. First, particular areas of investigation could be segregated out 
for experimentation. For example, it should be possible to set aside a 
certain amount of funding for clinical trials for new cancer or heart drugs 
without fully replacing private support for research in these areas. Also, it 
should be possible to obtain dividends much more quickly in the form of 
new drugs being available at generic prices. The time lag between the 
beginning of pre-clinical research and an approved drug can be 20 years, 
but the clinical testing process typically takes about eight years and can be 
less if a drug’s benefits become quickly evident in trials. 
Another important early dividend from public funding of clinical 
trials is that the results would be posted as soon as they are available, 
meaning that researchers and doctors would have access not only to the 
summary statistics showing the success rates in the treatment group 
relative to the control group, but also to the data on specific individuals in 
the trial.63 This access would allow them to independently analyze the data 
to look for differences in outcomes based on age, gender, or other factors. 
It would also allow for researchers to determine the extent to which 
interactions with other drugs affected the effectiveness of a new drug. 
In addition, the public disclosure of test results may put pressure 
on the pharmaceutical industry to change some bad practices. The 
problem of misreporting or concealing results in order to promote a drug 
can arise during clinical testing. While misrepresented results can be a 
63  Some information on individuals may have to be put into categories (e.g., age ranges 
rather than specific ages) in order to preserve the anonymity of patients. With rare 
diseases, these categories may have to be fairly broad, but it will still be possible to 
disclose more information than is currently available. 
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problem at any stage in the process, misrepresentations at the pre-clinical 
phase are unlikely to have health consequences because they will be 
uncovered in clinical testing. The problem of patients being prescribed 
drugs that are less effective than claimed or possibly harmful to certain 
patients due to misrepresentations occurs entirely during the clinical 
phase. If experiments with a limited number of publicly funded clinical 
trials can change the norms on disclosure of test results, they will have 
made an enormous contribution to public health. 
 
Potential benefits from upfront funding and marginal cost pricing 
 
While the savings shown in Table 5-3 are substantial, savings may 
not be the most important benefit from adopting a system of upfront 
research funding and marginal cost pricing. If drugs, scans, and tests were 
all sold in a free market, almost all would be relatively cheap, and all but 
the lowest-income households would be able to afford the drugs and tests 
considered beneficial to their health. The elimination of this potential 
financial burden would be an enormous benefit. 
In addition, there are good reasons to believe that a switch to a 
system of marginal cost pricing with fully open research will lead to better 
health outcomes. First, the current system of patent monopolies provides 
drug companies, manufacturers of medical equipment, and proprietary 
testing companies with an enormous incentive to misrepresent the benefits 
of their products and conceal potential negatives. If all of these items were 
sold in a free market where competition had pushed profits down to 
normal levels, there would be little incentive to misrepresent the safety 
and/or effectiveness of a product in order to boost sales. The additional 
profit from increased sales in a competitive market does not provide the 
same sort of incentive for corruption as the opportunity to sell more of a 
product at monopoly prices.  
The other reason why an alternative system of open research 
should lead to better outcomes is that the evidence for effectiveness of a 
drug or procedure would be directly available to doctors and researchers 
rather than held in secret by a drug company or medical equipment 
manufacturer. Doctors will be able to make decisions that focus on the 
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specific situation of their patients. If more than one drug is available for 
treating a condition, a doctor will have access to evidence about relative 
effectiveness for men versus women, or for overweight people, or people 
with other health conditions, allowing the doctor to make more-informed 
decisions for treating patients.  
Also, it is possible that better drugs and equipment will be 
available if openness allows research to advance more quickly. If open 
research turns out to advance more quickly, as some studies have 
indicated, the move away from patent-supported research may hasten the 
invention of treatments and cures for a wide variety of conditions. 
In addition to the benefits to patients and savings for government, 
a system of marginal cost pricing will yield substantial savings to the 
economy. The massive marketing industry that has developed to promote 
sales of drugs would disappear, freeing up resources for productive uses. 
Lawyers specializing in intellectual property tend to be among the most 
highly paid members of the profession, and with marginal cost pricing the 
number of lawyers and lobbyists required for court contests and K Street 
negotiations would plummet. If the demand for lawyers to press or defend 
patent suits in prescription drugs declined it would free up a substantial 
share of these lawyers to pursue other lines of work.  
Marginal cost pricing also would reduce the amount of money 
flowing through the health care insurance industry. On average, insurers 
take over 24 percent of the money paid to providers to cover 
administrative costs and provide their profit. 64  Reducing spending on 
drugs and medical equipment by $100 billion annually would imply 
savings on administrative expenses of more than $20 billion a year. 
  
64  This calculation comes from taking the $194.6 billion estimate for the net cost of 
administering health insurance in 2014 from CMS (2014), national health 
expenditures data for 2014 (Table 2), and dividing it by $796.4 billion, the CMS 
estimate for 2014 payments by insurance companies after subtracting administrative 
expenses (Table 3).  
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Non-patent-supported research outside of the health care sector 
 
While the abuses and inefficiencies of the patent system have the 
greatest consequence in the prescription drug industry and other health 
sectors, similar problems arise elsewhere. In most other sectors, patents 
are less important for supporting research and innovation because factors 
such as a first-mover advantage and complementary services tend to be 
more important in giving companies an edge. In this context, it might be 
desirable to preserve the patent system but reduce its importance. 
As noted earlier, a number of trade agreements commit the 
United States to a set of rules, including 20-year patent duration, which 
would preclude simply altering the basic structure of the patent system. 
However, the government can incentivize firms to accept weaker patent 
rules. Because some of the worst abuses stem from patent trolls who make 
dubious legal claims based on older patents, a major reform would be a 
reduction in the period of patent duration (Love 2013). A patent length of 
three to five years would allow firms to protect their use of new 
technologies for a limited period while giving patent trolls little 
opportunity to dredge up old patents to extort successful innovators.  
What kinds of incentives would convince firms to accept a shorter 
patent duration? One possibility is an expanded R&D tax credit.65 The 
current credit is constructed as a marginal credit of 14–20 percent of R&D 
expenditures in excess of spending over a prior base period; as currently 
structured it costs $18 billion annually, as of 2016, or 0.1 percent of 
GDP.66 This general credit could be eliminated and replaced with a credit 
of 10–15 percent of all R&D expenditures, allowed on the condition that 
all patents claimed by the company are open to the public under the 
copyleft rules after three to five years. After that, any company could 
make use of the patent, provided it also agreed to the shorter duration. 
Such rules would still allow corporations to have the full 20-year patent 
65  Dechezlepretre et al. (2016) provide evidence on the effectiveness of the R&D tax 
credit as currently structured in promoting research spending. 
66  The structure of the tax as well as the estimate of the cost can be found in CBO 
(2015b). 
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term required under trade agreements, but they would have to forego the 
R&D tax credit and free access to material subject to copyleft patents.  
This set of incentives should provide a mix that is roughly 
comparable to that provided by the current patent system and tax credit. 
Table 5-5 shows the National Science Foundation’s estimates of R&D 
spending by sector for 2012, the most recent year available. Total 
spending was about 1.9 percent of GDP; removing spending by 
pharmaceuticals and other health related industries reduces this share to 
1.45 percent.67 A tax credit of 10–15 percent would cost between 0.15 
percent and 0.22 percent of GDP if the take-up rate were 100 percent, 
but this assumption is clearly too high. More likely, 60–80 percent of 
spending would be covered by this system, implying a cost between 0.09 
percent and 0.18 percent of GDP, or between $16 billion and $29 billion 
in the 2016 economy. At the low end, this is about the cost of the current 
R&D tax credit, at the high end it is about 50 percent more. If this system 
led to a comparable amount of research, the benefits to the economy 
should exceed the additional expense. 
 
TABLE 5-5 
Medical and non-medical R& D expenditures 
(billions of 2012 dollars) 
 2012  GDP shares Tax credit 
   10% 15% 
GDP $16,155.3    
Total $302.3 1.87% 30.2 45.3 
Pharmaceuticals and medicines $48.1 0.30% 4.8 7.2 
Navigational, measuring, 
electromedical, and control 
instruments (50%) 
$8.0 0.05% 0.8 1.2 
Electromedical, electrotherapeutic,  
and other irradiation apparatus $4.4 0.03% 0.4 0.6 
Biotechnology  $7.4 0.05% 0.7 1.1 
All other $234.425 1.45% 0.15% 0.22% 
Source and notes: National Science Foundation (2012). 
 
67   This calculation counts 50 percent of the spending in the category “navigational, 
measuring, electromedical, and control instruments” as being health related.  
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Figure 5-1 compares the spending implied from this alternative 
tax credit to the expenses from the current patent system. The expenses 
shown are the annual costs of patent applications, the litigation costs of 
defending patent suits, and the annual cost of settlements as estimated by 
Bessen and Meurer.68 (All numbers are scaled to 2016 GDP.) 
 
FIGURE 5-1 
Expenses associated with patents versus the cost of the tax 
credit 
 
Source and notes: Bessen and Meurer (2012), Boldrin and Levine (2013), and author's 
calculations; see text. 
 
In the low-end estimate, the tax credit would imply modest 
savings compared to the current credit.69 At the high end, the additional 
cost of the credit would be $11 billion in the 2016 economy. Working off 
of the Levine and Boldrin calculation, companies would spend more than 
one-fifth of this amount just on the filing of patents. While firms would 
still have motivation to apply for patents under this alternative system, the 
incentive would be diminished, so the number of patent applications 
68  The $5 billion estimate of defendants’ litigation costs in suits initiated by NPEs is 
multiplied by four to include the plaintiffs’ expenses and to account for the cost of 
lawsuits that do not stem from NPEs. 
69  This is not entirely accurate, because a portion of the current credit goes to firms in 
the health care sector.  
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would likely fall sharply. The cost of litigation derived from Bessen and 
Meurer (2012) in the 2016 economy is $20.3 billion — almost twice as 
much as the high-end net cost of the tax credit. The cost of settlements 
with patent trolls is $28.6 billion, two-and-a-half times as much as the 
high-end cost of the credit.  
These calculations suggest that the economy would be 
substantially better off with a system that relied more on tax credits and 
less on patent protection to support research. Of course, the costs from 
patent litigation would not fall to zero even in a scenario where tax-credit 
support became the dominant mode for financing research. There would 
still be some litigation even associated with the shorter patents and the 
government would have to be prepared to protect its patents for the 
duration of the copyleft period. In addition, some firms will opt to remain 
outside the tax-credit system.  
But the increased competition from having fewer items subject to 
patent protection is likely to mean lower prices in a range of areas. And 
having more research freely available to innovators is likely to hasten the 
pace of innovation, particularly by smaller firms and start-ups for whom 
patent rights, and the negotiation of them, is a major expense. If small 
firms could count on supporting more of their own research through a tax 
credit, they could innovate in the areas dominated now by large firms and 
have less fear that a competitor might expose them to costly litigation. 
This dual-track public and private system will require provisions 
to prevent gaming. Companies might exploit the free access to technology 
and the R&D tax credit to secure for themselves a full 20-year patent. It 
would be all but impossible, for instance, to police the separation whereby 
some parts of a firm are getting the tax credit and access but other parts 
are ostensibly fully funding their own research and are thereby entitled to 
long patents. To prevent this, the receipt of the tax credit and free access 
to copyleft material by any subsidiary of a firm would preclude 20-year 
patent protection for the whole firm. Similarly, the rules on short patents 
would have to apply to companies and patents purchased by a firm that 
was within the tax-credit/copyleft system.  
If the incentives are structured properly, though, few large firms 
would find it advantageous to stay outside the system. The access to the 
Rigged 119 
 
tax credit and the free use of copyleft material should far exceed the 
potential benefits of additional years of patent protection. As a result, it 
would be difficult to envision a company like Google or General Electric 
remaining outside the system. Also, the ability of larger companies to 
benefit from the network effect of having their technology widely adopted 
would provide a further incentive to go with the tax-credit/copyleft 
system. 
Wide adoption of the tax-credit/copyleft system would drastically 
reduce the number of patent suits and narrow the space of operation for 
patent trolls, simply in terms of the odds. If the short patent associated 
with the tax-credit system were five years, and everyone was in the 
system, then the number of patents in force at a point in time would drop 
by 75 percent.70 If the patent were three years, then the drop would be 85 
percent, even before taking into account the likely collapse in the number 
of patents in pharmaceuticals and medical equipment when direct public 
funding largely replaces patent monopolies in these sectors. 
In fact, the actual decline in the number of patents in effect is 
likely to be even larger. Because the life of the patent will have been 
shortened, patents will be of less value. Therefore many companies may 
opt not to patent inventions that they would patent under the current 
system. The net result of this change would be far fewer resources getting 
wasted in filing patents and patent suits and far less concern on the part of 
innovative companies and individual inventors over the risk of being sued 
for patent infringement.  
It will be necessary for the government to be vigilant in protecting 
the patents subject to copyleft rules, both in the case of patents that grew 
out of research supported by the tax credit and also patents that resulted 
from direct public funding in the health care sector. Enforcement of these 
patents would be a great activity to be contracted out to private law firms 
paid largely on commission. This would minimize the risk that 
corporations could use their power to stay outside of the public funding 
70  This calculation assumes that the number of patents issued each year is constant.  
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and tax-credit system and still gain free access to the technology developed 
through these systems.71 
While the shortening of patent durations in most sectors is not 
likely to lead to the same collapse of prices that the ending of patent 
monopolies would cause in the health care sector, it should result in more 
competition and innovation, along with some drop in prices. There would 
be more pressure on larger established companies to constantly innovate 
and improve their products, because they could not count on a lengthy 
period of patent monopolies to protect them from competitors. In 
addition, the free access to a vast amount of technology on a copyleft basis 
to both large firms and smaller start-ups should accelerate the process of 
innovation.  
This system is likely to disproportionately benefit smaller firms 
because they would not need the legal resources to protect their patents 
nor to protect themselves against infringement suits. Also, the free access 
to copylefted technology is likely to be more of an asset to smaller firms 
that don’t have the in-house capacity to negotiate contracts allowing for 
the use of patents held by other firms. While it may be a relatively simple 
matter for an Amazon or an Apple to work out a licensing arrangement to 
gain access to patented technology, this is likely to be a much more 
difficult process for a small start-up without a sophisticated legal 
department. For this reason, having ready access to the technology that is 
copylefted should be a major advantage. 
 
An alternative to copyright monopolies 
 
The clear path of copyright policy over the last four decades has 
been longer and stronger protection. Today, digital technology is posing a 
particular challenge. The law has been repeatedly adjusted to make it 
more difficult to use digital technologies and the web to reproduce 
material subject to copyright protection. In some cases technologies have 
71  There is risk that law firms given the responsibility for enforcing copyleft patents 
could act like patent trolls. But the opportunities for public accountability and the 
option of non-renewal of contracts should limit this risk.  
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been blocked until effective locks could be developed to prevent 
unauthorized reproductions.72  
Enforcement of protections for digital material has also meant 
imposing responsibilities on third parties. Recent laws require 
intermediaries to remove copyrighted material from their sites when they 
have been alerted by the copyright holders. A striking aspect of these laws 
is that intermediaries are liable if they do not promptly remove the 
material after being notified by the copyright holder; the intermediary is in 
effect forced to side with the entity making the copyright claim against its 
customer. The entertainment industry has also pushed measures to require 
intermediaries to proactively search their sites for unauthorized versions of 
copyrighted material. 
This strengthening of copyright law and altering its structure to 
adjust to digital technology and the Internet is interesting not only because 
of the costs involved for the larger economy but also because it highlights 
alternative ways in which society adapts to technological change. 
Technological change has destroyed many sectors of the economy. The 
spread of digital cameras essentially destroyed the traditional film 
industry, causing the collapse of two major U.S. corporations, Kodak and 
Polaroid, and leading to the loss of tens of thousands of jobs. While the 
collapse of these companies and the job losses were unfortunate, no one 
would have considered it a reasonable strategy to block the spread of 
digital cameras.  
On the other hand, when the development of digital technologies 
and the Internet threatened the business model of the entertainment 
industry, the response was to pass laws to contain these technologies to 
preserve the sector’s mode of doing business. This is a great example of 
how it is not technology itself that is determining the distribution of 
income, but rather how various interest groups are able to write the laws 
governing the use of technology.  
72  There was a major debate in the 1990s around the introduction of digital audio 
recorders. In response to lawsuits, the major manufacturers agreed to include locks 
to prevent duplication of copyrighted material. See, for example: 
https://partners.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/10/cyber/cyberlaw/16law.html.  
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Like patents, copyright terms are protected by international 
agreements. However, it is possible to develop a comparable system or 
alternative funding to work around the copyright system. It is important 
that the system respect individuals’ choices in supporting music, books, 
movies, and other types of creative work rather than having a government 
agency decide which work should be supported. For this purpose, an 
individual tax credit would be appropriate. 
The model for a tax credit to support creative work could be the 
tax deduction for charitable giving. It allows individuals to make tax-
deductible contributions to religious, educational, social assistance, and 
cultural organizations with minimum interference from the government. 
In effect, the government is subsidizing the contribution at the taxpayer’s 
marginal tax rate, which is 39.6 percent for the highest-income taxpayers. 
Because the deduction is not capped, it is limited only by the size of the 
taxpayer’s tax liability (i.e. it is not refundable).  
To qualify for tax-deductible contributions, an organization need 
only file with the IRS and indicate the sort of tax-deductible activity in 
which it is engaged. The IRS does not attempt to determine whether an 
organization is “good” as a religious organization or as a provider of food to 
the poor; that determination is left to the taxpayer. The only concern for 
the IRS is that the organization is in fact engaged in the activity that 
provides the basis for its tax-deductible status and that it is not engaged in 
prohibited activities such as political campaigning or profit making 
ventures. 
Eligibility to receive funds through a creative work tax credit 
would work much the same way. Individuals or organizations would 
register to be eligible to receive funds by indicating the type of creative 
work in which they engaged as individuals or supported as organizations. 
This means that individuals would indicate that they are writers, 
musicians, video producers or engaged in some other type of creative 
work. The only issue from the standpoint of the IRS (or any other 
enforcement agency) would be whether the person is in fact engaged in 
the activity and whether the organization used its funding to support the 
type of creative work it claimed to support. In other words, if an 
organization claimed to support the writing of mystery novels or jazz 
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music, then the concern would be whether they had actually used their 
funds for this purpose. 
Because this system is intended to be an alternative to the 
copyright system, the condition for getting funding for both individuals 
and organizations is that they not would be eligible for copyright 
protection. In effect, creative workers would be given the option of 
relying on one or the other system of support. They could choose to rely 
on copyrights to support their work or they could opt to join the tax-
credit system, but they could not do both. In order to ensure that the tax-
credit system did not become a copyright farm system, in which people 
established their reputations in the tax-credit system and then cashed in 
with the copyright system, there should be a substantial gap (e.g., five 
years) between the last time creative workers received funding through 
the tax-credit system and when they could first receive copyright 
protection. 
A convenient feature of this system is that it would be largely self-
enforcing. A person who attempted to secure copyright protection on 
material for which he or she was not eligible would have the burden of 
suing the alleged infringer. Because there would be a registry of everyone 
in the tax-credit system, it would be a simple matter to show that the 
creative worker had been in the system too recently to qualify for 
copyright protection. In this case, there is no need for the government to 
do anything — it protects the integrity of the tax-credit system by doing 
nothing; the person does not have an enforceable copyright. 
From the standpoint of individual taxpayers, the tax-credit system 
would specify a limited sum (e.g., $100) that they could give to 
individuals or organizations registered as eligible recipients. This means 
they could give their tax credit directly to a writer, singer, musician, or 
other creative worker that is in the system or they could contribute to 
organizations that are within the system and are committed to supporting 
particular types of creative work. Individual taxpayers would have the 
option to give the tax credit to a single individual or organization or divide 
it up among as many individuals as they choose. One major difference with 
the tax deduction for charitable contributions is that the tax credit would 
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be refundable, meaning that every person would have the option to 
support creative work of their choosing, even if they had no tax liability.  
There would be some risk of fraud, just as there is with the 
charitable deduction. However, the risks are likely to be considerably 
smaller with the tax credit than with the charitable deduction because the 
sums involved per person would be much smaller. If a high-income person 
contributes $1 million to a bogus charity, he or she receives an effective 
tax subsidy of $396,000 that the charity and the individual could, in 
principle, split between them. A $100 tax credit would require 40,000 
people to scam the government by the same amount.  
A mechanism for preventing simple frauds would be to require a 
modest minimum level of funding for a person or organization to be 
eligible to receive any funds. Requiring that an individual has a floor of at 
least $3,000 and an organization of $10,000 would largely prevent simple 
trade-off arrangements whereby people agree to give each other their 
credits. Coordinated tax credit swapping might still be possible, but it 
would require a considerable amount of coordination, and therefore risk 
for a relatively small payout. 
A credit of $100 opted for by 90 percent of the adult population 
(a high percentage, but this is free money) would generate more than $22 
billion a year to support books, movies, music, and other creative work. 
This amount would vastly exceed the amount currently going to creative 
workers through the copyright system, although it would total far less than 
the current subsidy for charitable contributions, which is likely in the 
neighborhood of at least $54 billion in 2016.73  
73  The CBO estimated the size of this subsidy at $40.9 billion for 2006 (CBO 2011). 
Adjusting for the growth of the economy would put it at $54 billion in 2016. This is 
likely an understatement, since the tax rate for high-income taxpayers rose from 35 
percent to 39.6 percent in 2013. As a result, a contribution of the same dollar 
amount would imply a substantially larger tax subsidy in 2016 than it did prior to 
2013. 
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An issue that would naturally arise with this system is its scope. 
For example, should journalism be included as a type of creative work? 74 
How about video games or software?  
The logic of the system would suggest that the boundaries be 
drawn broadly, for two reasons. First, it would be difficult if not 
impossible to police the boundaries. If a person were being supported for 
writing non-fiction books but also posted weekly or daily pieces on the 
web on political events, would he or she be violating the rules if the 
system was not intended to support journalism? There would be a similar 
story with video games. At what point would interactive art become a 
video game? Do we want the IRS making this assessment?  
The second point in favor of broad boundaries is that they would 
minimize the need for copyright protection. The goal of the creative work 
tax credit is to make a large amount of material available to the public that 
can be transferred at zero cost. Putting more material in the public domain 
in different areas is a positive benefit, as long as people value this work. 
The ultimate check on the boundaries of the system is what people are 
prepared to support with their tax credits. If few people opted to support 
journalism or video games, then these industries would remain largely 
dependent on copyright protection. 
 
The special case of textbooks 
 
Textbooks are an enormous expense for college students: 
households are on a path to spend more than $10.5 billion on them in 
74  The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) estimated the number of people employed as 
reporters in 2015 in print, broadcast, and Internet journalism at 44,360. The 
average annual pay was $50,700; the median was $37,700 (BLS 2016b). Fully 
supporting their pay through the creative work tax credit would require roughly 
$2.2 billion of revenue from the credit. Of course, newspaper and broadcast outlets 
require other support personnel as well. However, even in the absence of copyright 
protection it would still be possible to charge for print versions of newspapers or 
other publications and for advertising, even if the fees would be lower for material 
that could be duplicated.  
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2016,75 or about $500 per student. The figure is even higher for full-time 
students. A single textbook can cost several hundred dollars, and renting 
one can cost $50–100 per semester. As with prescription drugs, most of 
this cost is attributable to a copyright monopoly.  
Public funding could produce a large number of textbooks free 
from copyright restrictions. The arithmetic here is striking. An 
appropriation of $500 million a year (0.01 percent of federal spending) to 
finance textbook writing and production would cover 500 books a year, 
assuming an annual cost of $1 million per textbook. After 10 years, 5,000 
textbooks would be available in the public domain to be downloaded at 
zero cost, or printed out in hard copy for the cost of the paper.76  
In addition to offering enormous cost savings to students, this 
system would offer more flexibility to professors, who could combine 
chapters from different textbooks without the need for time-consuming 
and costly permission requests. Updating a textbook would be much 
simpler because there would no need to have a complete new edition to 
add one or two additional topics.  
This is an area where long-term contracts with private publishers 
could work quite well. The contracts in this case, unlike prescription 
drugs, could be well defined. Publishers could specify how many books 
they intended to produce and the timeline on which they expected to 
produce them. Their ability to get subsequent contracts would depend on 
the quality of the work and the timeliness of the production. Because all 
information — the contract, the publication dates, and the books 
themselves — would be fully public, the problem of political favoritism 
should be minimized.  
Furthermore, anyone could still produce textbooks under the 
copyright system. If the publicly financed texts proved to be inferior, few 
professors would use them. This competition would provide a clear 
market test of the quality of the publicly financed work. 
75  BEA (2016), Table 2.4.5U, line 67. This spending does not correspond exactly to 
college textbooks because it refers to “educational books,” a category that can 
include some other books that are not college texts.  
76  Because the funding might also be used to finance updates of existing texts, the 
number of discrete books published through this system might be somewhat lower.  
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Conclusion: Savings from alternatives to patents and copyrights 
 
The prior sections suggested alternative mechanisms to patents 
and copyrights for supporting innovation and creative work in a variety of 
areas. While prescription drugs and medical equipment are almost 
certainly the most important area for alternatives to the existing system, 
there are many other areas in which the current patent and copyright 
system is likely posing a drag on economic growth. Switching to a system 
that relies on alternative mechanisms for supporting patents and copyrights 
could lead to substantial savings for households and businesses. 
Table 5-6 shows projected 2016 spending and potential savings in 
areas where the costs of current monopolies are likely to be largest. 
Savings for recorded music and video material as well as recreational 
books are pegged here at 50 percent, under the assumption that the tax-
credit system will make available a vast amount of free writing, music, and 
video material. Savings on educational books are pegged at 70 percent, 
under the assumption that the bulk of textbooks will be produced through 
the publicly funded system. The savings for prescription drugs are based 
on the calculation in Table 5-3. Savings in newspapers and periodicals, 
motion pictures, and cable TV are pegged at 20 percent. (With cable, 
many people may opt to rely on the Internet and cancel cable 
subscriptions.) The figure for medical equipment is loosely derived from 
the earlier calculation in Table 5-3; it is larger here because this figure 
reflects spending to purchase the equipment rather than the fees charged 
to patients. The total potential savings are $435 billion, or 2.4 percent of 
GDP.  
The calculations shown in Table 5-6 are speculative, of course, 
because there is no way to determine in advance the effectiveness of an 
alternative funding mechanism to replace patents and copyrights. There 
are good reasons for believing that an alternative would be at least as 
effective, especially in the case of patents. The prospect of having fully 
open research, where the incentive is for dissemination rather than 
secrecy, would almost certainly lead to more rapid progress than the 
current patent system.  
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TABLE 5-6 
Total savings from patent/copyright alternatives 
(billions of 2016 dollars) 
 Current spending 
Potential 
savings 
Recorded music and video material (line 42) $30.8 $15.4 
Educational books (line 67) $10.5 $7.4 
Recreational books (part of 90) $30.2 $15.1 
Prescription drugs (line 131) $430.0 $315.5 
Newspapers and periodicals (line 141) $61.2 $12.2 
Motion pictures (line 210) $15.0 $3.0 
Cable and satellite television and radio services (line 215) $95.0 $19.0 
Medical equipment and instruments (Line 6) $94.0 $47.0 
    
 Total $434.6 
Source and notes: BEA (2016), Tables 2.4.5U and 5.5.5U, and author's calculations; 
see text. 
 
More importantly, bringing prices in line with production costs 
would offer enormous gains, especially in the case of drugs and medical 
equipment. It is difficult to understand the logic of paying for innovation at 
the point where a patient needs a drug or access to medical equipment. 
Monopoly pricing imposes an enormous burden on people at precisely the 
time when they are least able to bear it. A payment system should be 
structured to let patients and their families focus on getting well, not 
paying for their health care. No one would propose determining payments 
for firefighters when they show up at a burning house, but this is 
effectively what we are doing with patent monopolies in the medical 
sector. The absurdity is heightened by the fact that the ultimate payment is 
almost always a political decision, not a matter of consumer choice, so 
proponents of the patent system can’t use the classic justification for 
market outcomes. 
Weakening or eliminating patent and copyright support for 
innovation and creative work would radically reduce waste. In a market 
system, the best way to make profits should be to produce better 
products, not to run to court. But the patent system increasingly supports 
this second path to profits.  
Economists have been successful in raising awareness about 
marginal cost pricing. The idea that consumers and the economy benefit 
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from eliminating tariffs and other trade barriers is widely recognized even 
if not universally accepted. However, the public is less aware of the much 
greater gap between prices and the cost of production as a result of patent 
and copyright monopolies. Economic theory tells us that the costs 
associated with this gap are enormously larger than the costs associated 
with the traditional trade barriers that remain. There is little reason to 
believe that the gain from the innovation and creative work that is induced 
by these forms of protection is remotely comparable to the costs, 
especially when considering the potential benefits of alternative 
mechanisms for providing incentives. 
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Chapter 6 
Out of Control at the Top: CEO Pay in the 
Private and Public Sectors 
There is an old joke that conservatives told about left-wing 
agitators at the start of the 20th century. The story goes that the speaker 
jumps up on the soap box and yells out: “If I had two million dollars, I 
would give you one.” He then says, “And if I had two houses I would give 
you one.” He continues, “If I had two pigs.” The radical then pauses and 
says quietly, “wait, I have two pigs.”  
This perspective seems to describe many of those working against 
inequality at our leading nonprofit foundations. While many foundations 
now list combating inequality as major part of their agenda, their top 
executives often draw paychecks in the high hundreds of thousands of 
dollars. For example, the average pay package for the highest paid non-
financial position at the country’s 10 largest foundations in 2014 was 
$820,000.77 This comes to more than 20 times the annual earnings of the 
median worker (BLS 2016c). 
77  Calculation is based on data from 990 Forms filed with IRS. 
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While the rise in pay at nonprofits is following the pattern of 
soaring CEO pay in the corporate sector, it would be interesting to ask 
what would happen if some of the major nonprofits committed themselves 
to a more modest ceiling on pay, say $400,000: the annual salary of the 
President of the United States. This would force down the pay of not only 
the president, but also of many of the other top officers at places like the 
Gates Foundation and the Ford Foundation. Would they still be able to 
find competent, hardworking people if these positions paid just 10 times 
the earnings of a typical worker?  
Suppose that the foundations took this issue a step further and said 
that they would not give grants to institutions in which people were paid 
more than the President of the United States? That could create an 
interesting dynamic. If several major foundations took this step, then it 
would provide a substantial incentive for college and universities to 
comply so that their faculty was not excluded from a major potential 
funding source. Smaller colleges might move quickly, since in many cases 
the only people over this cap would the president and perhaps a few other 
top managers, and even for these people the pay cuts need not be too 
large. 
If the top paid people at some schools took cuts to meet this 
standard, there would be pressure on others to follow suit. After all, it 
would be difficult for a college to recruit new faculty if prospects knew 
that they would be cut off from foundation funding by taking a job at that 
college, but not at its equally prestigious competitor. As more colleges 
went this path, the pressure would grow for many universities to also cut 
high-end pay. 78  It is certainly plausible that a dynamic would develop 
leading to a permanent lowering of pay for those at the top throughout the 
college and university system. This would mean lower tuition payments 
for students and more money available for less-well paid employees. 
There is also a policy argument for some sort of limit, since 
taxpayers are subsidizing these exorbitant paychecks as a result of the tax-
exempt status of foundations and universities. If we assume that the bulk 
of the contributions to these institutions come from people in the top 
78  The football coach would pose a problem. This is discussed later in the chapter.  
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income bracket, on which the tax rate is 40 percent, the taxpayer subsidy 
on the $820,000 average pay for foundation CEOs would come to 
$328,000 a year. That’s a good sized subsidy to be going from taxpayers to 
people who are way into the top 1 percent of wage earners.  
It would be impressive if one or several of the large foundations 
took the president’s pledge and committed itself to keeping the pay of its 
own staff under $400,000 a year and also imposing this ceiling on the 
institutions that receive grants from the foundation. But, we may not see 
this one anytime soon. After all, the foundations may be committed to 
fighting inequality, but like the radical with two pigs, there is a limit to 
this commitment.  
 
Trends in CEO pay 
 
The top executives of major corporations have always been well 
paid. It is a demanding job, and people generally rise to the top position 
only after a establishing long records as a competent managers. But the pay 
of top executives has exploded relative to everyone else over the last four 
decades. As Figure 6-1 shows, in the 1960s a CEO could expect to earn 
around 20 times as much as a typical worker. The ratio rose slightly to 23-
to-1 by 1973, to 32-to-1 by the end of the decade, to 58-to-1 by the end 
of the 1980s, to 120-to-1 in 1995, and to 376-to-1 at the peak of the stock 
bubble in 2000. It drifted somewhat lower in the 2000s, but stood at 276-
to-1 in 2015.  
We could believe that this explosion in pay is due to the fact that 
today’s CEOs are hugely more productive than CEOs were in the 1960s. 
If the pay reflects productivity, then CEOs went from being 20 times as 
productive as the typical worker to more than 200 times as productive in 
recent years and almost 400 times as productive in the late 1990s. It is also 
worth noting that United States is an outlier in this respect. CEO pay has 
risen everywhere but not by as much as in the United States. So this means 
that our CEOs not only became hugely more productive relative to the 
typical worker, but they also became hugely more productive relative to 
the CEOs in Europe, Japan, and South Korea. Since there are plenty of 
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large, highly profitable companies in Europe, Japan, and South Korea, this 
doesn’t seem likely. 
There also are many examples of CEOs getting exorbitant pay 
packages who certainly did not in any obvious way contribute to 
generating large amounts of shareholder value. Marissa Mayer, who took 
over as CEO of Yahoo in 2012, provides a recent example. 
  
FIGURE 6-1 
CEO-to-worker compensation ratio 
 
Source and notes: Mishel and Schieder (2016). 
 
At the point where Mayer stepped in, Yahoo was in a state of 
disarray. It had been one of the Internet pioneers of the 1990s and still had 
a huge base of users. But its traffic and revenue had been falling, as 
competitors like Facebook were rapidly pulling away users. The company 
lacked clear direction and had gone through three CEOs in less than four 
years. Mayer was seen as the best hope for a turnaround, having 
established an impressive reputation as a top executive at Google.  
She undertook a number of initiatives, including several large 
acquisitions, but none were very effective and the downward trend in 
revenue and earnings continued. Mayer negotiated the sale of the core 
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company to Verizon in 2016 for $4.8 billion, by some calculations 
considerably less than its value when she took the helm.79  
According to calculations by Stephen Gandel, a reporter at Fortune 
magazine, Mayer stands to walk away with more than $120 million when 
the deal is completed (Gandel 2016). This is quite a chunk of money for 
running a $4.8 billion company for four years. (This assumes the value of 
the company did not change during her tenure.) If Yahoo shareholders 
could have expected a return of 7.0 percent a year on their shares (the 
long-term average for stock), the money paid out to Mayer was a bit less 
than 10 percent of their expected earnings.  
Mayer’s compensation pales next to that of Robert Nardelli, who 
was CEO of Home Depot from 2001 to 2007. Nardelli left with $210 
million in compensation even as the company’s stock lost almost 40 
percent of its real value. The Home Depot’s poor performance can’t be 
explained by bad things hitting the home retail sector; the stock price of its 
main competitor, Lowe’s, nearly doubled over the same period.  
 
How CEOs get away with ripping off their companies 
 
The reason that CEO pay includes a large component of rent is 
that corporate governance is subject to serious collective action problems. 
It is very difficult for the shareholders to get together to do what may be in 
their common interest; in this case reduce CEO pay. The problems of 
running corporations effectively should be viewed the same way that 
conservatives often correctly point to problems in running government 
efficiently.  
Conservatives point to patronage, favoritism, and outright 
corruption in government as arguments to restrict its domain. The logic is 
that it is difficult for the average citizen to do much to rein in abuses. The 
personal stake of a citizen in preventing wasteful government is small. 
79  The calculation of Yahoo’s value is complicated by the fact that it owns a substantial 
stake in Alibaba, the Chinese Internet retailer, and Yahoo Japan, which is a separate 
publicly traded company. Most of the value of the traded stock is derived from these 
assets, not the value of the company managed by Mayer.  
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People may end up paying higher taxes than necessary or receiving worse 
services than they should, but their personal gain from taking action would 
be dwarfed by the amount of time and money they would have to commit 
to an effort with an uncertain outcome. By contrast, the direct 
beneficiaries of the corruption — for example, contractors receiving 
excessive payments, have a large stake in maintaining the status quo.  
The problem with corporate governance is very similar. In 
principle, the shareholders would hire their CEO and other top 
management at the market wage, paying them as much as their next best 
alternative and no more. 80  However, the structure of modern 
corporations does not typically allow for this sort of market transaction in 
setting CEO pay.  
Stockholders are a diffuse group of individuals and institutions, 
most with little direct stake in the running of the company since the 
dividends and capital gains are a small portion of their income. Organizing 
among shareholders to improve corporate practices and to change top 
management has high transaction costs, and so it is far easier for 
shareholders to simply sell the stock of a company if they are unhappy with 
its performance. In this environment, top management will often have 
effective control over the running of a company.  
Ostensibly, CEOs and other top management are answerable to 
the corporation’s board of directors, but corporate boards are generally 
composed of people who have other demanding jobs and can at best 
devote a small fraction of their time to the oversight of the corporation. In 
fact, it’s common for directors to sit on multiple boards, further reducing 
the time they can devote to overseeing the operations of any one 
company.  
One of the champions in this area was Erskine Bowles, who 
served as Chief of Staff to President Clinton in his second term and later 
went on to be president of the University of North Carolina. While 
80  This discussion works from the assumption that the duty of the corporation is 
maximizing returns to shareholders. This is a debatable issue, but is accepted as the 
standard framing in this chapter. The argument is that corporations are not currently 
being run in ways that best serve the shareholders. 
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serving in this latter position, Bowles simultaneously sat on the boards of 
General Motors, Morgan Stanley, and Cousins Properties. The first two 
companies needed bailouts from the government to stay in business, but 
sitting on the board of two companies that faced bankruptcy did not 
damage the demand for Bowles as a director. After General Motors’ 
bankruptcy cost Bowles his directorship there, he added directorships at 
Norfolk Southern and Facebook to his portfolio. This is an impressive 
collection of moonlighting jobs given that being president of a major 
university is ordinarily thought of as demanding work. It seems fair to 
assume that not much is expected of the directors of major corporations.  
Bowles attractiveness to companies as a director likely has more to 
do with his political stature and connections than his insights into running 
a large corporation. But this is not uncommon; many directors have held 
high-level political positions. (Table 6-1 in the Appendix gives a list of 
directors from the 100 largest publicly traded companies in the United 
States who have previously held positions in government.) The political 
connections of these directors may prove useful to the companies in 
getting contracts or dealing with regulators, but they are unlikely to be 
especially useful in ensuring that a company is well managed and serves the 
best interests of its shareholders. 
Furthermore, even if directors had the time and ability to 
challenge management, they typically have little incentive to do so. CEOs 
often play a role in selecting board members. In many companies, the 
CEO sits on the board, sometimes as chair. Directors are generally well 
compensated for their work, usually getting yearly stipends that run into 
the hundreds of thousands of dollars for attending a few meetings 
(typically six to 12 a year). They are unlikely to put their positions at risk 
by challenging top management than just going along with them and 
presumably most of the other directors.  
It is almost impossible for directors to be voted out through a 
shareholder revolt. An analysis of director elections in 2012 by Investor 
Shareholder Services found that 99.6 percent of the 17,081 directors 
nominated by management were approved (Stewart 2013). Even among 
the 61 who were defeated, 55 were still on the payroll many months later 
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at the next proxy filing. Their fellow directors were apparently willing to 
shelter them from the wrath of shareholders. 
For these reasons, the pay of top executives is not determined in 
anything resembling a normal market. There is little downside to directors 
signing off on increasingly excessive pay packages. And it is difficult for 
shareholders to override the directors, either by directly forcing down 
CEO pay or putting in a more responsible slate of directors. 
The amount of money at stake is huge. Lucian Bebchuk, one of 
the country’s leading experts on CEO pay, calculated that total 
compensation paid to the top five executives at public companies 
amounted to $350 billion over the 10-year period from 1993 to 2003 
(Bebchuk and Grinstein 2005). Furthermore, the amount going to the top 
five executives increased from 5 percent of after-tax profits in 1993–1995 
to 10 percent in 2001–2003. If this 10 percent figure still held in 2015, 
then around $120 billion a year was being paid out to the top five 
executives. Cutting this figure in half to its mid-1990s level would imply 
savings of $60 billion annually, or a year of SNAP spending, as shown in 
Figure 6-2. Cutting it by 75 percent would leave the ratio of the pay of 
CEOs to ordinary workers at 70-to-1, more than twice its 1970s level, 
and save $90 billion a year, or one-and-a-half years of SNAP. 
 
FIGURE 6-2 
Impact of reducing the pay of the top five executives in the 
U.S., in units of SNAP spending 
 
Source and notes: Author’s calculations; see text. 
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Academic research on CEO pay 
 
A considerable body of academic work has been devoted to the 
question of whether the value of their work justifies CEOs’ salaries. 
Answers point in both directions, but there is no shortage of studies 
indicating that CEO pay cannot be justified by the returns to shareholders. 
Bebchuk et al. (2006) compiled much of the evidence available at 
the time supporting the case that a large portion of CEO pay is rents. For 
example, the study notes research showing that superstar CEOs, those 
who win awards or are featured on business magazine covers, receive a 
large pay premium in subsequent years even though shareholders receive 
below-normal returns (Malmendier and Tate 2008). It also cites research 
showing that CEOs at companies that score highly on measures of good 
corporate governance receive lower pay than those at companies that 
score poorly (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 1999). This finding suggests 
that if corporate directors actually did their jobs in representing 
shareholders, CEOs might make less money. Finally, the study notes 
research showing that CEO pay responds strongly to factors occurring by 
chance that affect company profits, such as a sharp rise in world oil prices 
affecting an oil company’s profits (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). 
A number of other anomalies cited in research indicate a lack of 
connection between CEO pay and returns to shareholders. One study 
found that the companies of CEOs who bought mansions provided lower 
returns to shareholders in subsequent years (Liu and Yermark 2007). The 
study took this finding to indicate that CEOs who feel secure enough in 
their position to buy large homes feel less need to perform for 
shareholders. Yermark (2005) found that allowing a CEO to use a 
corporate jet was associated with a lower subsequent return for 
shareholders. Another study found that CEOs of companies in states with 
strong antitakeover provisions received higher pay than CEOs in other 
states (Barnhart, Spivey, and Alexander 2000). The implication is that if 
CEOs feel less threatened by the risk of takeovers, then they are more 
comfortable pushing up their pay.  
Evidence suggests that stock options to CEOs give them an 
incentive to manipulate earnings so that share prices will rise just before 
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the CEO is in a position to exercise the options. One way of finding 
evidence of this sort of manipulation is measuring the frequency with 
which earnings are restated. Burns and Kedia (2003) found that larger 
option grants are associated with more frequent restatements of earnings. 
This pattern would be consistent with a situation in which top 
management deliberately misstated earnings to increase the value of stock 
options at the point of exercise. Deliberately misrepresenting earnings is 
illegal, of course, although executives are almost never charged with it. 
However, there are many ways in which CEOs can affect the timing of 
earnings that are totally legal. For example, they can delay writing down a 
bad investment or shutting down a money-losing operation if they fear 
these actions would depress the share price. The timing on stock options 
could give them this sort of incentive, even if the action is contrary to 
shareholders’ interests. 
A recent paper provided remarkable evidence on the issuance of 
options in the 1990s (Shue and Townsend 2016). This analysis found that 
corporate boards failed to recognize that the value of an option was rising 
hugely over the course of the decade as share prices soared. Since they did 
not want to appear to be cutting the pay of their CEOs, they felt the need 
to give them the same number or more option grants, even though this 
implied a substantially larger pay package than was warranted by their 
performance. If this finding holds up to further scrutiny, it means that 
corporate boards had no idea how much they were paying their CEOs. 
Certainly, directors cannot effectively rein in CEO pay if they do not even 
know how much they are paying their CEOs.  
Quigley, Crossland, and Campbell (2016) looked at the impact of 
unexpected CEO deaths, like from an airplane or car crash, on stock 
prices. The reason for focusing on unexpected deaths is that it takes away 
the possibility that the death may have been anticipated and its impact 
already reflected in the stock price, as might be the case when a CEO dies 
after a long illness. In almost half of the cases examined since 1990 (44.3 
percent), the price of the company’s stock rose following the death of the 
CEO. If incumbent CEOs are uniquely talented individuals who cannot be 
easily replaced, then their loss should be unambiguously bad news for the 
company’s shareholders. In fact, the market might be expected to 
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overreact on the negative side to the unexpected death of a CEO, since 
there might be the expectation that the CEO actually was a major asset to 
the company even in cases where it is not true. After all, why else would 
they be paying them so much money? 
Finally, Marshall and Lee (2016) looked at long-term (10-year) 
returns to shareholders relative to total CEO pay at 429 large corporations 
over the years 2006–2015. The study found a significant negative 
relationship, with high CEO compensation being associated with worse 
returns to shareholders. The analysis divided CEO pay by quintiles and 
found that the total return to shareholders of companies with pay in the 
bottom quintile was more than 60 percent higher than the return to 
shareholders with CEO pay in the top quintile. These findings are hard to 
reconcile with a story in which the pay of CEOs reflects their ability to 
increase returns to shareholders.  
Some research suggests that CEOs are worth their pay. For 
example, Fernandes et al. (2009), which examined CEO pay in the United 
States and 14 other wealthy countries, argued that most of the higher CEO 
pay in the United States is explained by the fact that a much larger share of 
CEO compensation here is paid in stock options and other risky forms. 
The study argued further that if these payments were assigned their risk-
free value, most of the differences in pay would go away. But boards 
generally remove much of the risk of option-based pay by offering options 
at lower strike prices (the price at which the option can be exercised), in 
case the stock underperforms. The study also found that stronger 
corporate governance in other countries makes a substantial difference in 
CEO pay, but this is consistent with the rent story.  
A study that has attracted considerable attention, Cronqvist and 
Fahlenbrach (2012), is an analysis of CEO pay at companies that transition 
from public ownership to ownership by private equity. The rationale for 
focusing on these companies is that with private equity ownership there is 
no separation between ownership and control, and so if the problem of 
CEO pay is one of a corporate board that does not act in the interest of 
shareholders, then a takeover by private equity should remove this 
obstacle. The private equity company stands directly to gain by minimizing 
CEO pay, insofar as the pay is consistent with maintaining the 
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performance of the CEO. From this perspective, if CEOs of publicly held 
companies are drawing rents, then they should see sharp cuts when private 
equity owners take over. But Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach found little 
reduction in non-performance-based pay, such as straight salary and 
benefits, and a large rise in incentive pay. This outcome is often taken as 
evidence against the claim that CEO pay involves a substantial rent 
component. 
While Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach have performed an interesting 
analysis of the issue, their findings are far from conclusive on the question 
of rents in CEO pay. A major problem with using companies held by 
private equity as a comparison is that, almost by definition, the private 
equity firm is expecting the company it takes over to undergo major 
transitions. This is the point of the takeover. The private equity firm hopes 
that by restructuring the company, it can increase profitability. Its plan is 
to bring its takeover back on the market and resell it as a public company 
in three to 10 years.  
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising the CEO’s pay 
would go up. Much more is being demanded of the CEO than had been 
the case previously. In effect, the private equity company is looking for 
firms that have not been especially innovative and fast-growing and then 
turn them around into ones that are. The fact that a CEO of a firm 
undergoing this sort of transition would get higher pay than the CEO of a 
firm that was stuck in a rut doesn’t seem to offer much insight into 
whether or not CEOs typically draw rents.  
Like most academic debates, the one on CEO pay is not 
completely conclusive. Still, there is enough solidly grounded research to 
support the intuition that CEOs earn pay that is not proportionate to their 
contribution to shareholders.  
 There seems little dispute that luck plays a large role in CEO pay 
with many CEOs getting huge payouts because of factors that were 
completely out of their control. The risks faced by CEOs in this way are 
clearly not symmetric. A CEO of an oil company can earn tens of millions 
of dollars if the price of oil doubles or triples, but she will not have to pay 
tens of millions if the price of oil collapses. The CEO in that case will still 
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get her base salary and benefits which will be in the neighborhood of 50 
times the compensation of ordinary workers. 
We also know that corporate boards are often ignorant of both 
their companies’ activities (how many directors of major banks realized 
the bank was on the edge of collapse in the summer of 2008) and the value 
of the compensation packages that they are giving to their CEOs. 
Moreover, directors face an asymmetric incentive structure in which there 
is almost no downside risk associated with supporting management. It is 
almost impossible for directors to be voted off boards, and so if they want 
to keep a very part-time job that pays several hundred thousand dollars a 
year, the easiest path is to go along with management.  
Taking all of these factors into account, it is reasonable to believe 
that there is a substantial component of rent in CEO pay. In other words, 
it should be possible to find competent people who would work hard to 
increase profitability and shareholder returns for considerably less pay. 
It is worth noting that pay at poorly governed companies will 
inevitably affect the pay at well-governed companies. While it is not 
common for CEOs to jump companies, having overpaid CEOs at poorly 
governed companies in the reference group for determining CEO pay will 
tend to increase the pay for CEOs at even the best-run companies. If the 
norm is for CEOs at large companies to be paid between $10 million and 
$20 million a year, a well-managed company will have a tough time 
retaining top-quality executives for $3 million to $4 million a year, even if 
that pay package were more appropriate given the marginal contribution 
of the CEO to profitability.  
 
The importance of bloated CEO pay for the economy 
 
The issue of high CEO pay is not just a moral question of whether 
some people are getting too much money. Bloated pay for CEOs levies a 
substantial cost on the economy. But their pay and the pay of those 
immediately under them and on down through the corporation is only part 
of the picture. The run-up in CEO pay has the effect of raising salaries for 
top executives in educational institutions, hospitals, and private charities. 
The salaries of these executives can be expected to loosely follow CEO 
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pay, since the top executives of these organizations can legitimately say 
that they could make more in the corporate sector. As a result, nonprofits 
have to offer competitive pay to attract people with high-level 
management experience. 
Table 6-2 shows the pay of the presidents of the country’s 10 
largest charitable foundations. The highest paid is James Cuno, who got 
just less than $1.1 million in 2014 for serving as president and a trustee of 
the J. Paul Getty Trust. The average pay for this group is just over 
$856,500. It is interesting to compare this to the pay of the median 
worker. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the median 
worker would have earned less than $40,000 in 2014 working the year-
round (BLS 2016c). This means that the ratio of Mr. Cuno’s pay to the 
median worker’s pay was a bit more than 27-to-1 for the year. That is 
higher than the ratio of the pay of CEOs to the typical worker in the early 
1970s. Taking the average for this group, the ratio is more than 20-to-1. 
That is roughly the same as the average ratio for the 1960s, meaning that 
the compensation of these foundation presidents is as high relative to the 
pay of an average worker as what a CEO would have received 50 years 
ago.81 
Bloated pay structures also affect the top administrators at colleges 
or universities, although at public institutions the biggest paychecks go to 
athletic coaches. Table 6-3 shows the top five salaries at the University of 
California, Berkeley and the University of California at Los Angeles, along 
with the pay of the schools’ chancellors. It also shows the five highest-paid 
employees at five schools in the California State University system. 
 
 
 
 
 
81  The foundation president is generally not the highest-paid person at the foundation. 
In most cases the top-paid person is the chief investment or financial officer. In the 
case of the Getty Trust, the treasurer and chief investment officer earned $1.6 
million in 2014. The high pay for investment officers reflects the extent to which 
pay in finance is out of line with pay in the rest of the economy. 
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TABLE 6-2 
Pay of presidents of 10 largest charitable foundations (2013 or 
closest year) 
(2013 dollars) 
Person Foundation Annual salary 
Sue Desmond-Hellmann  Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation $897,868 
Darren Walker Ford Foundation $714,200 
James Cuno J Paul Getty Trust $1,083,310 
Risa Lavizzo-Mourey  Robert Wood Johnson Foundation $835,116 
Sterling Speirn  W.K. Kellogg Foundation $860,008 
La June Montgomery 
Tabron W.K. Kellogg Foundation $434,523 
Larry Kramer  William and Flora Hewlett Foundation $634,592 
Carol Larson  David and Lucile Packard Foundation $688,399 
Robert Gallucci  John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation $666,543 
Stephen McCormick Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation $603,750 
Earl Lewis  Andrew W. Mellon Foundation $755,189 
Don Randel Andrew W. Mellon Foundation $392,221 
   
 Average salary $856,571.90  
Source and notes: IRS 990 forms of listed institutions. Salaries for Andrew W. Mellon 
Foundation and W.K. Kellogg Foundation are part-year. 
 
TABLE 6-3 
Five highest-paid employees at selected California schools 
(including chancellor or president) 
(2014 dollars) 
Person/institution Position Annual salary 
   
UC Berkeley   
     Daniel Dykes Head Coach $1,805,400 
     Jeff Tedford Head Coach $1,800,000 
     Cuonzo Martin Head Coach $1,188,381 
     Michael Montgomery Head Coach $893,149 
     Anne Barbour Head Coach $634,305 
     Nicholas Dirks Chancellor $532,226 
   
UCLA   
     James Lawrence Mora Intercol Ath Head Coach EX $3,476,127 
     Stephen Todd Alford Intercol Ath Head Coach EX $2,745,341 
     Khalil Tabsh HS Clin Prof-HComp $2,303,327 
     Ronald Busuttil Prof-HComp $2,232,921 
     Abbas Ardehali Prof-HComp $1,556,331 
     Gene Block Chancellor $430,116 
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TABLE 6-3 
Five highest-paid employees at selected California schools 
(including chancellor or president) 
CSU Chico   
     Paul Zingg President $344,959 
     Lorraine Hoffman Administrator IV $219,838 
     Belle Wei Administrator IV $204,120 
     Drew Calandrella Administrator IV $202,782 
     Arnoldus Rethans Instructional Faculty – 12 Month $198,755 
   
CSU Northridge   
     Dianne Harrison President $304,775 
     Reginald Theus Administrator III $275,808 
     Harold Hellenbrand Administrator IV $227,994 
     Colin Donahue Administrator IV $214,662 
     Robert Gunsalus Administrator IV $210,844 
   
CSU Fullerton   
     Mildred Garcia President $335,486 
     Anil Puri  Administrator IV $244,027 
     Jose Cruz Rivera Administrator IV $214,384 
     Gregory Saks Administrator IV $209,883 
     Dedrique Taylor Administrator IV $198,094 
   
CSU Long Beach   
     Donald Para President $244,362 
     David Dowell Administrator IV $218,477 
     Mary Stephens Administrator IV $208,823 
     Forouzan Golshani Administrator IV $200,673 
     Jeetendra Joshee Administrator IV $198,148 
   
CSU Sacramento    
     Alexander Gonzalez President $368,943 
     Sanjay Varshney Instructional Faculty – Academic Year $296,958 
     Ming-Tung Lee Administrator IV $207,054 
     Thomas Sperbeck Administrator IV $203,079 
     Lori Varlotta Administrator IV $196,370 
Source and notes: Transparent California (2016). Does not include benefits. 
 
One head coach at UCLA earned $3.5 million and another earned 
$2.7 million in 2014; two head coaches at Berkeley earn $1.8 million 
each. The other high-end earners on this list are heads of medical clinics at 
UCLA. The pay of the chancellors at both schools is modest in 
comparison: Berkeley’s chancellor received $532,000, UCLA’s $430,000.  
The schools in the California State University system provide an 
interesting contrast. The highest-paid person in this group is Alexander 
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Gonzalez, president of California State University, Sacramento, who 
received $369,000 in 2014. While the California State University system 
is clearly a big step down in its stature in academia from Berkeley and 
UCLA, these are large institutions with tens of thousands of students and 
budgets that are well over $100 million. In other words, the top 
administrators have positions of considerable responsibility.  
The chancellors of Berkeley and UCLA fare poorly even 
compared to some of their counterparts elsewhere. The top-paid 
university presidents earn well over $1 million a year, as shown in Table 
6-4. Yale’s Richard Levin earned $1,653,000 to come in 10th on the list. 
Some presidents who may have been a surprise were Anthony Catanese 
who earned $1,884,000 at Florida Institute of Technology, Dennis Murray 
who earned $2,688,000 at Marist College, and Joseph Aoun who earned 
$3,122,000 at Northeastern University. In fairness, many university 
presidents are paid largely for their ability to attract donations, and it is 
possible that these presidents were especially successful in attracting 
contributions. However, this is a skill that matters much more in an 
unequal society that depends on donations from the rich to support higher 
education. Being able to develop relationships with the wealthy is a much 
less valuable skill in a society where the wealthy have less money and 
education is supported through other channels. 
 
TABLE 6-4 
Top paid university presidents 
(2013 dollars) 
Person Institution Annual salary 
Robert Zimmer University of Chicago $3,358,723 
Joseph Aoun Northeastern University $3,121,864 
Dennis Murray Marist College $2,688,148 
Lee Bollinger Columbia University $2,327,344 
Lawrence Bascow Tufts University $2,223,752 
Amy Gutmann University of Pennsylvania $2,091,764 
Anthony Catanese Florida Institute of Technology $1,884,008 
Esther Barazzone Chatham University $1,812,132 
Shirley Ann Jackson Rensselaer Polytechnic University $1,752,642 
Richard Levin Yale University $1,652,543 
Source and notes: Westerholm (2013). 
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Policies to combat high pay at the top 
 
The implication of CEOs and other top executives earning large 
rents is that they are taking away money that would otherwise go to 
shareholders and perhaps to lower-paid workers. This means that 
shareholders have a stake in reining in CEO pay in order to increase 
returns. But the current corporate governance structure makes it difficult 
for shareholders to exert control and push CEO pay down to its market 
level. The solution is to find ways to increase the ability of shareholders to 
rein in pay.  
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 included a modest step in this 
direction. The law requires that every three years companies hold a “say-
on-pay” vote in which shareholders can vote up or down on the pay 
package provided to the company’s top executives. The vote is non-
binding, so it doesn’t require the company to alter its pay package, but it 
provides at least some opportunity for shareholders to provide feedback. 
As a practical matter, it is difficult to rally shareholders in a say-on-pay 
vote, just as it is difficult to organize for an election to the Senate or for 
the presidency. A large number have to be contacted to have any hope of 
winning, and there is not much incentive to organize since, even if the 
measure succeeds, it’s not binding.  
Furthermore, the voting structure is stacked against unhappy 
shareholders. A large portion of corporate shares are voted by mutual 
funds and asset management companies. Blackrock, the world’s largest 
asset management company with $4.6 trillion under management and 
control of the largest block of proxies at many of the country’s largest 
companies, has supported management in 97 percent of say-on-pay votes. 
TIAA-CREF, the huge retirement fund for college and university faculty, 
has supported management at even higher rates (Marriage 2016). Just as 
directors may view corporate CEOs as their friends rather than their 
employees, it seems that a similar relationship exists with many of the 
asset managers who control the bulk of company stock. They have little 
reason to pick fights with the management on behalf of the people they 
ostensibly represent.  
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However, there are ways to change the incentive structure of the 
people in a position to act. Suppose, for example, that the rules stipulated 
that directors lost their stipend for the year in the event of a “no” vote on 
management pay. Directors would stand to lose hundreds of thousands of 
dollars, and the risk might cause them to think about pay packages a little 
more carefully. 
Congress could institute such a measure just as it included the say-
on-pay package in Dodd-Frank. Note that this rule would not in any way 
limit the pay that CEOs receive. Rather, it gives shareholders more power 
to contain pay. Since CEOs ostensibly work for the shareholders, this rule 
might even be considered a pro-business measure, and it would be 
reasonable to ask corporations to adopt it voluntarily. After all, given that 
less than 3 percent of say-on-pay packages are rejected, it hardly seems to 
be asking too much of directors to risk their pay on the possibility that 
they will be in the bottom 3 percent.  
It is possible to envision going even further and constructing pay 
packages for directors that give them a direct incentive to limit CEO pay. 
Suppose that directors were given the opportunity to share half of the 
savings from cutting the pay of the CEO and the next four highest-paid 
executives, provided that the subsequent stock returns matched or 
exceeded those of a peer group. 
 This would mean that if the directors of a steel company cut the 
pay of their CEO by $3 million a year for a three-year period and they 
achieved comparable savings from the compensation packages of the next 
four most highly paid executives taken together, then they would be able 
to split a total of $9 million (half of the $18 million in savings) if the 
returns on the steel company’s stock at least matched those of its 
competitors for these three years, and a subsequent five-year period. The 
latter is necessary to avoid incentivizing short-term behavior.  
There are many ways to design contracts that would incentivize 
directors to restrict CEO pay. From the standpoint of shareholders, this is 
the way directors should be thinking. They should constantly be asking 
whether it is possible to get comparable performance from the CEO and 
other top executives while paying less, just as management tries to 
minimize costs by paying ordinary workers as little as possible given their 
Rigged 149 
 
levels of productivity. Remarkably few if any companies design the 
compensation packages for directors along these lines. 
It would probably be too much micro-management for the 
government to mandate incentive packages that encourage directors to 
hold down CEO pay. However, it is certainly reasonable for shareholders 
such as pension funds, foundations, and universities to ask the companies 
in which they hold stock why directors have no incentive to limit CEO 
pay. This is consistent with maximizing returns to shareholders. After all, 
if a CEO is being paid more than necessary for a person with his or her 
abilities and performance, then the shareholders are throwing away their 
money. And in cases like Yahoo and Home Depot, the money wasted on 
CEOs who didn’t produce amounted to a large percentage of 
shareholders’ expected returns. 
 
Limiting pay at nonprofits 
 
The tax-exempt status of nonprofit organizations amounts to a 
substantial subsidy. Since donors can deduct their contributions from their 
taxable income, taxpayers effectively pick up much of the tab. A person in 
the top 39.6 percent income bracket saves 39.6 cents in taxes for every 
dollar contributed to a tax-exempt organization, money that must be 
made up by other taxpayers. If the contribution takes the form of a 
bequest in a will, the public foregoes the 40 percent estate tax that 
otherwise would have been collected. 82  In short, taxpayers are major 
contributors to these organizations. 
For the top executives of foundations and universities, the amount 
of the taxpayer subsidy is impressive. The president of the Getty Trust 
received $1,083,000 in compensation in 2013. If we assume that most of 
the money for the foundation came from people in the 39.6 percent 
82  The story is little changed if a foundation or university has an endowment that 
provides a substantial portion of the executive’s income. If not for the tax 
exemption, the original contribution would have been substantially smaller, which 
would make the current year income smaller by the same percentage.  
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bracket, the taxpayer subsidy for that year amounts to $642,000, 83 
equivalent to more than 281 food stamp years, based on the $127 a month 
average benefit (Figure 6-3). The subsidy for Robert Zimmer, the 
University of Chicago’s president, amounted to $1,330,000 in 2011, or 
873 food stamp years. The subsidy for James Mora, the head football 
coach at UCLA, who received a salary of $3,476,000 in 2013, was 
$1,376,000, or 903 food stamp years. 
 
FIGURE 6-3 
Taxpayer annual subsidies to high-end earners working at 
nonprofits, in years of food stamp benefits 
 
Source and notes: Author’s calculations; see text. 
  
The fact that the salaries of these executives are subsidized by 
taxpayers is important because it is reasonable to then ask whether they 
should be limited in some way. Note this does not mean telling the Getty 
Foundation, the University of Chicago, or anyone else how much they can 
pay their top executives. It simply means that if they want to get a subsidy 
from taxpayers in the form of tax-exempt status, there will be a limit on 
what they can pay their top executives. The restriction is attached to the 
83  Alternatively, if the money is from an estate, the heirs saved 40 percent of this 
money on their estate tax.  
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subsidy, if they don’t want the subsidy they can pay people whatever like, 
but if they want the taxpayers to foot a large part of the bill, then they 
have to accept limits. 
The President of the United States earns $400,000 a year, and 
every four years many people with impressive credentials compete 
vigorously for this position. If a foundation, university, or private charity 
can’t attract good help for this price, perhaps it does not deserve taxpayer 
support.  
The case of athletic coaches raises interesting issues. The major 
college programs compete directly with professional teams that routinely 
pay millions of dollars to top coaches, and it is likely that college programs 
would have a problem getting and retaining good coaches without offering 
comparable pay. However, should these highly visible athletic teams be 
getting special tax treatment as a result of their ties to the university? 
There is a solid argument for public subsidies for higher education, but the 
argument for subsidizing Ohio State’s football team is less clear cut.  
We wouldn’t expect a university to own a steel factory or a hotel 
chain and then claim special tax treatment for these for-profit businesses. 
The athletic programs at major universities are clearly business enterprises 
that have nothing to do with the traditional function of the university. If 
imposing a $400,000 cap on pay for the head coaches made it impossible 
for them to attract top quality talent, then the schools might make a 
decision to divest themselves of the affected programs. A private business 
could run “Ohio State football” or “University of North Carolina 
basketball,” there is no reason for taxpayers to be footing a large share of 
the cost for these teams. Their fans can pay the cost without a taxpayer 
subsidy.  
 
Conclusion: Letting the market work to rein in pay at the top 
 
This chapter has argued that the explosion in CEO pay over the 
last four decades is largely attributable to a failure for the current system 
of corporate governance to impose effective checks on the pay of top 
corporate executives. The pay of CEOs is largely at the discretion of 
corporate boards of directors. These directors often owe their job to the 
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CEOs and in any case have little incentive to ever try to push CEO pay 
down. It is nearly impossible for shareholders to remove directors and 
almost no director ever loses their position because of a failure to hold 
down the pay of top executives. 
In this context the incentives push directors toward going along 
with ever higher pay packages. The problem is not only that these lead to 
bloated pay for CEOs, but also for the other top executives in the 
corporate hierarchy. In addition, the high pay in the corporate sector spills 
over to high pay for top executives in private foundations, universities, 
and charities. Changing the rules of corporate governance to make it easier 
for shareholders to hold down CEO pay and to give corporate directors a 
direct incentive to hold down pay would be a market-friendly approach to 
applying discipline to CEO pay. Stockholders would never have incentive 
to vote for lower CEO pay if they believed that paying less to their top 
executive would lead to lower returns to them as shareholders. For this 
reason, making it easier for them to reduce CEO pay is very much a 
market-oriented reform. 
The argument for the nonprofit sector is that these institutions are 
paying their top executives with public funds since they benefit from large 
tax subsidies. Just as the government puts all sorts of other restrictions on 
the activities of organizations receiving tax-exempt status, it can also make 
caps on pay a condition. Foundations and universities would still be free to 
pay their top executives whatever they wanted, but they wouldn’t be able 
to receive a subsidy if they violated the pay ceiling. 
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Chapter 7 
Protectionism for Highly Paid 
Professionals  
The United States will spend more than $3.3 trillion in 2016 on 
health care (CMS 2015), more than $10,300 per person and roughly twice 
the average for other wealthy countries. But for all this extra spending it is 
not clear that we get better quality health care. By some measures, like life 
expectancy and infant mortality rates, the United States ranks low among 
rich countries. While treatment for some conditions is better here, we 
cannot say that the quality overall is better. 
A big part of the difference in costs is that our doctors are paid 
twice as much as doctors in other wealthy countries. Average pay for 
doctors in the United States is over $250,000 a year, and in some highly 
paid areas of specialization the average is over $500,000. Paying our 
doctors the same as Germany, Canada, and other wealthy countries pay 
theirs would reduce our health care bill by close to $100 billion a year. 
Doctors are able to maintain such high salaries in large part 
because of measures that protect them from competition. We have limits 
on the number of people who go to medical school and on the number of 
foreign medical school graduates who can enter U.S. residency programs, 
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the completion of which is a requirement for practicing medicine in the 
United States. 84  State laws also limit the extent to which nurse 
practitioners and other health care professionals can perform tasks, such as 
prescribing medicine, that might limit the demand for doctors. 
Protectionist barriers limit competition among other highly paid 
professions as well. Dentists cannot practice their field in the United States 
unless they graduated from an accredited dental school in the United 
States or, recently, Canada. State rules limit the extent to which dental 
hygienists can perform tasks like cleaning teeth without the supervision of 
a dentist. State bar exams limit the number of people who can practice 
law, sometimes sharply curtailing the supply of attorneys by making the 
exam more difficult. 
It is interesting to contrast the array of barriers that protect high 
pay in these areas with efforts to free up trade and remove barriers in 
other areas. While recent trade pacts have sought to limit the basis for 
imposing health, safety, and environmental regulations, they have done 
little to facilitate freer trade in the services of highly paid professionals. Do 
our trade negotiators really believe that doctors cannot be competent to 
practice medicine unless they completed a residency program in the 
United States? Or do these barriers persist because doctors and other 
highly paid professionals have more political power than the workers 
whose pay has been reduced as a result of international competition?  
This chapter argues that the barriers to competition and high pay 
exist because the professionals who benefit have far more political power 
than ordinary workers. No economic rule states that doctors, dentists, 
lawyers, and other professionals at the top of the pay ladder should be 
protected from the wage-depressing effects of globalization. Millions of 
smart and ambitious people in the developing world would be happy to 
train to U.S. standards and have the opportunity to work as professionals 
in the United States, but U.S. regulations make it difficult, if not 
84  There are exceptions, with prominent foreign physicians generally able to get 
licensed to practice in the United States, but the typical doctor practicing in Europe 
or Canada would not have the option to practice in the United States without 
completing a U.S. residency program. 
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impossible, for them to go this route. The goal of current trade policy is 
cheap shoes and steel from the developing world, not low-cost doctors 
and lawyers.  
Excessive pay for doctors and other high-end professionals, a 
group that makes up a large share of the top 1 percent of the wage 
distribution, should be thought of as a tax. The rest of the country is 
paying more than necessary for health care and a variety of other services. 
Freeing up markets for highly paid professionals can both reduce inequality 
and lead to more rapid economic growth. 
 
Surveying the landscape of professionals’ high pay 
 
Comparing the compensation of highly paid professionals in the 
United States and other wealthy countries is not entirely straightforward 
due to the fact that many of these professionals have their own practices, 
especially in the United States. As a result, standard measures of labor 
income tend to be inadequate, since much of the income of these 
professionals, especially the higher-paid ones, will show up as income 
from owning a practice rather than as payments for services. 85 
Nonetheless, a variety of surveys, many from professional organizations, 
seek to get around this problem. While the data may not be as accurate for 
high-paying professions as for other occupations, we can get a reasonably 
good idea of salaries based on the data that are available. 
 
Physicians 
 
Physicians are a good place to start, since they are the highest paid 
of these professions and there is also a large number of practicing 
physicians in the United States. A recent analysis of physicians’ pay 
(Laugesen and Glied 2008) found large differences in pay for both general 
practitioners and orthopedic surgeons (the only area of specialization 
85  The structure of the income tax, which taxes capital income at a lower rate than 
labor income, gives professionals who own their own practice an incentive to have 
labor income appear as capital income. 
                                               
156 Dean Baker 
 
examined) between the United States and the other wealthy countries 
included in the comparison group (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom). Average pre-tax earnings in the United States 
for primary care physicians was $186,600 in 2008 dollars, compared to an 
(unweighted) average of $121,200 for the other five countries (the U.S. 
number would be over $215,000 in 2016 dollars). The average pre-tax 
earnings for orthopedic surgeons in the United States was $442,500, 
compared to an average of $215,500 in the reference countries.  
An analysis by the OECD (Fujisawa and Lafortune 2008) put the 
average compensation for general practitioners in the United States in 
2004 at $146,000, more than 40 percent higher than the average for the 
other countries in the analysis, even when excluding the Czech Republic as 
an outlier on the low side. This analysis found an even larger gap between 
the pay of specialists in the United States — $236,000 in 2003 (in 2003 
dollars) — and most other OECD countries: $159,000 in Canada, 
$153,000 in the United Kingdom, $144,000 in France, and just $93,000 
in Denmark. (The Netherlands, where specialists were paid more than in 
the United States, was the exception.) The levels and gaps would be 
almost 30 percent higher in 2016 dollars.  
A more recent analysis suggests that doctors’ pay in the United 
States is somewhat higher than indicated by these earlier studies. A 2012 
survey by the Association of American Medical Colleges and American 
Medical Group Association put the median pay for family medicine at 
$208,900 (Washington Post 2012). The median for general surgeons was 
$367,300, for anesthesiologists $372,800, and for cardiologists $422,900. 
These figures are striking because there is much more room on the upside 
than the downside, the median is almost certainly well below the average. 
A factor affecting physician compensation in the United States is 
the skewing of the mix of doctors toward specialists. In most other 
wealthy countries, close to two-thirds of physicians are general 
practitioners and one-third are specialists. In the United States the mix is 
in the opposite direction. This difference implies that we pay more for 
physicians both because we pay more for each type of physician than in 
other wealthy countries and because we have a much larger share of 
expensive specialists and relatively fewer primary care physicians. An 
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analysis by the Commonwealth Fund (2006) found that, on a purchasing 
power parity basis, the United States spends almost three times as much 
per capita for physicians as the median for other wealthy countries. 
An implication of this difference in composition is that primary 
care physicians in other countries perform many of the diagnoses and 
procedures that are reserved for specialists in the United States. If this 
difference is not associated with improved outcomes, then the increased 
use of specialists in the United States is likely due to rent-seeking by 
specialists. In that case, we would expect to see specialists setting and 
imposing medical standards that produce more demand for their 
specializations.  
While many cases call for the expertise of a specialist, evidence 
shows that specialists are used in cases in which general practitioners have 
sufficient training (see e.g., Sharp et al. 2002).86 And if specialists in the 
United States are spending much of their time performing tasks that in 
other countries are routinely performed by less highly trained general 
practitioners, then the gap in pay is likely larger than the raw data indicate. 
We are paying specialist wages for general practitioner work. 
On the other side, the implication is that general practitioners in 
other countries have a higher level of skills than in the United States 
because they are capable of performing tasks that would be assigned to 
specialists in the United States. In that case, the effective gap in pay may 
still be larger since general practitioners in other countries have more 
skills and responsibilities than GPs in the United States. 
The low density of doctors in the United States might also be a 
factor in the pay gap. The United States has 2.6 physicians per 1,000 
people (OECD 2014), compared with 2.8 in the United Kingdom, 3.3 in 
France, and 4.0 in Germany. But the relatively low density in the United 
States is a matter of deliberate policy. In 1997, the Accreditation Council 
on Graduate Medical Education decided to limit medical school 
86  The evidence for the impact of specialists on outcomes is mixed. A review of 
published work on the benefits of specialists found that, in 13 papers with 33 clear 
findings, 16 showed positive benefits from the use of specialists, 14 showed no 
effect, and three showed negative impacts.  
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enrollments in the United States, which had previously been growing 
more or less in step with population growth (Cooper 2008). More 
importantly, the federal government caps the number of residency slots 
that Medicare supports, which is an effective limit on the number of 
residents in the United States. That might not matter if we could fill the 
gap with medical school graduates from other countries. But since a U.S. 
residency is virtually a requirement for practicing medicine in the United 
States, the cap on Medicare-supported residency positions effectively 
limited the number of practicing physicians in the country. According to 
Cooper, the United States is the only country that requires practicing 
physicians to complete a residency within the country.  
The result of these policies has been to limit physician density as 
demand was growing due to rising incomes and the aging of the 
population. The United States is an outlier in this respect, as shown in 
Figure 7-1. The deliberate constriction of supply is consistent with a 
story of rising rents, as non-market forces denied trained people, both 
domestically and internationally, the opportunity to work in the United 
States. 
 
FIGURE 7-1 
Physician density in select OECD countries, 1995 and 2012 
 
Source and notes: OECD (2014). Data for Japan for 1995 is the average of 1994 and 
1996. 
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Limiting the number of U.S. medical school positions and the 
number of residency positions, together with requiring a U.S. residency 
for licensure, are explicit efforts to limit the supply of doctors. At the 
same time, limiting the extent to which less highly paid medical 
professionals like nurse practitioners and nurse midwives are allowed to 
engage in tasks such as prescribing medicine or delivering babies increases 
the demand for physicians’ services. While there can be legitimate safety 
concerns associated with restrictions on the scope of practice of less highly 
trained professionals, the economic implications are straightforward: 
higher pay for doctors and higher health care costs for patients. 
 
Dentists 
 
The compensation of dentists in the United States, like the pay of 
doctors, is out of line with dentists’ pay in other wealthy countries. 
According to World Salaries (2016), the average pay of U.S. dentists is 
almost 40 percent higher than in the next highest country (Japan) and 
more than twice as high as in the United Kingdom, Italy, or Finland, as 
shown in Figure 7-2. 
 
FIGURE 7-2 
Average net monthly income for dentists, select countries 
 
Source and notes: World Salaries (2016). Underlying data from International Labour 
Organization. Salary for the United Kingdom is a median. 
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These data, drawn from a survey of dentists who are employees, 
almost certainly understate the disparity. Most U.S. dentists have their 
own practices, and this group on average has considerably higher pay than 
dentist-employees. According to a survey by the American Dental 
Association (ADA 2015a), the average pay in 2014, net of expenses, for all 
general practitioner dentists who owned their own practices was 
$183,340, and for all general practitioners it was $174,780 (Table 7-1). 
As is the case with physicians, specialists earn much higher pay than 
general practitioners. The average pay for specialists who owned their 
own practice was $344,740, compared with $322,200 for all specialists. 
The average pay for all dentists was $201,920, with a median of 
$170,000. This median places the bulk of dentists in the top 2 percent of 
workers. 
 
TABLE 7-1 
Average and median net income for general practitioner 
dentists, specialist dentists, and all dentists 
(2014 dollars) 
Type of dentist Average net income Median net income 
General practitioners     
     All owners $183,340  $160,000  
     All general practitioners $174,780  $150,000  
Specialists     
     All owners $344,740  $290,000  
     All specialists $322,200  $250,000  
All dentists     
     All owners $213,690  $180,000  
     All dentists $201,920  $170,000  
Source and notes: 2015 Survey of Dental Practice from the ADA (2015a). 
 
There are also substantial differences in pay by specialty. At the 
top are oral surgeons, with an average annual pay in 2014 of $413,410 and 
a median of $348,000. The least highly paid specialty is prosthodontist, 
with an average pay of $221,030 and a median of $175,000 (Table 7-2). 
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TABLE 7-2 
Average and median net income for dentist specialties 
(2014 dollars) 
Type of dentist Average net income Median net income 
Oral and maxillofacial surgeons $413,410  $348,000  
Endodontists $325,840  $290,000  
Orthodontists and dentofacial 
orthopedists $301,760  $245,000  
Pediatric dentists $347,310  $273,000  
Periodontists $257,960  $200,000  
Prosthodontists $221,030  $175,000  
Source and notes: 2015 Survey of Dental Practice from the ADA (2015a). 
 
As with doctors, dentists benefit from licensing restrictions that 
protect them from international and domestic competition. Here too, the 
licensing rules are set primarily by members of the profession. In terms of 
international competition, the law requires that dentists graduate from an 
accredited dental school in the United States (an exception for Canada 
began in 2011). Dentists protect themselves from domestic competition 
by limiting the scope of practice of dental hygienists, who often have the 
skills to perform many of the tasks performed by dentists. As with 
restrictions on the scope of practice of nurses, real public health concerns 
may underlie these restrictions, but their economic impact is to increase 
the demand for the services of dentists and presumably raise their pay. 
 
Lawyers 
 
The legal profession uses formal licensing requirements to restrict 
entry, most obviously by requiring lawyers to pass a state bar examination. 
Lawyers also use state governments to reserve for themselves tasks that 
could be performed by workers with less legal training, such as paralegals, 
or by clients themselves. While there is some legitimate basis for barriers 
to foreign lawyers practicing in the United States — not all countries have 
the same criminal or civil codes and penalties as the United States — 
standardization could allow for more foreign lawyers or legal workers to 
perform U.S.-based legal work. (The work could be outsourced through 
162 Dean Baker 
 
the Internet, eliminating the need for foreign legal workers to physically 
enter the United States.) 
Though there are few good measures of the openness of the legal 
profession across countries that include the United States, there are 
indications that the United States has a less-open legal market than most 
other wealthy countries. A recent analysis by the OECD noted that in 
2000, the United Kingdom issued 881 work permits to lawyers from the 
United States alone. By contrast, the United States issued a total of 775 
work permits for lawyers in the same year (Hook 2007). The United 
States can certainly be more open to both more foreign lawyers working 
in the United States and more legal work being done overseas.  
Consistent with the idea of law being a protected profession, a 
recent analysis found that the pay of lawyers rose substantially more 
rapidly from 1990 to 2000 (49.2 percent) than the pay of PhDs in 
engineering (41.0 percent), the life sciences (37.5 percent), and the 
natural sciences (29.7 percent) (Freeman 2006). Another study found 
that, after controlling for education, experience, and other standard 
variables, lawyers enjoyed a pay premium of 49.0 percent (Winston et al. 
2011). 
Apart from erecting legal barriers that prevent non-lawyers from 
engaging in many types of legal work, lawyers can also increase the 
demand for their services by ensuring that tasks are more complicated than 
necessary in order to force people to hire more lawyers. For example, the 
documents associated with closing on a mortgage are now largely 
standardized, and it should be possible in most cases to structure them so 
that it would not be necessary to have a lawyer review them and be 
present at closing. Many states now have standardized forms for wills that 
can be downloaded from the Internet. People without extensive assets or 
complicated family situations can typically fill out these forms without the 
assistance of a lawyer.87  
87  Individual income tax filings is another area that provides a considerable amount of 
often unnecessary work for lawyers. It should be possible for the IRS to calculate the 
returns of most low- and moderate-income workers and send the completed forms 
back to the taxpayer for approval. This is the practice in several European countries. 
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Several big rent-seeking sectors of the economy require the 
services of lawyers, and typically offer very high pay. Intellectual property 
law requires lawyers with narrow areas of specialization, and since large 
sums are often involved the lawyers tend to be well paid. The National 
Association for Law Placement found that starting pay was higher at law 
firms that did intellectual property law and that median pay among senior 
associates was $65,000–75,000 higher at firms with lawyers performing 
intellectual property law than it was for the average of firms (NALP 
2015). The other rent-seeking sector that requires considerable legal work 
is corporate and individual tax avoidance. Many corporations devote 
enormous resources to finding ways to minimize their tax bill 
(Kocieniewski 2011), and compensation can be substantial, since an 
effective loophole can be enormously valuable.  
The United States has more lawyers per capita, 3.65 per 
thousand, than other wealthy countries, such as Canada (2.2) and 
Germany (1.3) (Magee et al. 1989). While the relatively large number of 
lawyers in the United States is a drain on the economy, factors unique to 
the United States might explain the higher ratio. Specifically, the rate of 
incarceration in the United States is far higher than in other wealthy 
countries, and so the demand for prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers 
is higher. In addition, the fact that the United States does not provide 
universal health insurance and has extraordinarily high health care costs 
means that people would have incentives that do not exist in other 
countries to pursue legal actions over physical injuries. Finally, regulation 
and litigation are alternative forms of protection. In countries with more 
extensive regulation for consumer protection and safety, there may be less 
need for legal action. 
 These qualifications are crucial, since it is important to recognize 
the factors that may lead the United States to devote a larger share of its 
resources to its legal system than other countries. However, even if these 
Adopting this approach would radically reduce the need for tax consultants and for 
lawyers to challenge the work of these consultants.  
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factors may lead to more need for lawyers, it does not necessarily follow 
that they should get higher pay than in other countries.88  
It is worth noting that in recent years there has been somewhat of 
a glut in lawyers, with many new law school graduates having difficulty 
finding jobs in the profession and others receiving salaries insufficient to 
allow repayment of their educational loans. But at the same time, top law 
firms are still offering students just out of law school salaries well over 
$100,000 a year, suggesting that rents in the legal profession may be 
getting distributed to a more narrow group of lawyers. 
 
Cumulative pay and rents 
 
How much would the United States save if, rather than receiving 
rents, physicians, dentists, and lawyers earned pay comparable to the 
levels paid in other wealthy countries (Table 7-3, Column 4) or if the gap 
were cut in half (Column 5)? One might argue that comparisons with 
other countries should be adjusted for the United States’ higher per capita 
income of 20 percent, on average, compared with other wealthy 
countries, but an adjustment of this size would still leave a large gap. 
For physicians’ pay, we would save $80 billion a year if the gap 
were fully eliminated and $40 billion if the gap were cut in half. While the 
numbers in the table for average salaries are somewhat imprecise given the 
limits of the data and differences across sources, they are consistent with 
other findings. For example, the Commonwealth Fund (2006) calculated 
that the United States spent $1,362 per capita in 2004 on physicians’ 
services, compared to a median of $482 across the OECD, $319 in 
Canada, and $307 in Germany. These differences imply a gap of $270 
billion between physicians’ payments in the United States and the OECD 
median and a gap of more than $320 billion between payments in the 
United States and payments in Canada and Germany. The Commonwealth 
88  There is evidence that a larger number of lawyers per capita is associated with 
slower economic growth. Magee et al. (1989) found that more students of law (a 
proxy for lawyers) was associated with slower growth. 
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Fund’s analysis includes more than just doctors’ pay, but its numbers are 
consistent with the sort of gap shown in Table 7-3.  
 
TABLE 7-3 
Potential savings from eliminating rents for doctors, dentists, 
and lawyers 
(2014 dollars) 
 Number Average pay 
Average 
pay other 
countries 
Savings with 
no gap 
Savings with 
50% gap 
Doctors 800,000 $250,000 $150,000 $80 billion $40 billion 
Dentists 150,000 $202,000 $60,000 $21.2 billion $10.6 billion 
Lawyers 1,268,000 $260,000 n.a. $108.4 billion $54.2 billion 
      
   Total $209.6 billion 
$104.8 
billion 
Source and notes: 2015 Survey of Dental Practice from the ADA (2015a); BLS (2014); 
World Salaries (2016); Winston et al. (2011, p. 27); ABA (2013); Author's 
calculations; see text. 
 
For dentists, the savings would be $21.2 billion if the gap were 
eliminated and $10.6 billion if the gap were cut in half. The comparable 
savings for lawyers are $108.4 billion and $54.4 billion.89  
In all, the potential savings if rents were eliminated in these three 
professions total $209.6 billion (about 1.2 percent of GDP). Reducing 
them by half would save $104.8 billion (about 0.6 percent of GDP). These 
calculations indicate there would be large potential savings to consumers 
and benefits to the economy if the pay of these professionals can be 
brought closer in line with their counterparts elsewhere in the world 
without a deterioration in the quality of the services provided. The next 
89  Average pay for lawyers in the United States is taken from Winston et al. (2011, p. 
27), where the figure of $191,000 for 2000 was adjusted upward by the CPI for 
2014. This is an average for lawyers in law firms, so it is likely higher than the 
average for all lawyers. On the other hand, it is likely missing the earnings of many 
of the most highly paid lawyers who are senior partners who may report earnings as 
capital income. For this reason, it is not clear that the number is necessarily too 
high. The number of licensed lawyers is from the ABA (2013). Since the data on 
international comparisons is limited, the number calculated for the “savings with no 
gap” column is based on the 49.0 percent wage premium calculated by Winston et 
al. (2011). 
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section reviews some of the research on professional licensing to examine 
the evidence that unnecessarily strict requirements have raised the pay in 
these professions. It also presents some original analysis that explores this 
question in a slightly different way. The following section explores the 
possibility of increased openings to foreign professionals. 
 
Licensing and rents in highly paid professions 
 
There has been a considerable body of research in recent years 
looking at the role of licensing requirements in raising the wages and 
limiting supply of the affected occupations. While most of the work has 
focused on licensing in middle or lower paying occupations, there is some 
research that examines the impact of licensing requirements on high 
paying occupations. This work provides some evidence that excessive 
licensing requirements (meaning beyond what is necessary to ensure 
quality) reduce supply and raise pay for these occupations. 
Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) found that states with lower pass rates 
for their dentistry licensing exams from 1980 to 2000 had fewer dentists 
and higher prices than states with higher pass rates. Using a unique dataset 
of dental exams for incoming army recruits (which identifies the recruits’ 
state of origin), the study found no evidence of differences in outcomes 
based on the states’ pass rates. 
Kleiner and Park (2010) examined whether regulations allowing 
for more independence for dental hygienists affected their pay and the pay 
and demand for dentists. The analysis found that giving hygienists the 
opportunity to be self-employed increased their pay by 10 percent and 
decreased the pay of dentists by 16 percent.  
Kleiner et al. (2014) found that restrictions on the ability of nurse 
practitioners to prescribe medicine led to an increase in the cost of a well-
child exam, lower hours for nurse practitioners and increased hours for 
doctors. The study used eight years of data from the American 
Community Survey (ACS), compared the hours of nurse practitioners and 
doctors in states with more and less restrictive prescribing rules. Wages of 
nurse practitioners in states with more restrictive rules were about 14 
percent lower and physician wages about 7 percent higher than in states 
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with fewer restrictions. Annual hours of nurse practitioners were 6–14 
percent lower while physicians’ hours were 6–9 percent higher. The study 
also found that tighter restrictions increased the price of a well-child 
medical exam by 3–16 percent. The study found that weaker restrictions 
were not associated with either an increase in infant mortality rates or 
higher malpractice premiums.  
In contrast, Stange (2013) tested for the impact of an increase in 
the density of nurse practitioners and physician assistants on the number of 
doctor visits, total medical expenditures, and other outcomes over the 
period 1996–2008. The study also tested whether restrictions on the 
ability of nurse practitioners to prescribe drugs affected outcomes. In 
virtually every specification, the analysis found no significant impact of the 
density of nurse practitioners or physician assistants on utilization or 
spending.  
A striking finding of the research estimating the impact of flexible 
practice rules on the hours and wages of nurse practitioners vis-à-vis 
doctors is that the impact is quite large even though there are only about a 
quarter as many nurse practitioners as doctors. Furthermore, insofar as 
nurse practitioners substitute for doctors, they would be substituting for 
general practitioners, who are paid much less than specialists. But a simple 
substitution of the time of nurse practitioners for the time of general-
practitioner doctors cannot explain the size of the estimates for impact on 
doctors’ hours and pay. In effect, the results imply that for every hour 
reduction in the time of a nurse practitioner due to tighter regulations, a 
doctor works 1.7 to 6.0 hours more. This is unlikely. 
A more plausible story, which the study suggests, is that nurse 
practitioners are less likely to recommend follow-up procedures or exams 
with more highly paid specialists. This suggests that increased use of nurse 
practitioners may lead to a type of health care more in line with that in 
other wealthy countries, where fewer procedures require specialists.90 
90  The study did examine two outcome measures to look for evidence of quality being 
affected by the substitution of nurse practitioners for doctors, although neither 
would seem conclusive. One was infant mortality rates, which showed no change 
associated with the increased prescribing authority of nurse practitioners. The other 
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The findings on the relationship between the pay and hour of 
dentists and dental hygienists suggest a similar pattern. While the implied 
substitution of labor between the two professions is more plausible, given 
the much closer relationship between the size of the two occupations, the 
implied impact of the pay of dental hygienists on the pay of dentists cannot 
be explained simply by substitution. With the average pay of dental 
hygienists roughly one-third the pay of dentists, the estimates imply that a 
one dollar increase in the pay of a dental hygienist is associated with 
roughly a three dollar decrease in the pay of dentists. Here also, a more 
plausible explanation is that, in addition to substituting lower-cost labor 
for higher-cost labor, self-employed dental hygienists are less likely to 
recommend the services of more expensive specialists. 
While not directly examining the impact of licensing, Hall et al. 
(2011) found evidence that highly skilled immigrants often work at jobs 
with educational requirements far lower than their skill levels. Using ACS 
data for the years 2006–2008, the study found this mismatch to be the 
case for 11.3 percent of highly skilled immigrants compared to just 6.1 
percent of native-born workers. The study notes that having been 
educated in the United States has a large effect on employment, so the gap 
would likely be higher if the analysis were restricted to immigrants who 
earned their degrees outside the country. 
This finding is consistent with the possibility that licensing 
requirements are preventing many qualified immigrants from working in 
high-paying professions. These workers presumably came to the United 
States knowing that they would unlikely be able to work in the professions 
for which they were trained, but it is also probably the case that more 
highly educated immigrants would come to the United States if they had 
was malpractice premiums for doctors, which also did not rise in states with greater 
authority given to nurse practitioners. This finding is not necessarily compelling 
since the ability to win a malpractice case against a doctor depends on the 
responsibilities assigned doctors relative to nurse practitioners in a specific state. If 
an error by a nurse practitioner, operating without a doctor’s supervision, leads to 
harm for a patient, it is presumably more difficult to win a malpractice suit against 
the doctor than if the nurse practitioner were operating under the doctor’s 
oversight.  
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the opportunity to work in their professions. In the case of physicians and 
dentists, the barriers are explicit: no license if a person was not trained in 
a U.S. medical residency program or a U.S. dental school (except for an 
accredited dental school in Canada). Allowing immigrants trained as 
doctors or dentists in their home countries to come to and practice in the 
United States, perhaps after completing additional training to meet U.S. 
standards, would have a beneficial impact for the productive economy and 
public health.91 
In sum, the evidence shows that licensing of highly paid 
professionals has the effect of increasing their pay,92 and weaker licensing 
requirements are not associated with a deterioration in the quality of the 
service. The standards seem to serve more as protectionist barriers than as 
means of assuring quality care.  
 
The potential impact of international competition on the earnings 
of highly paid professionals 
 
Doctors, dentists, and lawyers have been largely protected from 
international competition over the last four decades even as trade has 
expanded as a share of GDP. While this privileged outcome is partly due 
to the nature of the services involved, it is also in part the result of a 
deliberate decision to leave protectionist barriers in place. For doctors the 
wall is completion of a U.S. residency program. This is very clear in the 
case of physicians and dentists. In the former case, only doctors who have 
completed U.S. residency programs are able to practice medicine in the 
United States.93 In the case of dentists, to get a license it is necessary to 
91  Developing countries face the risk of a brain drain if a large portion of the 
professionals emigrate to the United States or other wealthy countries. This could be 
countered by refunding a portion of the gains, for example, the income tax on the 
earnings of immigrant doctors, to the home country. Such a rule would allow for 
the training of several professionals for every one that comes to the United States. 
92  Not all the research finds that licensing leads to a pay premium. Some research has 
found a relatively small premium for licensing that went away altogether in some 
specifications (e.g., Gittleman and Kleiner 2013). 
93  There are exceptions, with prominent foreign physicians generally able to get 
licensed to practice in the United States, but the typical doctor practicing in Europe 
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graduate from a dental program in the United States, with the exception 
that Canada also now has some programs that are accredited by the United 
States as well.  
Increased international competition might affect prices and pay in 
these highly paid professions through three main routes. The first is by 
allowing more foreign-trained professionals to practice in the United 
States. The second route is through medical travel, though mostly for 
physician services, since the difference in price for dental care might not 
be large enough to justify foreign travel. The third route is through the 
emigration of U.S. retirees. If retirees could access their Medicare benefits 
outside of the United States (and share in the savings from lower cost 
health care), they may be more inclined to move abroad, and Medicare 
would enjoy the savings from the lower cost of their health care.  
 
Increased use of foreign-trained professionals 
 
Ensuring that doctors and dentists trained in other countries have 
been educated to U.S. standards is a legitimate public health concern. But 
just as the United States was able to put in place a reciprocal accreditation 
process for dental schools with Canada in 2011, it should be possible to 
establish a process on a broader basis (ADEA 2014). In principle, doctors 
and dentists from countries with comparable standards to those of the 
United States can be tested for proficiency and then work in their 
profession with the same freedom as someone who was trained here. Such 
is already the case within the European Union, where doctors who meet a 
common set of standards are free to practice in any E.U. country (Kovacs 
et al. 2014). 
Persons trained in developing countries with lower professional 
standards could be trained to U.S. levels. Such a practice would mirror 
general trade policy — the creation of uniform standards in a range of 
areas has been a major component of every trade pact negotiated over the 
last quarter century. The removal of barriers that prevent workers in 
or Canada would not have the option to practice in the United States without 
completing a U.S. residency program. 
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highly paid professions from working in the United States could have been 
included too. 
How many foreign-trained physicians would come to the United 
States if there were a standardized licensing process? Data on the number 
of foreign-born and foreign-trained physicians now practicing in the 
United States can provide a useful point of reference. These are physicians 
who in almost all cases completed a U.S. residency program in addition to 
their foreign training. According to the American Medical Association 
(AMA), approximately 25 percent of practicing physicians in the United 
States were international medical graduates (IMG), meaning they 
graduated from a medical school outside of the United States (AMA 
2016). Roughly a fifth of them graduated from medical schools in the 
Caribbean and were likely U.S. citizens who went overseas for medical 
school. That leaves roughly 20 percent of practicing physicians who are 
foreign born and foreign trained.  
The question is how many more IMGs would be practicing in the 
United States if foreign trained physicians had the opportunity to take part 
in a U.S. equivalent residency program in their home country, and then 
have the same right to practice in the United States as a U.S. citizen who 
had completed all of their training within the United States. Under current 
rules, IMGs are effectively subject to a quota system that limits the 
number of residency slots available to them (Desbiens and Vidaillet 2010). 
An open system would allow IMGs to have a larger share of the U.S. 
residency slots (the quota system suggests that many are rejected in favor 
of less-qualified U.S. graduates) and also allow them to receive equivalent 
training to residency in their home countries.  
In addition to allowing for an increase in the overall supply of 
doctors, the logic of greater openness to IMGs is simple: it’s cheaper to 
train doctors in other countries than in the United States. Given the large 
gap between the pay of physicians in the United States and other wealthy 
countries, and the even larger gap between the pay of physicians in the 
United States and developing countries, it is reasonable to expect a large 
supply response to a policy that allowed foreign-trained physicians to 
practice in the United States as long as they completed an equivalent 
residency program. 
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Table 7-4 shows the change in annual inflows, the cumulative 
change after 10 years, and the percentage increase in physicians that would 
result from this policy. The rows assume alternatively that the number of 
IMGs entering the United States each year increases by 50 percent, 100 
percent, and 150 percent from 6,300, the number accepted into U.S. 
residency programs in 2015 (ECFMG 2015).94 It is worth noting that the 
number of IMGs who applied to U.S. residency programs in 2015 was just 
under 12,400, almost twice the number accepted (ECFMG 2015). This 
might give some indication of the likely increase in foreign IMGs who 
would enter in a more open system. 
The estimates range from a cumulative gain after 10 years of 
65,000, a 7.6 percent rise in the number of physicians, assuming the 
increase in the flow is at the low end of 50 percent, to 195,000 at the high 
end, representing a 22.7 percent increase in supply. While these numbers 
are large relative to the projected supply of doctors, they focus on the 
inflow of new medical school graduates and so are likely to understate the 
number of foreign-trained physicians who would be practicing in the 
United States under a more open system. In a more open system it is likely 
that many practicing physicians in other countries would opt to practice in 
the United States. In short, a more open system of licensing of foreign-
trained physicians would likely have a large impact on the supply of 
doctors in the United States. 
 
TABLE 7-4 
Impact after 10 years of allowing foreign-trained physicians 
to practice in United States 
 
Percent increase in flow of 
new residents 
Cumulative increase 
after 10 years 
Percentage increase in 
supply of physicians 
50% 65,000 7.6% 
100% 130,000 15.1% 
150% 195,000 22.7% 
Source and notes: ECFMG (2015), Dill and Salsberg (2008), and author's calculations; 
see text. 
 
94  The projection for the total number of doctors practicing in the United States in 
2025 (860,000) is taken from Dill and Salsberg (2008).  
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Medical travel 
 
A second route through which foreign professionals can be placed 
in competition with their counterparts in the United States is through 
medical travel. There are huge gaps between the price of major medical 
procedures in the United States and other countries. These gaps in price 
are substantial when comparing the cost in other wealthy countries, but 
the price can be an order of magnitude when comparing prices in the 
United States with the prices charged in countries like Thailand and India, 
which have sought to cultivate their medical travel industry. In these cases, 
procedures are performed in modern facilities comparable to those in the 
United States or Western Europe. 
The average price of hip replacement surgery in the United States 
is $40,400 compared to less than $12,000 in the United Kingdom (Table 
7-5). (There is enormous variation around this $40,400 figure within the 
United States, which raises another set of issues.) The cost in Argentina is 
just $3,600, less than one-tenth the U.S. cost. Heart bypass surgery costs 
an average of $73,400 in the United States, compared to $14,100 in the 
United Kingdom and $8,900 in Argentina. These gaps indicate an 
enormous potential for savings if a substantial portion of major surgeries 
needed by people in the United States were performed in lower-cost 
countries. 
 
TABLE 7-5 
Comparative prices of medical procedures, U.S., Argentina, 
Spain, and U.K., 2012 
(2012 dollars) 
 United States Argentina Spain 
United 
Kingdom 
Hip replacement $40,364 $3,565 $7,731 $11,889 
Knee replacement $25,637 $3,192 $7,827 $7,833 
Heart bypass surgery $73,420 $8,882 $17,437 $14,117 
Angioplasty $28,182 $2,851 $9,446 $14,366 
Source and notes: International Federation of Health Plans (2012). 
 
Table 7-6 shows the number of each of these four procedures 
performed in the United States in 2010. The third column estimates 
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potential savings by assuming that total costs, including travel expenses, 
are $10,000 above the costs in the low-cost country, which is Argentina in 
each of these cases. (Argentina is an outlier among this group of developed 
countries. But a full list that included modern facilities meant to 
accommodate medical travel in countries like India and Thailand would 
likely show several countries with prices comparable to those in 
Argentina.)  
 
TABLE 7-6 
Potential savings from having medical procedures performed 
in other countries 
(2010 dollars) 
 
Number 
(2010) 
Total spending 
(millions) 
Savings per 
procedure 
Total savings 
(millions) 
Hip replacement 332,000 $13,401 $21,799 $7,237 
Knee replacement 719,000 $18,433 $7,445 $5,353 
Heart bypass surgery 395,000 $29,001 $49,538 $19,568 
Angioplasty 500,000 $14,091 $10,331 $5,166 
 
    
 Total $74,926  $37,323 
Source and notes: International Federation of Health Plans (2012). 
 
The last column shows the potential savings if all the surgeries in 
each category in 2010 had been performed in the low-cost country with 
the $10,000 travel cost assumption. The savings total $7.2 billion for hip 
replacement surgery, $5.4 billion for knee replacements, $19.6 billion for 
heart bypasses, and $5.2 billion for angioplasties, and sum to $37.3 
billion.  
While it is unrealistic to imagine that most of these medical 
procedures would be performed in other countries, it is plausible to think 
that a substantial fraction might be if insurance companies and government 
health programs offered to split the savings with patients. Many people 
would be attracted to an offer of several months’ pay in exchange for 
having an operation performed in a high-quality facility in another 
country. And since most of these procedures are performed on a non-
emergency basis, patients could make plans well in advance with their 
families, their regular physicians, and the facilities in the host countries. If 
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30 percent of these procedures were performed in other countries, the 
savings would be over $11 billion annually, and a fuller list of procedures 
would likely take the potential savings to more than $15–20 billion a 
year.95  
The biggest factor obstructing medical travel is the lack of an 
institutional structure. First, few would want to travel to another country 
for a major medical procedure without an assurance of the quality of the 
care. There are private accreditation groups, but issues have been raised 
about their integrity. Instead, an intergovernmental organization, relying 
on existing national systems in countries with a track record of 
maintaining high standards and on a system of inspections in other 
countries, could certify that facilities met quality standards. It could be 
financed by a tax on medical travel.  
A second institutional step would be to establish a system of legal 
liability to ensure that patients would be compensated if a procedure were 
not carried through properly. The system need not replicate the U.S. 
malpractice system, but it should provide patients with the confidence that 
they will be compensated for additional medical care and lost earnings 
associated with a failed procedure. 
The third issue is that the vast majority of these procedures are 
paid for by third parties, either government programs or private medical 
insurance. As a result, the savings would not directly accrue to patients, 
giving them no incentive to consider medical travel. This could be 
remedied by setting up a system where the patient is rebated a portion of 
the savings. For government programs this could be done directly. For 
example, Medicare could rebate half of the savings it would receive from 
having a procedure carried through outside of the United States. Private 
insurers could also adopt similar policies. Setting up these rules would 
likely involve some regulatory issues, since regulatory boards would have 
to authorize the practice. That could happen on a state-by-state basis, or 
alternatively the federal government could impose rules that require state 
regulatory boards to allow the rebates. 
95  Issues connected with medical travel are discussed in Matoo and Rathindran (2006).  
                                               
176 Dean Baker 
 
Of course, many patients might not want to travel to a foreign 
country for a medical procedure, given the stress that can be associated 
with a major operation. However, there is no obvious reason not to give 
people the option and to share in the savings, if they choose to go this 
route. 
It is possible that an increased demand for a developing country’s 
doctors from wealthy-country patients might pull doctors away from 
treating their own country’s population. But in principle, host countries 
could tax medical travel and use the revenue to train additional health care 
professionals, thereby ensuring that the host country’s population benefits 
as well.  
Though the potential savings from medical travel are substantial, 
only a fraction would come at the expense of doctors. If one-third of the 
cost of the procedures is attributable to doctors’ fees, and 10–30 percent 
of the $100 billion in outsourceable surgeries were performed outside the 
United States, then the reduction in the demand for doctors would 
translate to between $3 billion and $10 billion annually, based on 2014 
levels of demand and prices. 
 
Emigration of retirees 
 
A third channel through which international competition could 
exert downward pressure on the pay of doctors is through increased 
emigration among retirees. The issue here is that retirees may often have 
an interest in living in other countries. By definition, they no longer are 
tied to the United States by their work. While many may have family ties 
that make them reluctant to move to other countries, many people in the 
United States also have family ties to people in other countries. This will 
be increasingly true in the decades ahead as a larger share of the retired 
population will be foreign-born. Even small movements of retirees abroad 
could make a substantial difference in the demand for health care.  
Currently about 1.5 percent of the people receiving Social 
Security retiree, spousal, or survivor benefits live outside the country.96 
96  From SSA (2014a) and (2015a). 
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This number will likely increase in the decades ahead even with no change 
in policy due solely to the growing share of the foreign-born over-65 
population, from 13.2 percent in 2014 to an estimated 18.6 percent in 
2035 and to 25.8 percent in 2050 (U.S. Census Bureau 2015). While 
there do not appear to be projections for the number of retirees who will 
decide to move back to their country of birth, it is reasonable to believe 
that the number of older immigrants who opt to spend their retirement 
outside of the United States will be larger than the number of native born 
retirees. 
But the number of retirees who choose to live outside the country 
could be substantially larger if the government adopted policies to 
encourage emigration. The simple motivation for the government is that 
health care is cheaper in other countries, and because the bulk of retiree 
health care costs are covered by Medicare and Medicaid, the government 
could save substantially by encouraging retirees to take advantage of the 
health care systems in other countries. It could reimburse other countries 
for the cost of caring for U.S. retirees and still have large savings. 97 
Reimbursement agreements such as this are already in place between 
countries in the European Union (Footman et al. 2014).  
Emigration by retirees would have a sizable impact on the demand 
for health care in the United States. According to the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, the average health care expenses of a 
person over 65 are 260 percent of the overall average (CMS 2010).98 As a 
result, in 2010 the over-65 population accounted for almost 34 percent of 
total spending even though they were just 13.0 percent of the 
population.99 And this share is projected to rise rapidly over the next two 
decades, reaching 20.7 percent by 2035. Assuming no change in the 
distribution of health care costs by age implies that the over-65 population 
97  There is already an agreement for Social Security benefits under which other 
countries integrate their programs with the U.S. Social Security system. This way, 
benefits for people who worked in other countries are adjusted for the benefits they 
receive from the United States. This is described on page 12 of SSA (2015a).  
98  See: https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Age-and-Gender.html.  
99  CMS (2010), Table 1; share of the population from SSA (2015b). 
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will account for more than 47 percent of health care spending in 2035 
(Table 7-7). 
 
TABLE 7-7 
Foreign-born shares of over-65 population and over-65 share 
of health care spending 
(percent) 
 2014 2035 
Foreign-born share 13.2% 18.6% 
Over 65 share of total population 13% 20.7% 
Over 65 share of health care spending 33.9% 47.2% 
Source and notes: U.S. Census Bureau (2015), CMS (2015), and SSA (2016a); see 
text. 
 
According to the OECD (2015), per capita spending on health 
care in the United States in 2013 was $8,700, compared to an OECD 
average of less than $3,500 (in 2013 purchasing power parity dollars). 
Germany was the second-highest spender at just over $4,800 per capita, 
and Canada was third at under $4,400. Per capita spending in the U.K. 
was under $3,200 and several of the lower income countries in the OECD 
spent less than $3,000 per person. This is shown in Column 1 of Table 7-
8.  
The second column shows per capita spending for the over-65 
population under the assumption that the ratio in each country is 260 
percent of per capita spending for the population as a whole, as in the 
United States. This is almost certainly an overstatement, since spending is 
not as skewed toward the elderly in other countries. 
Column 3 shows a projection of per capita health care spending 
for the over-65 population in 2035 under the assumption that real per 
capita spending increases at an annual rate of 1.5. This is somewhat more 
rapid than the recent rate of growth across the OECD.  
Column 4 shows the difference between projected per capita 
government spending on Medicare in 2035 and the projected per capita 
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cost of health care in each country in 2035.100 It is a projection of the 
difference between what the government will be spending on Medicare for 
each beneficiary in 2035 and what it would cost a beneficiary to get care in 
other countries. In the case of Germany this gap is more than $1,000 a 
year, and in some of the lower-cost countries the gap is more than 
$10,000 a year. 
 
TABLE 7-8 
Current expenditure on health, per capita 
(US$ purchasing power parities) 
 Overall 2013 
Over 65 
2013 
Over 65 
2035 
Gap between 
Medicare cost 
and cost in 
other countries 
Gap 
including 
Medicaid 
OECD 
average $3,453 $8,977 $12,456 $5,947 $8,847 
Australia $3,866 $10,051 $13,946 $4,456 $7,356 
Canada $4,351 $11,313 $15,698 $2,705 $5,605 
Chile $1,606 $4,175 $5,793 $12,610 $15,510 
France $4,124 $10,722 $14,877 $3,525 $6,425 
Germany $4,819 $12,529 $17,385 $1,018 $3,918 
Greece $2,366 $6,153 $8,538 $9,865 $12,765 
Ireland $3,663 $9,524 $13,215 $5,188 $8,088 
Israel $2,428 $6,312 $8,758 $9,644 $12,544 
Italy $3,077 $7,999 $11,099 $7,304 $10,204 
Mexico $1,048 $2,726 $3,782 $14,620 $17,520 
Poland $1,530 $3,979 $5,521 $12,882 $15,782 
Portugal $2,514 $6,538 $9,072 $9,331 $12,231 
Spain $2,898 $7,536 $10,457 $7,946 $10,846 
United 
Kingdom $3,235 $8,410 $11,669 $6,733 $9,633 
United 
States $8,713 $22,655 $31,435 n.a n.a 
Source and notes: OECD (2015). 
 
100  The projection for per capita spending on Medicare in 2035 is taken from CMS 
(2015). These projections run through 2024. Real per capita costs were assumed to 
grow at the same rate after 2024 (2.1 percent annually) as they did from 2023 to 
2024. The numbers were deflated to 2013 dollars using the CPI-U.  
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Column 5 adds a projection of per capita Medicaid spending. 
Medicaid spending adds almost $2,900 a year (in 2013 dollars) to average 
per capita spending, substantially increasing the gap between what the 
government is projected to spend on Medicare beneficiaries and the per 
person cost of health care in other OECD countries.101 The average figure 
in this case is somewhat misleading, since most of the over-65 population 
will not receive Medicaid. But for those who will, the gap between 
combined Medicare and Medicaid spending would be considerably larger 
than the numbers shown in Column 5.  
There are a few points worth noting about the size of the spending 
gaps shown in Columns 4 and 5. First, they are likely to understate the 
true gap because the calculations assume that spending on the elderly in 
other countries is as out of line with overall spending as in the United 
States. This will not be true in most or all cases. Second, a portion of the 
health care costs of the over-65 population are not covered by Medicare 
(out-of-pocket costs and the costs of private add-on insurance can be 
substantial), and retirees remaining in the United States and receiving 
Medicare would incur these expenses. Table 7-8 is comparing government 
spending on beneficiaries in the United States with total per person health 
care spending in other countries. The potential savings to beneficiaries 
from having the option to buy into other countries’ health care plans 
would also include their savings on out-of-pocket spending and private 
insurance in the United States. This means that the total per person savings 
for a retiree buying into a health care system in other countries would be 
substantially larger than the amounts shown in Table 7-8. The projected 
gap between total per capita spending in the U.S. and spending in other 
countries is more than $15,000 per person in the case of high-cost 
countries and more than $20,000 per person in the case of the lower-cost 
countries. 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that these figures are for 
per person savings. So the potential savings would be over $5,400 annually 
101  Per capita Medicaid costs were obtained by taking 2010 per capita spending for 
Medicaid beneficiaries over age 65 from CMS (2010), Table 10, and projecting the 
same rate of increase in real per capita costs as for Medicare.  
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for a retired couple moving to Canada, to Australia more than $10,000, 
and to Mexico more than $30,000, even before counting the savings in 
out-of-pocket costs. By comparison, the median income for a couple over 
the age of 65 in 2013 was just over $50,000, and $18,600 for an individual 
(SSA 2015c), implying that the potential savings from taking advantage of 
the health care system in another country is comparable to the income of 
much of the elderly population. Gaps of this magnitude would allow the 
federal government to pocket savings on Medicare, pay a premium to the 
host country, and provide a financial incentive to beneficiaries. 
Allowing seniors to buy into other countries’ health care systems 
could be complicated. The system would have to be designed to limit the 
risk of adverse selection on both sides. If the immigrants to a country were 
relatively unhealthy, a compensation system based on average costs would 
cause the host country to lose money. Conversely, the emigration of 
healthier-than-average people would hurt Medicare’s finances if it 
reimbursed host countries based on age-group averages. There also will be 
issues with people who want to reverse their decision.  
But these complications are not qualitatively different than the 
issues Medicare already faces. People who have opted for Medicare 
Advantage have been healthier on average than most beneficiaries, and the 
program has sought to adjust premiums to compensate. Complications 
also arise when people want to switch between insurance plans when they 
realize the plan they have chosen does not provide the coverage they need 
for a specific condition. It is not possible to find mechanisms that work 
perfectly and treat beneficiaries fairly in all cases, but providing an 
additional option to buy into another country’s health care system should 
on net be a huge positive to retirees. 
How many retirees might opt to emigrate? As noted earlier, about 
1.5 percent of Social Security beneficiaries already live in other countries, 
and it is reasonable to believe that this number will increase as incentives 
are implemented, as the percentage of the foreign born among the retired 
rises, as the quality of health care abroad increases, and as growing 
communities of retirees in places like Ireland and Mexico inspire more 
people to relocate. 
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Table 7-9 shows the impact on U.S. health care spending after 20 
years under the assumptions that 5 percent, 10 percent, and 20 percent of 
the retired population decides to emigrate if given the option to use their 
Medicare payment to buy into the other country’s health care system. 
Projected spending reductions range from 2.4 percent to 9.4 percent, and 
it would be reasonable to assume that any of the projections would 
correspond with an equivalent reduction in the demand for doctors. 
 
TABLE 7-9 
Impact on health care spending in 2035 from varying rates of 
emigration 
(percent) 
Over 65 share of health care spending 47.2% 
Percentage savings from 5 percent emigration 2.4% 
Percentage savings from 10 percent emigration 4.7% 
Percentage savings from 20 percent emigration 9.4% 
Source and notes: Author's calculations; see text. 
 
Cumulative effect on the doctors’ compensation 
 
This chapter has discussed on four channels — the elimination of 
licensing restrictions, reduction of barriers to entry for foreign-trained 
professionals, medical travel, and retiree emigration — through which the 
effective demand for domestically trained doctors and other professionals 
can be reduced. These channels would directly save money by encouraging 
the use of lower-cost services and indirectly save money by pushing down 
the wages for highly paid professionals.  
 
Physicians 
 
For doctors, the largest and clearest potential source of gains is 
through allowing more foreign-trained physicians to practice in the United 
States (Table 7-10). Given that roughly half of the applicants to U.S. 
residency programs are rejected solely on the basis of quotas, there clearly 
is a large potential supply of foreign-trained physicians who are already 
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near to meeting U.S. standards. A policy to encourage foreign-trained 
physicians to practice in the United States would probably produce higher 
numbers than the ones in Table 7-10. 
The next largest source of gain is from eliminating licensing 
restrictions that reserve tasks for physicians that other health care 
professionals are capable of doing. Another important dimension of these 
restrictions would be requiring specialists to do tasks for which general 
practitioners are fully qualified. The latter are less often legal 
requirements than norms of practice, which may be enforced by the threat 
of malpractice suits. Though this discussion has focused on restrictions 
affecting nurse practitioners, the list of professionals who would be able to 
substitute for physicians includes nurse midwives, nurse anesthesiologists, 
and radiation therapists. As diagnostic technology develops, it is likely that 
more of the tasks now performed by physicians can be well accomplished 
by workers with less medical school training. 
 
TABLE 7-10 
Impact on the demand for doctors — 2030 
(percent) 
 Low Middle High 
Changes in licensing 3% 5% 10% 
Immigrant physicians 7.6% 15.1% 22.7% 
Medical travel 1.5% 3.0% 5.0% 
Emigration of retirees 2.4% 4.7% 9.4% 
    
Total 15% 28% 47% 
Source and notes: Author's calculations; see text. 
 
The potential gains from increased foreign medical travel and 
emigration of retirees are both substantial, although smaller than from the 
first two paths. Both practices are likely to become more common even 
without any policy changes, due to continuation of current trends. 
However there is a potential for large gains from policies that promote 
both trends.  
In aggregate these policies would have a substantial impact on the 
pay of physicians in the United States. The elasticity of demand for health 
care is estimated to be quite low, usually around -0.2 percent (see Ringel 
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et al. 2002). If the elasticity of demand for physicians is comparable to the 
elasticity for health care more generally, then even the 15 percent decline 
in the demand for physicians shown in the low scenario should be large 
enough to eliminate most or all of the differences between physicians’ 
compensation in the United States and in other wealthy countries. Of 
course, there would be some supply response, with fewer students from 
the United States opting to become physicians and some currently 
practicing physicians retiring earlier. Nonetheless, it seems quite plausible 
that policies designed to reduce protections for physicians could 
substantially reduce their pay relative to other workers and provide 
substantial economic gains.  
 
Dentists 
 
As noted earlier, there are opportunities to increase competition 
for dentists by allowing a broader scope for practice for dental hygienists. 
The evidence in Kleiner and Park (2010) indicated that the cost of dental 
care could be reduced with no loss in quality, by substituting dental 
hygienists for some of the procedures now performed by dentists. As is the 
case with substituting nurse practitioners for doctors, the savings found in 
that analysis would imply that the benefits go beyond just substituting the 
lower-cost labor of dental hygienists for the higher-priced labor of 
dentists, but likely also reflects less use of specialists in cases where their 
services may not be necessary. In addition to the reduction in the demand 
for dentists that could result from greater use of dental hygienists, there is 
also the possibility that more foreign-trained dentists could be licensed to 
practice in the United States if there was a liberalized licensing regime. 
Unlike the situation with foreign medical graduates seeking admission to 
U.S. residency programs, there is not a pool of qualified or nearly 
qualified foreign-trained dentists actively seeking to practice in the United 
States. While this makes it more difficult to project the number who 
might apply, the projections for doctors should provide some guidance.  
In the case of doctors, the number of foreign medical school 
graduates who applied for U.S. residency program was equal to 40 percent 
of the slots available. Since the disparity in pay between dentists in the 
Rigged 185 
 
United States and other countries is comparable to the disparity in pay 
among doctors, it would be reasonable to expect a comparable inflow of 
foreign-trained dentists if the licensing restrictions were relaxed. 
However, since the current inflow of foreign-trained dentists is near zero, 
in contrast with foreign-trained physicians who make up more than 20 
percent of new residents, the impact would be twice as large, effectively 
increasing the supply of new dentists by 40 percent annually (i.e. going 
from 0 to 40 percent, as opposed to going from 20 percent to 40 percent). 
Table 7-11 shows the impact that expanded scope-of-practice 
rules and a relaxation of restrictions on foreign-trained dentists could have 
on the effective demand for dentists trained in the United States. The first 
row makes the same assumptions concerning the potential gains from 
expanding the scope of practice of dental hygienists as were applied to 
expanding the scope of practice of nurse practitioners and related 
occupations. The second row doubles the potential impact of relaxing 
restrictions as applied to doctors, since the current inflow of dentists is 
near zero. 
 
TABLE 7-11 
Impact on the demand for dentists — 2030 
(percent) 
 Low Middle High 
Changes in licensing rules 3% 5% 10% 
Immigrant dentists 15.2% 30.2% 45.4% 
    
Total 18% 35% 55% 
Source and notes: Author's calculations; see text. 
 
The estimates for the effective reduction in demand for dentists 
range from 18 to 55 percent. The impact of this reduction on the price of 
dental care and the earnings of dentists would be less than a comparable 
reduction in the demand for doctors, since the demand for dental care is 
estimated to be somewhat more elastic — between 0.5 and 0.7 percent 
(Nash and Brown 2012) — than the demand for doctors. The implied 
reduction in the price of dental services would be between 20 and 30 
percent at the low end and between 35 and 45 percent using the mid-
range of assumptions. As is the case with doctors, an offsetting reduction 
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in the supply of domestically trained dentists is likely, since some would 
opt for other professions and others would retire earlier. But in any case 
these changes in demand would be large enough to eliminate most or all of 
the rents in this area.  
 
Lawyers 
 
While much of the work performed by lawyers can be performed 
by workers with less legal training, the decision to use lawyers rather than 
paralegal workers is more attributable to norms of practice rather than 
legal prohibitions. Nonetheless, there is a substantial difference in the pay 
of lawyers and paralegals, as shown in Table 7-12 by state.102 
 
TABLE 7-12 
Hourly pay of lawyers and paralegals, by state 
(2014 dollars) 
 Lawyers Paralegals 
United States $68.32 $26.02 
Alabama $52.78 $19.58 
Alaska $48.10 $25.46 
Arizona $62.54 $24.68 
Arkansas $58.85 $17.64 
California $75.14 $30.05 
Colorado $66.81 $25.65 
Connecticut $84.22 $30.18 
Delaware $64.72 $24.63 
D.C. $103.33 $28.63 
Florida $62.97 $25.56 
Georgia $64.79 $26.12 
Hawaii $82.22 $21.19 
Idaho $51.15 $21.82 
Illinois $71.43 $26.77 
Indiana $54.19 $22.57 
Iowa $62.34 $21.29 
Kansas $53.64 $21.77 
Kentucky $54.83 $25.97 
Louisiana $57.11 $22.43 
Maine $53.08 $19.40 
102  In some states the sample size is too small to provide a reliable estimate.  
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TABLE 7-12 
Hourly pay of lawyers and paralegals, by state 
Maryland $73.98 $31.14 
Massachusetts $71.17 $27.34 
Michigan $56.57 $21.34 
Minnesota $64.93 $23.91 
Mississippi $57.12 $20.23 
Missouri $53.29 $22.23 
Montana $46.20 $18.14 
Nebraska $47.15 $19.54 
Nevada $67.70 $25.11 
New Hampshire $50.27 $23.45 
New Jersey $78.74 $28.88 
New Mexico $61.47 $25.05 
New York $77.52 $29.10 
North Carolina $59.08 $22.10 
North Dakota $53.62 $17.34 
Ohio $52.86 $24.11 
Oklahoma $66.29 $21.30 
Oregon $55.86 $22.69 
Pennsylvania $62.49 $24.66 
Rhode Island $54.68 $26.56 
South Carolina $57.65 $20.31 
South Dakota $40.70 $16.25 
Tennessee $72.89 $22.99 
Texas $66.04 $26.24 
Utah $57.24 $24.13 
Vermont $151.72 $20.40 
Virginia $77.18 $30.83 
Washington $63.22 $24.77 
West Virginia $46.51 $18.59 
Wisconsin $56.05 $22.83 
Wyoming $45.48 $16.90 
Source and notes: CEPR analysis of American Community Survey, 2010–2014 (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2014). 
 
In every state the average pay of lawyers is at least twice as high as 
for paralegals and in some states it is almost three times as high. This gap 
should provide a strong incentive to substitute paralegals for lawyers in 
routine tasks like drafting a will or reviewing a mortgage and transferring 
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documents at the closing of a house sale.103 Ideally these processes would 
be simple enough that in most cases no legal assistance is required. Many 
states have taken steps to simplify some legal processes, but more can be 
done. 
Many of the highest-paid lawyers are involved in areas of practice 
that are strongly associated with rent seeking. Table 7-13 shows the 
average compensation of partners in law firms by areas of specialization. 
Partners have the highest compensation in corporate, intellectual 
property, and tax and ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act) 
law. Table 7-14 shows the number of lawyers in each area of practice. 
Intellectual property law stands out as a large and growing area of law, 
employing almost 12 percent of all lawyers in 2014. 
While it is not possible to eliminate the sorts of legal actions that 
create demand for lawyers in corporate law, the demand for lawyers in 
intellectual property law is entirely the result of patents, copyrights, and 
other types of intellectual property claims. The extension of these forms 
of property in length and scope has naturally led to increased demand for 
lawyers’ services. One of the main benefits of intellectual property reform 
would be a reduction in the resources tied up in legal actions related to 
these claims. 
 
TABLE 7-13 
Average compensation for partners by practice area 
(2014 dollars) 
 2014 
Litigation $700,000 
Corporate $893,000 
Intellectual property $855,000 
Labor and employment $503,000 
Tax/ERISA $832,000 
Real estate $573,000 
Other $620,000 
Source and notes: Major, Lindsey & Africa (2014), Partner Compensation Survey. 
103  This is an area that seems ripe for a new business that could use trained paralegals to 
handle the necessary legal documents for a house closing at a fraction of the cost 
charged by lawyers.  
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TABLE 7-14 
Number of lawyers by area of practice 
(number of lawyers) 
 2010 2012 2014 
Litigation 254,259 297,398 343,865 
Corporate 252,273 217,004 225,546 
Intellectual property 142,359 154,744 155,294 
Labor and employment 87,402 84,021 99,216 
Tax/ERISA 56,281 70,118 62,857 
Real estate 85,415 64,678 63,473 
Other 325,108 357,241 340,168 
    
Total 1,203,097 1,245,205 1,290,419 
Source and notes: Major, Lindsey & Africa (2014) and ABA (2013). 
 
There is a similar story with tax law, although the number of 
lawyers employed is considerably lower. The role of many of the highest-
paid tax lawyers is to design creative mechanisms for corporations to 
minimize their tax liability. A dividend of corporate tax reform, such as 
the one described in Chapter 4 that would sharply reduce the number of 
companies paying the corporate income tax, is that fewer resources would 
be committed to developing tax-avoidance strategies.  
Certainly insofar as it is possible, it would be desirable to 
standardize procedures so that more lawyers from other countries could 
perform legal work in the United States. But there are still likely to be 
substantial areas of law where the differences between the United States 
and other countries are large enough that a foreign-trained lawyer would 
need considerable training to competently practice here.  
 
Conclusion: Highly paid professionals are highly paid because they 
set their own rules 
 
Doctors, dentists, and lawyers don’t face the same downward 
pressure on their wages as textile workers, autoworkers, and retail clerks 
because the government’s policies are not trying to push their pay lower. 
We aren’t designing trade agreements to expose these professions to 
competition with lower-paid counterparts in the developing world. Nor 
are politicians constantly looking for new ways to alter regulations in ways 
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that undermine these workers’ bargaining power. The workers in these 
professions sit near the top of the pay ladder not because of the inherent 
dynamics of globalization and the market economy, but because they have 
much more say than other workers in setting the rules. 
It will become increasingly important to challenge the power of 
these professionals in setting the rules in the years ahead; otherwise the 
country is likely to pay an ever greater price in the form of the rents 
earned in these professions. These rents are likely to grow both because 
the supply of well-trained professionals excluded from the U.S. market 
will be expanding hugely in the decades ahead, but also because 
developments in technology are likely to reduce the need for the most 
highly skilled professionals in many areas. For example, developments in 
diagnostic technology may make it possible for a skilled technician to 
assess a patient’s heart condition as well as an experienced cardiologist. As 
robotics develops further, we may be far better off having our surgeries 
performed by robots than highly skilled and highly paid surgeons. There 
will always be genuine quality concerns in making these decisions, but if 
the assessment of quality issues is left to the professionals who stand to 
benefit, we can expect that these professionals will be enriching 
themselves at the expense of the rest of us.  
There is one final point worth mentioning in this discussion. Of 
course, many young professionals, especially doctors, have put in years of 
training and have incurred large debts to practice in a field that they 
expected to be financially rewarding. It is reasonable to have some 
sympathy for them and perhaps lessen the blow from market-opening 
measures by, for example, offering student loan forgiveness.  
However, why apply a different standard to market openings for 
highly trained professionals than to market openings for textile workers 
and autoworkers? For less highly paid workers we take steps that increase 
efficiency and promote growth and pledge that we will help those left 
behind. (In most cases the help has not been especially useful.) It does not 
make sense to believe that the most educated workers in society somehow 
are in need of greater protection from the government than the millions of 
less-educated workers who have been displaced by trade openings and 
other measures. Sympathy might be appropriate, special protection is not.  
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The Political Economy of an Anti-Rent-
Seeking Equality Agenda  
Progressives have long been suspicious of the market. Some see it 
as an aberration to be contained, if not actually overcome. In the extreme 
case, the goal is some form of central planning in which the government 
makes the bulk of decisions on allocating resources. More tempered 
versions have the government taking possession of key industries, with 
smaller firms and less-consequential sectors left in private hands. The 
social democratic vision dominant in Western Europe leaves the market 
largely in private hands. The government provides a safety net to ensure 
health care, education, and other basic needs, and it acts to redistribute 
economic gains to partly reverse inequality created by the market, at least.  
However, neither vision takes into account the notion that the 
government structures the market in fundamental ways that determine 
market outcomes. Both visions largely accept the view of the market held 
by Friedman-esque conservatives — that it is a fact of nature. Undesirable 
outcomes such as poverty or extreme inequality are givens, and the issue is 
the extent to which we want the government to supplant the market or 
ameliorate its effects.  
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Markets are not fixed by nature; rather, they are infinitely 
malleable. They are and can be structured in different ways depending on 
the desired outcomes. The enormous upward redistribution in the United 
States of the last four decades was not an inevitable outcome of technology 
or globalization. It was the result of deliberate policies, the purpose of 
which was to redistribute income upward.  
To sustain progressive politics in the decades ahead it is essential 
that progressives understand the causes of upward redistribution and get a 
clearer understanding of the market. The suspicion of market outcomes is 
a prejudice that needs to be overcome. The market is a tool, like the 
wheel. Many horrible acts have been done with wheels — young children 
have been run over by cars, sometimes even deliberately — but no one in 
their right mind would see this as a serious basis for not using wheels.  
In the same vein, we can point to plenty of cases where the 
market has led to really bad outcomes. Tens of millions of people have 
faced unemployment. Hundreds of millions have faced poverty and 
hunger. But these outcomes were not necessary features of a market 
economy. To some extent poverty has been a result of a genuine lack of 
resources: actual scarcity. More frequently, poverty is the result of the 
way we have organized markets and structured property rules. If we had 
rules designed to lead to more equal outcomes, there would not be so 
much poverty co-existing alongside great wealth for the few. 
The chapters in this book have outlined ways in which different 
policies can be put in place to reverse the upward redistribution of 
income. This chapter discusses some of the political economy issues 
around these policies and assesses the political coalitions that could 
potentially advance the economic agenda described in this book. 
 
The full employment agenda 
 
In principle, a full-employment agenda should be the easiest goal 
among the major policy areas, since the winners hugely outnumber the 
losers. Full-employment policy, first and foremost, is explicitly about 
making the pie larger, even if full employment also has important 
implications for distribution. We are foregoing a great deal of potential 
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output simply because there is not enough demand in the economy. With 
more demand, the economy will produce more, more workers will have 
jobs, and in principle everyone can be better off. 
The potential gains from maintaining a full-employment economy 
are enormous compared to almost any other policy. In 2008, before the 
severity of the recession was clear, the CBO projected that GDP in 2015 
would be $20.5 trillion in 2016 dollars, $2.3 trillion more than it actually 
was in 2015. The cumulative gap between the CBO’s 2008 projection and 
actual GDP from 2008 to 2015 is more than $13.5 trillion, which comes 
to $42,000 for every person in the United States. Even if we assume that 
the CBO hugely overstated the economy’s potential back in 2008, the lost 
income would still be enormous. 
We don’t have to speculate about the benefits from a full-
employment policy since we experienced it in the late 1990s. In 2000, 
when the unemployment rate fell to 4.0 percent as a year-round average, 
the economy was 11.7 percent larger than the CBO had projected it 
would be back in 1996. This difference is the equivalent of $2.2 trillion in 
the economy of 2016, or $6,800 per person.  
The gains from getting to full employment will not be evenly 
shared. They will go disproportionately to blacks and Hispanics and to 
people with less education. This was the case in the boom of the late 
1990s, though it’s not clear that there need be losers at all. The profit 
share of income may drop somewhat, but if the pie is larger, businesses 
can still come out ahead. After all, few corporations saw 2000 as a 
disastrous year.  
The impact of full employment will vary across sectors. Businesses 
that depend on low-wage labor will face difficulties as workers with better 
options either leave or demand higher pay to stay. A predictable result of a 
full-employment economy is that we will have fewer convenience stores 
and fast food restaurants, since some of these businesses will not be 
profitable if workers are paid a substantially higher wage.  
Other businesses may take a hit as wages for many of their 
employees rise rapidly due to a tight labor market. For example, the 
clerical staff at a legal firm or the custodians in a software company can be 
expected to receive higher pay in a tight labor market, and their gains may 
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have some modest effect in reducing profits if the costs cannot be fully 
passed along. 
However, some businesses will benefit from an increase in 
demand. Traditionally, a major beneficiary of a high-employment 
economy has been the manufacturing sector. Auto and steel manufacturers 
can expect to see higher profits as increased demand pushes them closer to 
capacity. Their ascent may be somewhat less lofty today than it was 30 to 
40 years ago as these companies are increasingly competing in a global 
market, but most manufacturing firms are still likely to see an increase in 
demand as a net positive for their bottom lines. 
If there is an industry that is a plausible loser from a strong 
economy it would be the financial sector. Banks and other financial firms 
will almost always have a large volume of long-term loans on their books. 
While securitization has reduced the volume of loans that these firms are 
likely to hold on their books, they are almost certain to still be on net 
holders of long-term debt. They stand to lose if increased wages lead to 
price increases and higher inflation. Since their loans are almost always set 
at a fixed rate, e.g., a five-year car loan at 4.0 percent interest, the value 
of the repayment will decline if inflation rises.  
To take the simplest case, if they offered the 4.0 percent car loan 
with an expectation that inflation would be 1.5 percent, the bank would 
have expected a real interest rate of 2.5 percent (4.0 percent minus 1.5 
percent). If the inflation rate ends up being 2.5 percent then the real 
interest rate on this loan falls to 1.5 percent (4.0 percent minus 2.5 
percent). The bank will then have taken a large loss on this loan since it 
will be getting substantially less money in real terms than it had anticipated 
due to the rise in the inflation rate.  
Fear of inflation is why many financial firms are opposed to full-
employment policies. They may see little gain from the prospect of more 
growth and lower unemployment (bankers and their families are not the 
ones typically hurting in a recession), while they face a big risk to their 
profits if full employment leads to higher inflation. But different businesses 
within the financial sector may have different interests. Increased growth 
will increase the opportunity for making loans, a clear source of profit. 
And a stronger economy will improve the average quality of loans, 
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reducing the number of defaults. Since banks can take large hits on 
defaulted loans, a lower default rate is a big plus for the financial sector. 
Nonetheless, the financial sector does seem to be the place where there 
are the greatest concerns over inflation, and for this reason, the greatest 
source of pressure against full-employment policies that could lead to 
more inflation.  
But obstacles to full-employment policies exist well beyond those 
sectors with a direct interest in preventing inflation and keeping workers 
from gaining more bargaining power. Tens of millions of ordinary 
workers, who would win from expansionary fiscal and monetary policies 
designed to lower the unemployment rate, staunchly oppose these 
policies. 
The problem is the prevailing myths about the virtues of austerity 
and fears about easy money. Polls and focus groups regularly find that the 
story that the government budget is like a family budget has enormous 
appeal, but few people have a clear enough understanding of the economy 
to recognize that this analogy is inappropriate. Everyone understands that 
using credit cards to balance income and spending each month will lead to 
trouble. The idea that the government’s finances are qualitatively different 
— that the government does not face the same constraints as a family — 
strikes most people as bizarre and fanciful. 
The same attitudes apply to expansionary monetary policy. The 
notion that the government can print money and thereby create wealth 
seems crazy. Everyone has heard stories of Weimar Germany, or more 
recently Zimbabwe, where governments facing economic crises sought to 
resolve their problems by printing money. It is difficult to distinguish the 
idea of printing money when demand is weak and printing money when 
the government can’t pay its bills. If these two situations look similar to 
people, it is understandable that they would prefer to be on the safe side 
and avoid the risk of hyperinflation. This preference for security probably 
explains the continuing appeal of the gold standard even for an economy 
that has been suffering from too little inflation rather than too much.104  
104  It is also true that few people have any clear idea of the actual rate of inflation in the 
economy. Most people are not following economic statistics closely. Their 
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Politicians are happy to exploit this confusion even in the cases 
where they do not share it themselves. (Most politicians have not studied 
economics extensively, so there is little reason to believe that most of 
them have a clearer understanding of these issues than the bulk of the 
population.) For example, many Democrats who likely recognize the 
virtues of deficit spending, will tout the budget surpluses of the Clinton 
years as a triumph of wise policymaking. They contrast their fiscal 
prudence with the reckless tax cutting of Republicans.  
While the purpose of Republican tax cuts may be to give more 
money to the wealthy, the idea that the economy will often benefit from 
larger deficits is accurate. Deficits driven by tax cuts for higher-income 
people offer less of a benefit for the economy than deficit spending on 
infrastructure, education, or child care because in the former case some of 
the money is saved, not spent, while in the latter case all of the money is 
spent, providing a larger short-run boost to the economy and a long-term 
boost to productivity from the investments. But the constant warnings 
about deficits make it difficult to gain political support for progressive 
stimulus measures.  
For example, then-Senator Obama knew better back in 2006 
when he said that a vote to raise the debt ceiling “is a sign of leadership 
failure. It is a sign that the U.S. government can’t pay its own bills.” He 
voted against raising the debt ceiling (Kessler 2013), even though he 
presumably knew that there was no problem with the federal government 
running the modest deficits of 2006 and that there was no problem with 
raising the debt ceiling, which simply authorizes borrowing to meet 
commitments already made. He was making a pitch that would resonant 
politically because most of his constituents did not understand the way the 
economy works and the difference between their own borrowing 
constraints and the federal government’s. He chose to reinforce these 
misconceptions for short-term political gain. 
perception of inflation will be determined by the prices that they happen to see. 
And, it is also likely that rising prices will have more of an impact on their 
perceptions than stable or falling prices, so a jump in the price of milk or gas will 
stand out, even though the prices of most other items might be stable or falling 
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2010). 
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There is no simple route for circumventing the large-scale 
confusion people have about the basics of macroeconomic policy. The 
public’s conservatism on these issues is deeply held and believed to be 
common sense. Few people spend their time contemplating the dynamics 
of the economy or studying the history of instances of successful fiscal and 
monetary stimulus. Unless the public deepens its economic understanding, 
it will be difficult to overcome the fear of debt as a barrier to full 
employment. This task is not made any easier by the fact that there is a 
whole industry devoted to fanning these fears.105 
If it is not possible to make progress on full employment through 
larger budget deficits, the obvious alternative is smaller trade deficits. In 
this case, the popular prejudices go in the right direction. Just as people 
think it is bad for the government to run a deficit, they also generally 
believe it is bad for the country to be running a trade deficit. And when 
we are below full employment, they are right. 
A simple remedy for a trade deficit is to reduce the value of the 
dollar, because a lower-valued dollar makes U.S.-made goods and services 
more competitive internationally. With a lower-valued dollar, our exports 
become cheaper for other countries; therefore, they will buy more of 
them. On the other hand, imports become relatively more expensive, 
meaning that we will buy fewer imported goods and more goods produced 
here. The result is more domestic demand and more jobs, bringing us 
closer to full employment. 
While this route may seem straightforward, powerful industries 
have a direct interest in blocking it. As discussed in Chapter 3, many U.S. 
corporations directly profit from the trade deficit. Most major 
manufacturing firms produce a substantial portion of their parts and/or 
products in other countries. They are not anxious to see the cost of the 
items they import rise by 15–20 percent, if the dollar falls by a 
comparable amount. Also, major retailers like Walmart have worked hard 
105  The private equity billionaire Peter Peterson has devoted a substantial portion of his 
wealth to supporting organizations that promote fears of budget deficits. This list 
includes the Concord Coalition, Fix the Debt, the Committee for a Responsible 
Federal Budget, and others.  
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to establish low-cost supply chains in the developing world. They don’t 
want to see the prices they pay rise sharply due to a drop in the dollar. 
Another obstacle is the need to negotiate a lower-valued dollar 
with China and other major trading partners. These negotiations will 
involve trade-offs, and making a lower-valued dollar a top priority would 
mean downgrading some industry priorities, like Microsoft’s enforcement 
of its copyrights or Pfizer’s enforcement of its patents. It would also mean 
downgrading demands from Goldman Sachs and other banks for increased 
access to foreign financial markets or Verizon to telecommunications 
markets. These are not trivial obstacles. 
One argument that should not be accepted is the claim that we 
should accept higher trade deficits — and by implication lower 
employment — because smaller trade deficits will hurt poor people in the 
developing world. But as pointed out in Chapter 1, this contention is just 
bad economics. Relatively fast-growing developing countries should be 
borrowing capital from rich countries like the United States, which means 
that they should be running trade deficits in order to build up their capital 
stock and infrastructure. As a practical matter, successful developing 
countries like China, South Korea, and Taiwan have eschewed this 
practice by running trade surpluses while experiencing growth. However, 
their experience reflects a serious failing of the international financial 
system, which has not supported regular flows of capital from rich 
countries to poor countries. So instead of pointing fingers at workers in 
the United States and other rich countries who just want to be employed, 
we should take a hard look at the actions of the IMF and U.S. Treasury 
Department. 
Another route toward full employment is shortening average 
work time. As was noted in Chapter 3, Germany managed to reduce its 
unemployment rate in the Great Recession, even though it was 
experiencing a steeper falloff in output than the United States, because it 
encouraged firms to reduce hours rather than lay off workers. There is 
both a short-term cyclical aspect to this issue and a longer term 
institutional dimension. The short-term is simply the structure of the 
system of unemployment benefits. The unemployment system in the 
United States is primarily designed to encourage layoffs, rather than 
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shorter hours, since workers can more easily be compensated for layoffs. 
In the longer term, the German experience speaks to trends in work 
hours. In other wealthy countries, the length of the average work year 
decreased dramatically over the last four decades. A benefit of shorter 
work weeks is that more workers have the opportunity to work at better-
paying jobs.  
There has been some progress in both areas in recent years in 
large part because these are policies that can be put in place at the state 
level or in some cases even the local level. In terms of unemployment 
benefits, 29 states and the District of Columbia now have a work-sharing 
(short-time compensation) program as part of their system of 
unemployment insurance. Take-up rates have been low because many 
employers are unaware of the program and because the system is highly 
bureaucratic and difficult for employers to use. However, this is an area 
where progress can, in principle, be made without too much difficulty. It 
should be possible to better publicize work-sharing programs so that 
employers at least know they have the option as an alternative to layoffs. 
And if the existence of work-sharing programs were more widely known, 
workers may pressure their employers to go the work-sharing route. As 
for the bureaucratic side, most of the existing programs were designed in 
the late 1970s or early 1980s. In many cases, they require filing forms on 
paper. There are also many aspects of these programs that unnecessarily 
make work sharing far more difficult for employers than just laying off 
workers. In order for take-up rates to expand significantly, the rules must 
be adapted so that they don’t impose needless burdens.106  
In terms of hours more generally, the incentive for companies in 
the United States is to have fewer workers putting in longer hours rather 
than to have more workers worker fewer. The issue is overhead costs per 
worker, but those costs are falling as employers reduce their benefits — 
defined benefit pensions, for example, are rapidly disappearing from the 
private sector — and as the Affordable Care Act (ACA) reduces the 
dependence of workers on employer-provided health insurance. While the 
106  The federal government set aside money for the modernization of the program and 
provided subsidies to states to use work sharing (Baker and Woo 2012). 
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ACA does not seem to have had much impact on employer-provided 
insurance thus far, a larger share of the workforce is likely to procure 
insurance through the exchanges in the future. If pension and health care 
benefits are no longer a per-worker cost, then employers have less 
incentive to force workers to put in longer hours rather than just hiring 
more workers. 
On the other side, progress has been made at the state and local 
levels to require employers to provide paid family leave and paid sick days. 
If workers can take time off to deal with child care or care for sick 
relatives, or take days off when they are sick themselves, their average 
hours will probably fall. The arithmetic is striking: an increase in average 
time off of 2.5 days a year would reduce work time by 1.0 percent. If total 
hours of work needed did not change, an additional 1.4 million people 
would be hired in the 2016 economy. Of course, how such changes play 
out will never be this simple. But, as a general rule, if the average worker 
puts in fewer hours, we will need more workers. 
The main reason for promoting measures like paid family leave 
and paid sick leave is to accommodate people’s needs. Paid vacation 
should also be included in this mix, and the United States is an outlier in 
not guaranteeing it. Most other wealthy countries guarantee workers four 
to six weeks a year of paid vacation (Ray, Sanes, and Schmitt 2013), but 
the United States inadvertently put in place a structure of benefits that 
pushes workers toward taking the gains from higher productivity in the 
form of higher income rather than time off. There is nothing natural about 
this, and evidence suggests that many workers would value more leisure 
time even at the cost of income or less rapid income growth in the 
future.107 But beyond these reasons, reducing average work hours spreads 
good jobs around more broadly and tightens up the labor market, 
improving workers’ bargaining positions. 
 
 
 
107  There is also reason to believe that taking the benefits of productivity growth in 
leisure rather than income will have environmental benefits (Rosnick 2013). 
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The macroeconomy and everything else 
 
Maintaining a full-employment economy is the key element in 
ensuring that the benefits of growth are shared equally throughout the 
income distribution. However, we cannot assume that governments will 
always opt for progressive macroeconomic policy for reasons noted above. 
Furthermore, progressives may be in a position to gain power at a level 
where they can’t set macroeconomic policy, as would be the case for state 
governments in the United States or the national governments within the 
euro zone. No progressive government should ever find itself in the 
situation of Syriza when it took power in Greece in 2015, with little clear 
agenda other than hoping Germany would grant it better bailout terms 
than were granted to its right-wing predecessor.  
And, there is more than a little truth to the concerns of fiscal 
conservatives about high interest rates and/or inflation. It is certainly 
possible for excess demand to create a serious inflationary threat in the 
context of a high-employment economy, even if we have seen little 
evidence of this problem in the wealthy countries for the last three 
decades. For this reason, it is important to have policies that directly 
attack the source of high-end rents. Reducing the purchasing power of 
those at the top leaves more room for expanding the purchasing power of 
everyone else, without adding to inflation pressures.  
 
Combating inflation by taming high-end rents 
 
There is no better place to begin the discussion of the politics of 
curbing high-end rents than the financial sector, which is the basis of many 
of the country’s most bloated incomes. Here is it worth bringing the back 
the analogy of successful counterfeiters to get a better understanding of 
the economics.  
The immediate effect of eliminating hundreds of billions of dollars 
of waste in the financial sector through a financial transactions tax and 
cracking down on abuses by the industry would be similar to the effect of 
shutting down a massive counterfeiting operation. The counterfeiting 
operation both directly employs people to print money and get it into 
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circulation. It also indirectly employs people based on the spending of the 
counterfeiters. Exposing the bills as counterfeits will put all these people 
out of work. Nonetheless, shutting down counterfeiters is still considered 
to be good economic policy. The assumption is that the people now 
employed as a result of the fake bills will instead be reemployed in the real 
economy. 
Eliminating waste in finance that isn’t facilitating the working of 
the productive economy has the same impact as shutting down 
counterfeiters. It should lead to clear benefits as a whole, even if there are 
short-term costs as people need to adjust to an economy where they are 
not dependent on the spending of the counterfeiters or high-flyers in the 
financial industry. 
This can be true even in a financial center like New York City. In 
addition to the jobs lost by people employed in the industry, there would 
also be jobs loss among the hundreds of thousands of people employed 
serving their meals, cleaning their houses, caring for their kids, and 
providing a whole range of other services. But the flip side of this situation 
is that the demand for housing, and therefore the cost, would be 
dramatically reduced. Suppose that rents in the city fell by 30 to 40 
percent, as the Wall Street crew was no longer able to pay outlandish 
prices for condominiums and apartments. This would allow many people 
to move to the city who might otherwise never have been able to afford it. 
That should provide a huge boost to other industries, since they will be 
able to attract more workers. Also, lower rents will free up tens of billions 
of dollars a year from the budgets of people who already live in the city. 
These people will have more money to spend on a whole range of goods 
and services, filling much of the gap created by the drop in spending from 
the Wall Street crew.  
It is likely that even in the case of New York City, most people 
who do not work in the financial industry end up as winners by reducing 
the waste in the industry. It is unambiguously the case that the rest of the 
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country comes ahead by having less of its savings effectively taxed away by 
the financial industry.108  
Of course, the politics of targeting waste in the financial industry 
will be difficult. Just as autoworkers would resist a trade pact that is likely 
to lead to wide-scale job loss in the auto industry, the financial industry 
will resist any proposal to reduce its income. But the financial industry has 
representatives in the places of power. Top officials in administrations of 
both parties are drawn from the financial industry. For Treasury 
Secretary, George W. Bush installed Henry Paulson, a former Goldman 
Sachs CEO; Bill Clinton installed Robert Rubin, also a former Goldman 
Sachs CEO; and Barack Obama installed Jack Lew, formerly a top 
executive at Citigroup. The top ranks of all three administrations were 
chockfull of representatives of the financial industry who would do 
everything in their power to block efforts to eliminate waste there. After 
all, we’re talking about their friends’ incomes, not autoworkers’ 
paychecks. 
The power of the financial industry will make it difficult to enact 
measures at the national level to tax financial transactions or to break up 
too-big-to-fail banks. But that hardly means that progressives should not 
continue to draw attention to the waste and high-end rents. Also, it would 
be possible for states with major financial centers (e.g., New York and 
Illinois) to impose modest financial transactions taxes on the trades that 
take place there. But since these trades can migrate fairly easily to other 
financial centers within the country, the taxes would have to be 
considerably lower than the levels that would be possible nationally.  
It is possible to take other, more direct action at the state level to 
reduce other sources of waste in the sector. For example, any state (or set 
108  The prospects of London in the post-Brexit era may provide insights into the plight 
of a financial center after the industry has been downsized. London is virtually 
certain to lose jobs in the financial industry under a Brexit, but it remains to be seen 
whether the net effect will be positive or negative for people not working in the 
industry. While the media are reporting declines in house prices as bad news, the 
opposite is true for Londoners (or potential Londoners) who don’t own a house or 
condo. The prospect of lower rent and the possibility of paying less for a house in 
the future is unambiguously good news for them.  
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of states) can establish a low-cost retirement system that is available for 
contributions from the state’s workers. Illinois is implementing such a 
system in 2017, and California was debating a similar plan in the summer 
of 2016.109 A national pension system would be better, but it may be 
necessary for a number of states to take the lead.  
States may also be able to set up low-cost services in other areas to 
compete with the financial industry. For example, a number of proposals 
for a postal banking system would provide basic banking services to low- 
and moderate-income households (Office of the Inspector General of the 
United States Postal Service 2014). States may be able to follow this 
model, perhaps with the cooperation of the Postal Service. States may also 
be able to provide lower-cost auto insurance and reduce unnecessary costs 
associated with buying and selling homes.  
In addition, state and local government can act to ensure that they 
are not wasting money in their pensions by paying high fees to hedge funds 
and private equity funds that don’t produce returns that beat the market. 
An important step to ensure this outcome is increased transparency. All 
contracts entered into by these pensions should be publicly available and 
show what the pensions paid to hedge fund and private equity fund 
managers and what returns the funds received. There can be real value in 
setting examples. If a progressive state like Vermont or California 
required that all terms be public, then other states might be shamed into 
following the example. The same could be the case if places like San 
Francisco or New York City went this route. And university endowments 
can also provide leadership in this area. There is no excuse for throwing 
away public money by paying high fees to the financial industry that are 
not justified by the returns they produce. The first step for avoiding this 
situation is public disclosure. 
Finally, it is important to simplify the tax code in order to reduce 
the size of the tax avoidance industry. Allowing firms to issue non-voting 
shares of stock as an alternative to paying the corporate income tax is 
perhaps the best way to bring about corporate tax simplification. 
Companies would be allowed to issue a number of shares that is roughly 
109  Illinois’ law can be found in Illinois General Assembly (2015). 
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proportionate to the percentage of the corporate income that it expected 
to pay. This policy could be enacted by states that have corporate income 
taxes. If states followed this practice, they would likely both be reducing 
their own enforcement costs and setting a model that could be copied 
elsewhere.  
If issuing shares were offered as an alternative to the corporate 
income tax at the national level it is difficult to believe there would not be 
some companies who now pay their taxes that would welcome the option 
of this simpler alternative. If any substantial number of companies went in 
their direction it could put pressure on the ones that didn’t. Certainly it 
would be hard to explain why, if they actually are paying the taxes they 
owe, they would not prefer a simple mechanism that could save them a 
considerable amount of money in compliance costs. The first step is of 
course making the issuing of shares an option, which allows for the 
obvious question: what’s wrong with giving people a choice? 
 
Alternatives to patents and copyrights 
 
The pharmaceutical, entertainment, and software industries can 
be expected to fight just as hard as the financial industry to keep in place 
the protections that ensure their profitability. But here, too, the market is 
our friend. 
These industries, as currently structured, depend on an incredibly 
inefficient system of government-imposed monopolies. These monopolies 
make items that would otherwise be cheap, like prescription drugs and 
medical equipment, incredibly expensive. They also make it expensive to 
get recorded music, movies, and software — all items which could 
otherwise be transferred at zero cost. The goal of a reform strategy is to 
expose the enormous waste associated with these monopolies and to find 
mechanisms to allow increased production and use of non-protected 
items. It is also important to block efforts by the government to extend 
the deeper reach of these monopolies to the rest of the world through 
trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
In the case of prescription drugs and medical equipment, 
consumers tend to have little appreciation of the extent to which patent 
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monopolies raise prices because they have become so used to paying high 
prices and are unaware that high-quality generic versions are selling in, say 
India, for less than 1 percent of the U.S. price. These differences are 
incredible both at the level of the individual drug and also at the aggregate 
level. It is unlikely that even many economists are aware of the hundreds 
of billions of dollars of additional spending on drugs, tests, and medical 
equipment each year as a result of their protected status. This sum is far 
larger than what is at stake in most policy disputes.  
One way to publicize these differences is to take advantage of 
them. Insofar as possible, people can attempt to buy generic versions of 
drugs in countries where they are available. In the case of some new drugs, 
which are priced at more than $100,000 for a course of treatment, it 
would be easy to cover the cost of an extended stay in India or other 
countries, bring along family members, and still have enormous savings. 
While this is far from an ideal way to receive medical care, it is certainly 
better than going without care or mortgaging a house and draining savings 
to cover the cost of medications. There is a basic principle that everyone 
should understand: drugs are cheap, but patents and other forms of 
protection make them expensive.  
The other route is to increase the room for non-patent-supported 
R&D wherever possible. As noted in Chapter 5, it is not plausible that the 
country will flip over all at once from a system that relies on patent 
monopolies to one that relies on publicly funded research for prescription 
drugs and medical equipment. But publicly funded clinical trials could be a 
midway step. The government would contract with private companies, 
through a process of competitive bidding, to conduct clinical trials of 
chemicals that were either already in the public domain or to which the 
company bought the rights. The results would be publicly posted for 
doctors and researchers, and the drugs themselves would be available as 
generics once they had been through the FDA approval process so that 
anyone would be able to produce them.  
This system of publicly funded clinical trials can be infinitely sliced 
and diced. There could public funding of trials in just some areas (for 
example, cancer drugs) which would require a relatively small portion of 
the funding now going to the National Institutes of Health. The payoff 
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would be both the availability of a large amount of data on the 
effectiveness of the trials — possibly shaming drug companies into more 
disclosure of test results — and the possibility that some number of 
important new cancer drugs would be available at generic prices. The 
costs of clinical tests are low enough that a major foundation or a 
collaboration of smaller foundations could put up the necessary funding.110 
If this spending produced some number of effective drugs that were made 
available at generic prices, it could have a considerable impact. 
There are many other ways that the process can be cut. For 
example, the government allows drug companies a six-month patent 
extension when they test a drug for pediatric uses. The government could 
instead pay for the testing itself (making the results public) and compare 
the implicit cost of a six-month patent extension with the cost of direct 
payment.111 The point here is to get a foot in the door to allow a clear 
basis for comparing the efficiency of directly funded research with the 
current system of patent monopolies. It is likely that the patent monopoly 
system would flunk this test. It is likely that the drug industry knows that 
the patent monopoly system would flunk this test, which is why they will 
do everything in their power to ensure that such tests don’t take place. 
One advantage in this effort is that the generic drug industry stands to 
benefit from weakening or eliminating patent monopolies. Insurers, in 
principle, also stand to benefit from the availability of low-cost drugs as 
well as medical tests. Even the major pharmaceutical companies could still 
profit through a system of publicly funded research, since they would 
likely be the major recipients of contracts. However, as long as these 
companies can make large profits under the current system, they will be 
110  Doctors Without Borders is already engaged in a process along these lines with its 
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (http://www.dndi.org/). While this project 
has produced an enormous return on the money invested, it is explicitly targeted on 
diseases that primarily afflict poor people in the developing world. Therefore, it 
does little to affect thinking on the process of drug development in wealthy 
countries.  
111  This idea was suggested to me by Jamie Love, the director of Knowledge Ecology 
International.  
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uninterested in a new route, regardless of the costs their system imposes 
on the country and the world.  
There is a similar story on the enforcement of copyright 
monopolies. This is an increasingly archaic way of supporting creative 
work as the Internet makes it ever more difficult to prevent the transfer of 
unauthorized copies. This is the motivation for more punitive laws on 
copyright enforcement and increasing efforts to make third parties share in 
the cost of enforcement.  
The answers in this case are both to resist repressive efforts at 
enforcement and to increase the availability of work not supported 
through copyrights. In terms of repressive efforts, the defeat of the Stop 
Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the PROTECT IP Act (PIPA) were notable 
achievements. These laws would have required web intermediaries to 
police their sites for copyright violations. This is a big step up from 
current law, which already requires that companies side with claims by 
copyright holders, against their customers, and immediately remove 
material that is alleged to be in breach. The Trans-Pacific Partnership and 
other trade deals under discussion also increase the strength of copyright 
protection, imposing larger burdens on intermediaries. 
Chapter 5 discusses a tax-credit system modeled on the charitable 
giving tax deduction as an alternative mechanism for supporting creative 
work. This can be implemented at the national level for an amount 
considerably smaller than the current cost of the charitable giving tax 
deduction. This would create a vast pool of funds to support creative 
work, which would almost certainly exceed the amount going to creative 
workers through the copyright system. As explained in that chapter, the 
condition for being eligible for receiving funding through the tax-credit 
system would be waving the right to get copyright protection for a limited 
period of time. This has the great virtue of being self-enforcing, since 
someone attempting to cheat the system by getting a copyright during 
their period of ineligibility would find that their claim was not 
enforceable. 
While such a system could produce a large amount of creative 
work if it were implemented nationally, states or local governments could 
experiment with a similar tool. Suppose a city of 200,000 made available a 
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credit of $50 per adult. To be eligible for the credit, a creative worker 
would not only have to forego copyright protection for a period of time, 
but he or she would also have to physically live in the city for at least eight 
or nine months of the year. Donations by three quarters of the population 
(a high share, but it’s free, since the donor gets a full tax credit) would 
create a pool of $7.5 million to support creative workers.  
Since these workers would be required to live in the city much of 
the year, they would have an incentive to perform their music or plays, 
conduct writing workshops, or perform other work that would both 
support them and increase their visibility to people deciding what to do 
with their tax credit. It is easy to envision a scenario in which this sort of 
influx brings in enough tourist revenue to more than cover the cost of the 
tax credit. Of course, this would be an easier proposition if a creative 
foundation were prepared to put up part of the cost.  
In any case, this and many other mechanisms can increase the 
supply of material supported outside of the copyright system. As more 
free material becomes available, it will be more difficult and irrelevant to 
maintain copyright as we know it.  
 
Reining in CEO pay: Getting corporations to serve their 
shareholders 
 
Chapter 6 noted the explosion in CEO pay over the last four 
decades and argued that this was the result of a failed corporate 
governance structure, rather than the increased value that CEOs were 
providing to shareholders. The argument is that the corporate directors 
who most immediately determine CEO pay largely owe their jobs to top 
management. They have little incentive to ever challenge a CEO pay 
package since they risk angering the CEO and their fellow board members 
by pressing the issue. In contrast, virtually no director ever loses their job 
because of allowing an excessive pay package for CEOs and top 
management.  
Insofar as this story accurately describes the rise in CEO pay, the 
appropriate political strategy involves making it easier for shareholders to 
exercise control over the company they are supposed to own. Chapter 6 
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proposes changes to corporate governance that alter the structure of 
incentives for corporate directors. For example, the directors could lose 
their annual stipend if a CEO pay package is voted down in a say-on-pay 
vote by shareholders. The pay for directors can also be structured in ways 
that give them a direct incentive for holding down CEO pay. For example, 
the directors can be allowed to share half of the savings from cutting CEO 
pay, as long as the company’s stock performance was not harmed. 
While changes in corporate governance rules could be 
implemented through Congress, this is not likely to happen anytime soon. 
However, it would be reasonable to push some changes as voluntary 
measures. For example, less than 3 percent of CEO pay packages are 
rejected by shareholders. This means that asking directors to voluntarily 
agree to an arrangement where they would surrender their pay in such 
cases is simply asking for a vote of confidence that they will not be in the 
bottom 3 percent of corporate boards. This is a rather low bar.  
This also could be a situation where a few examples could prove 
very powerful. If the board of a major corporation accepted a rule 
whereby it agreed to forfeit its pay in the event that a say-on-pay initiative 
were defeated, it might shame other boards into following its lead. After 
all, why are these boards collecting their large salaries if they can’t hold 
CEO pay to reasonable levels? 
The other part of this chapter dealt with the run-up of pay of top 
executives in the nonprofit sector, which has paralleled the run-up in CEO 
pay. While the top executives of major universities and foundations are 
not getting paychecks in the tens of millions of dollars a year, it is not 
uncommon for their pay to cross $1 million, or more than 25 times the 
pay of the typical worker. As was noted in the chapter, this pay is largely 
subsidized by taxpayer dollars, since donations to these institutions are 
tax-exempt. This means that roughly 40 percent of their salaries came 
from taxpayers. In the case of a foundation or university president getting 
$1 million a year, effectively $400,000 is coming from taxpayers. 
If taxpayers are paying the bill, it is reasonable to put limits on the 
top salaries that these institutions can pay. The President of the United 
States is paid $400,000 a year, which seems like a fair limit on the pay of 
people employed by tax-exempt institutions. Just to be clear, this is not 
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limiting what nonprofit institutions can pay their presidents or other top 
officials. It is only limiting what they can pay them while getting a subsidy 
from taxpayers. This is a measure that also can be put in place at the state 
level. While the most important tax subsidy is allowing contributors to 
write off the donation on their taxes, most states exempt nonprofits from 
paying sales taxes and often property taxes. They could in principle make 
eligibility for this special tax treatment contingent on accepting limits on 
pay. As a practical matter, it is unlikely that states would have to worry 
much about nonprofits fleeing. Harvard is unlikely to leave Massachusetts 
even if it were forced to reduce its president’s pay to $400,000 a year — 
the salary of the President of the United States — as a condition of special 
tax treatment. 
Pressure on individual institutions by students, faculty, and alumni 
could prove effective. And some schools going this route would put 
pressure on others to follow. The fruit of lower pay for those at the top is 
lower tuition costs and more money available for other employees.  
 
Protectionism for high-paid professionals 
 
The last major form of rent discussed in this book is the pay of 
highly educated professionals, like doctors, dentists, and lawyers. These 
professionals are paid far more than their counterparts in other wealthy 
countries. As noted in Chapter 7, if doctors in the United States were paid 
the same as their counterparts in other wealthy countries it would save 
roughly $100 billion a year in health care costs. 
It’s not an accident that the pay of these workers has not been put 
under pressure by globalization. It was the result of deliberate policy 
decisions to largely protect these highly educated workers from foreign 
and even domestic competition. In the case of doctors, foreign-trained 
doctors are largely excluded from practicing medicine in the United 
States.  
The issues with domestic forms of protection in highly paid 
professions are likely to become more serious as technology makes it 
possible for many relatively complex tasks to be performed by 
professionals with lower levels of training. For example, advances in 
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diagnostic technology may allow nurse practitioners to make diagnoses of 
most conditions with the same or better accuracy than most doctors. 
However, if doctors are allowed to determine standards of care, then they 
are likely to leave in place regulations that effectively force people to see 
general practitioners or even highly paid specialists when a much lower 
paid professional could perform the work equally well.  
If our trade negotiators treated doctors and other highly paid 
professionals the same way they treated manufacturing workers, then 
trade agreements would have been written to make it as easy as possible 
for smart, ambitious kids in Mexico, India, and other developing countries 
to study to meet U.S. standards. They then would be able practice their 
profession in the United States in the same way as someone born and 
educated in the United States. The fact that manufacturing workers face 
competition from low-paid workers in the developing world and doctors 
and other highly paid professionals don’t has nothing to do with the 
inherent dynamics of globalization: it is about the differences in the power 
of these groups. 
Ideally, we would start to change trade deals so that we did see 
this sort of competition at the high end. It would lead to the same sorts of 
gains from trade that we get from buying cheaper clothes and car parts 
from abroad. However, in this case, the impact would be to reduce 
inequality rather than increase it. 
It is not likely that our trade agenda will be taken over by avid free 
traders anytime soon, but there are other mechanisms that can help to 
bring about similar outcomes. One is measures that make it easier for 
patients to take advantage of the lower prices for major medical 
procedures in other countries. There are many high-quality facilities in 
countries like India that charge prices that are often less one-tenth the 
prices in the United States. Since the cost of some of these procedures 
runs into the hundreds of thousands of dollars in the United States, and 
they are usually not done on an emergency basis, patients could travel for 
their surgery (and even bring along family members) and still have large 
savings.  
While this practice is not likely to be promoted at the national 
level due to the power of the doctors’ lobby, there is no reason that a state 
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couldn’t take advantage of this opportunity for cost savings. States could 
offer their Medicaid patients the option to get major operations overseas, 
while splitting the savings, as an alternative to having procedures done in 
the United States. They could also write rules for insurers to facilitate such 
arrangements. In addition, a solid international licensing system for 
medical facilities would be helpful for ensuring quality standards, as would 
clear rules on malpractice. Allowing more people to take advantage of 
low-cost health care in other countries will directly put downward 
pressure on prices in the United States by reducing demand. It can also 
have the beneficial political effect of allowing people to see first-hand that 
the quality of care in many other countries is comparable to that in the 
United States. 
In principle, it would be possible to make similar arrangements 
with Medicare. The cost of providing health care to our retirees is more 
than twice as much per person as in other wealthy countries. This creates 
the potential for large gains if Medicare beneficiaries are given the 
opportunity to use their Medicare to buy into health care systems in other 
countries. The gap between the cost of providing care under the Medicare 
system and the cost of providing health care through another country’s 
health care system could be shared between the beneficiary and the U.S. 
government. This would also reduce the demand for domestic medical 
services while educating people about the quality of health care in other 
countries.  
Here also the doctors’ lobbies will furiously fight the idea of 
globalizing Medicare. While it would be hard to overcome their 
resistance, it is a case where the doctors are clearly the enemies of 
globalization and relying on old-fashioned protectionism to maintain their 
bloated pay. If doctors were treated the same way as textile workers and 
autoworkers in trade pacts, they would face massive job loss and plunging 
paychecks.  
There are similar, if less dramatic stories, with the other highly 
paid professions. There are enormous potential gains from opening them 
up to international competition. It is only the political power of these 
relatively highly paid workers that prevents them from being subject to the 
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same sort of international completion as their less highly paid 
counterparts. 
 
Adding it all up 
 
All of the changes outlined in the previous chapters are not likely 
to happen anytime soon. But the point of this book is that the distribution 
of income can be hugely altered by restructuring the market to produce 
different outcomes. This doesn’t dismiss the value of tax and transfer 
policies, but if the market is rigged to redistribute ever more income 
upward, it will be difficult to design tax and transfer policies to reverse 
this effect. And if the rigging efforts are never challenged, then they will 
impose an ever greater burden on those trying to reduce inequality 
through tax and transfer policy.  
Table 8-1 shows the range of the gains from restructuring the 
market. The total comes to almost $2 trillion in additional income in 2016 
in the low-end case, $3.7 trillion in the high-end case. Expressed as units 
of SNAP spending (Figure 8-1), the low-end amount is equal to 27.1 
units and the high-end amount just under 50. In short, there is a lot of 
money at stake here. 
This calculation requires several important qualifications. First, 
more than half of these potential gains are associated with full-employment 
policy. The high-end number is based on a projection of GDP that assumes 
the 2008 crash either never happened or that we responded to it quickly 
and aggressively enough to quickly restore GDP back to its potential. Of 
course, that didn’t happen, and we can’t rewrite the past. The result of 
the crash and subsequent policy failures has to been to permanently reduce 
potential GDP, both as a result of a lower capital stock and also due to 
some people likely permanently leaving the labor force. The lower figure, 
which assumes that we can make up half of the gap between the pre-crash 
projection of potential GDP and actual output, is more realistic but still 
optimistic.  
The second qualification is that not all of this money would be 
transferred from the rich to everyone else. For example, if we increased 
GDP back to its potential, some of the gains would go the 1 percent. And 
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even if a disproportionate share of the additional output from getting back 
to full employment goes to people lower down on the income 
distribution, the share going to the top 1 percent will not be zero. The 
same would hold true for all of the potential gains from eliminating rents. 
Not all the benefits will go to those lower down in the income 
distribution, even if the bulk does. 
 
TABLE 8-1 
Gains from restructuring markets 
(billions of 2016 dollars) 
 Low High 
Adopting a full-employment policy $1,115 $2,300 
Eliminating financial sector waste $460 $636 
Ending patent/copyright monopolies $217 $434 
Reforming corporate governance $90 $145 
Ending protection of highly paid professions $100 $200 
   
Total $1,982 $3,715 
Source and notes: Author's calculations; see text. 
 
FIGURE 8-1 
Gains from restructuring markets, in units of SNAP spending  
 
Source and notes: Author’s calculations; see text. 
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Finally, there is likely to be some interactive effect that would go 
in the right direction from the standpoint of reducing inequality. For 
example, more than 470,000 physicians are specialists in the United States 
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2016), and the vast majority earn over 
$250,000 a year. They account for roughly a quarter of high-end earners 
in the United States (SSA 2016b). Reducing the ratio of specialists to 
primary care physicians down to the level that holds in other countries and 
bringing their average pay down closer to $200,000 (also more in line 
with other wealthy countries), would put downward pressure on the 
wages of high-end earners more generally. A sharp reduction in the 
number of high-paying jobs would have a substantial impact on the high 
end of the labor market just as the loss of manufacturing jobs has an impact 
on the labor market for non-college-educated workers more generally. 
For this reason, some of the estimates in Table 8-1 may actually understate 
how much eliminating rents may reduce income inequality.  
For all the qualifications, there should be little doubt that there is 
potential to have a large impact on the distribution of income through 
economically plausible restructurings of the market. The gainers in the top 
1 percent have structured the market over the last four decades in ways 
that increase their share of income. This restructuring can be reversed. 
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Chapter 9 
Rewriting the Narrative on Economic 
Policy  
The standard framing of economic debates divides the world into 
two schools. On the one hand, conservatives want to leave things to the 
market and have a minimal role for government. Liberals see a large role 
for government in alleviating poverty, reducing inequality, and correcting 
other perceived ill-effects of market outcomes. This book argues that this 
framing is fundamentally wrong. The point is that we don’t have “market 
outcomes” that we can decide whether to interfere with or not.  
Government policy shapes market outcomes. It determines 
aggregate levels of output and employment, which in turn affect the 
bargaining power of different groups of workers. Government policy 
structures financial markets, and the policy giving the industry special 
protections allows for some individuals to get enormously rich. 
Government policy determines the extent to which individuals can claim 
ownership of technology and how much they can profit from it. 
Government policy sets up corporate governance structures that let top 
management enrich itself at the expense of shareholders. And government 
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policy determines whether highly paid professionals enjoy special 
protection from foreign and domestic competition. 
Pretending that the distribution of income and wealth that results 
from a long set of policy decisions is somehow the natural workings of the 
market is not a serious position. It might be politically convenient for 
conservatives who want to lock inequality in place. It is a more politically 
compelling position to argue that we should not interfere with market 
outcomes than to argue for a system that is deliberately structured to make 
some people very rich while leaving others in poverty.  
Pretending that distributional outcomes are just the workings of 
the market is convenient for any beneficiaries of this inequality, even those 
who consider themselves liberal. They can feel entitled to their prosperity 
by virtue of being winners in the market, yet sufficiently benevolent to 
share some of their wealth with the less fortunate. For this reason, they 
may also find it useful to pretend that we have a set of market outcomes 
not determined by policy decisions. 
But we should not structure our understanding of the economy 
around political convenience. There is no way of escaping the fact that 
levels of output and employment are determined by policy, that the length 
and strength of patent and copyright monopolies are determined by 
policy, and that the rules of corporate governance are determined by 
policy. The people who would treat these and other policy decisions 
determining the distribution of income as somehow given are not being 
honest. We can debate the merits of a policy, but there is no policy-free 
option out there.  
This may be discomforting to people who want to believe that we 
have a set of market outcomes that we can fall back upon, but this is the 
real world. If we want to be serious, we have to get used to it.  
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Appendix 
This Appendix includes Table 6-1, referenced on page 136. 
TABLE 6-1 
Directors of the 100 largest publicly traded companies in the 
U.S. who have previously held positions in government 
Firm Name Government Agency Government Position 
Apple Inc. Albert Gore Jr. White House Vice President 
McKesson Wayne Budd Department of Justice Associate Attorney General 
UnitedHealth Group Gail Wilensky Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Administrator 
CVS Health Nancy-Ann Deparle White House Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy 
General Motors Michael Mullen Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman 
Ford Motor Company William Kennard 
FCC (1997–2001), 
Embassy to European 
Union (2009–2013) 
Chairman, Ambassador 
Ford Motor Company Jon Huntsman State of Utah Governor 
AT&T Richard Fisher Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President 
AT&T 
Laura 
D'Andrea 
Tyson 
Department of State Secretary of State Foreign Affairs Policy Board 
AT&T William Kennard 
FCC (1997–2001), 
Embassy to European 
Union (2009–2013) 
Chairman, Ambassador 
AT&T Glenn Hutchins 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York Director 
General Electric Mary Schapiro Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman 
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TABLE 6-1 
Directors of the 100 largest publicly traded companies in the 
U.S. who have previously held positions in government 
Firm Name Government Agency Government Position 
General Electric Peter Henry Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Member of Economic Advisory 
Panel 
AmerisourceBergen Jane Henney Food and Drug Administration Commissioner 
Verizon Donald Nicolaisen 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission Chief Accountant 
Verizon Rodney Earl Slater 
Department of 
Transportation Secretary 
Chevron Linnet Deily Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Deputy Representative 
Chevron Jon Huntsman State of Utah Governor 
Costco Daniel Evans U.S. Senate Senator (R-WA) 
Kroger Susan Phillips Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System Governor 
Amazon Jamie Gorelick Department of Justice Deputy Attorney General 
Walgreens William Foote Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Chairman of the Board 
Walgreens David Brailer Department of Health and Human Services 
National Coordinator for Health 
Information Technology 
Walgreens Leonard Schaeffer 
Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services Administrator 
Express Scripts 
Holding 
William 
Roper 
Centers for Disease 
Control Director 
Express Scripts 
Holding 
Woodrow 
Myers 
New York City 
Department of Health 
and Mental Hygiene 
Commissioner 
Express Scripts 
Holding 
Roderick 
Palmore Department of Justice 
Assistant U.S. Attorney for 
Northern District of Illinois 
Express Scripts 
Holding Elder Granger Department of Defense 
Deputy Director and Program 
Executive Officer of the TRICARE 
Management Activity 
JPMorgan Chase Laban Jackson Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Director 
JPMorgan Chase Linda Bammann Freddie Mac Director 
Boeing Kenneth Duberstein White House Chief of Staff 
Boeing Susan Schwab Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Representative 
Boeing Edmund Giambastiani Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman 
Bank of America Susan Bies Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System Governor 
Bank of America Monica Lozano 
Board of Regents of 
University of California Board Member 
Wells Fargo John Stumpf Federal Reserve Board Member of Financial Advisory Council 
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TABLE 6-1 
Directors of the 100 largest publicly traded companies in the 
U.S. who have previously held positions in government 
Firm Name Government Agency Government Position 
Wells Fargo Cynthia Milligan 
Omaha Branch of 
Kansas City Federal 
Reserve 
Director 
Wells Fargo Federico Pena Department of Energy Secretary 
Wells Fargo James Quigley Securities and Exchange Commission 
Member of Advisory Committee on 
Improvements to Financial 
Reporting 
Wells Fargo Elaine Chao Department of Labor Secretary 
Wells Fargo Elizabeth Duke Federal Reserve Board 
Chair of Committee on Consumer 
and Community Affairs, Member of 
Committee on Bank Supervision 
and Regulation, Member of 
Committee on Board Affairs 
Wells Fargo Suzanne Vautrinot U.S. Air Force 
Major General and Commander, 
24th Air Force, Air Forces Cyber 
and Air Force Network Operations 
Citigroup Eugene McQuade Freddie Mac Director 
Citigroup Joan Sperro Department of State Under Secretary, Economics, Business and Agricultural Affairs 
Citigroup Diana Taylor State of New York Superintendent of Banks 
Citigroup Ernesto Zedillo President of Mexico President 
Citigroup Anthony Santomero 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia President 
Phillips 66 Marna Whittington State of Delaware Secretary of Finance 
IBM Joan Sperro Department of State Under Secretary, Economics, Business and Agricultural Affairs 
IBM Shirley Ann Jackson 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission 
Chairman 
Valero Energy Donald Nickles U.S. Senate Senator (R-OK) 
Valero Energy Deborah Majoras 
Federal Trade 
Commission Chair 
Valero Energy 
Susan 
Kaufman 
Purcell 
Department of State Member, Policy Planning Staff 
Procter & Gamble Ernesto Zedillo President of Mexico President 
Procter & Gamble Francis Blake Department of Energy Deputy Secretary 
State Farm Insurance Dan Arvizu Department of Energy Director, National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
State Farm Insurance Christopher DeMuth 
Office of Management 
and Budget 
Administrator for Information and 
Regulatory Affairs 
State Farm Insurance Allan Landon Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System Governor 
State Farm Insurance Gary Perlin World Bank CFO 
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TABLE 6-1 
Directors of the 100 largest publicly traded companies in the 
U.S. who have previously held positions in government 
Firm Name Government Agency Government Position 
State Farm Insurance Susan Phillips Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System Governor 
Comcast Kenneth Bacon Fannie Mae Executive Vice President 
Target Kenneth Salazar 
Department of the 
Interior Secretary 
Johnson & Johnson A. Eugene Washington 
Centers for Disease 
Control Employee 
Johnson & Johnson D. Scott Davis Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Chairman 
Johnson & Johnson Mark McClellan 
Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services Administrator 
MetLife R. Glenn Hubbard 
Council of Economic 
Advisors Chairman 
MetLife Carlos Gutierrez 
Department of 
Commerce Secretary 
MetLife William Kennard 
FCC (1997–2001), 
Embassy to European 
Union (2009–2013) 
Chairman, Ambassador 
Archer-Daniels 
Midland 
Francisco 
Sanchez 
Department of 
Commerce 
Under Secretary for International 
Trade 
Marathon Petroleum John Snow Department of Treasury Secretary 
Marathon Petroleum B. Evan Bayh U.S. Senate Senator (R-IN) 
Marathon Petroleum John Surma Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Deputy Chair of Board of Directors 
Freddie Mac Nicholas Retsinas 
Department of Housing 
and Urban 
Development 
Assistant Secretary for Housing, 
Federal Housing Commissioner 
Freddie Mac Richard Hartnack 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of San Francisco Director 
Freddie Mac Anthony Williams 
Department of 
Agriculture CFO 
Freddie Mac Raphael Bostic 
Department of Housing 
and Urban 
Development 
Assistant Secretary for Policy 
Development and Research 
PepsiCo Richard Fisher Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President 
United Technologies 
Christine 
Todd 
Whitman 
Environmental 
Protection Agency Administrator 
United Technologies Lloyd Austin U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff 
United Technologies Richard Myers U.S. Air Force Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Aetna Jeffrey Garten Department of Commerce 
Under Secretary for International 
Trade 
Aetna Frank Clark Chicago Board of Education President 
Aetna Molly Coye California Department of Health Services Director 
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Directors of the 100 largest publicly traded companies in the 
U.S. who have previously held positions in government 
Firm Name Government Agency Government Position 
Aetna Olympia Snowe U.S. Senate Senator (R-ME) 
UPS Kevin Warsh Board of Governor of Federal Reserve System Governor 
AIG Peter Fisher Department of Treasury 
Under Secretary for Domestic 
Finance 
AIG Theresa Stone Federal Reserve Board of Richmond Director 
Prudential Financial George Paz Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Chairman 
Prudential Financial Sandra Pianalto 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of Cleveland President 
Intel Corp Charlene Barhefsky 
Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative Representative 
Intel Corp Reed Hundt 
Federal 
Communications 
Commission 
Chairman 
Humana David Jones Jefferson County Board of Education Chairman 
Cisco Kristina Johnson Department of Energy Under Secretary for Energy 
Pfizer Joseph Echevarria 
Presidential 
Commission on 
Election Administration 
Member 
FedEx Shirley Ann Jackson 
U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory 
Commission 
Commissioner 
FedEx Susan Schwab Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Representative 
FedEx John Inglis National Security Agency Deputy Director 
Caterpillar Susan Schwab Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Representative 
Caterpillar Jon Huntsman State of Utah Governor 
Lockheed Martin James Ellis Air Force Commander, U.S. Strategic Command 
Lockheed Martin Joseph Ralston NATO 
Commander, U.S. European 
Command and Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe 
Lockheed Martin James Loy Department of Homeland Security Deputy Secretary 
Lockheed Martin Bruce Carlson National Reconnaissance Office Director 
Coca-Cola Co. Helene Gayle Centers for Disease Control 
Director, National Center for HIV, 
STD, and TB Prevention 
Coca-Cola Co. Alexis Herman Department of Labor Secretary 
Coca-Cola Co. Samuel Nunn U.S. Senate Senator (D-GA) 
Coca-Cola Co. Richard Daley City of Chicago Mayor 
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TABLE 6-1 
Directors of the 100 largest publicly traded companies in the 
U.S. who have previously held positions in government 
Firm Name Government Agency Government Position 
HCA Holdings Nancy-Ann Deparle White House Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy 
Tyson Foods Mike Beebe State of Arkansas Governor 
Delta Airlines Shirley Franklin City of Atlanta Mayor 
Delta Airlines Francis Blake Department of Energy Deputy Secretary 
Delta Airlines Thomas Donilon 
National Security 
Council National Security Advisor 
Nationwide Mutual Diane Koken State of Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner 
Johnson Controls Jeffrey Joerres Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Director 
Johnson Controls Dennis Archer City of Detroit Mayor 
Honeywell 
International D. Scott Davis 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of Atlanta Chairman of the Board 
Honeywell 
International Judd Gregg U.S. Senate Senator (R-NH) 
Honeywell 
International George Paz 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of St Louis Chairman of the Board 
Honeywell 
International Linnet Deily 
Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative Representative 
Massachusetts Mutual 
Life Insurance 
Patricia Diaz 
Dennis Department of State 
Assistant Secretary for Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs 
Massachusetts Mutual 
Life Insurance Marc Racicot State of Montana Governor 
Massachusetts Mutual 
Life Insurance 
Cathy 
Minehan 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of Boston President 
Massachusetts Mutual 
Life Insurance Laura Sen 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of Boston Director 
Oracle Michael Boskin 
Council of Economic 
Advisors Chairman 
Oracle Leon Panetta Department of Defense Secretary 
Morgan Stanley Erskine Bowles White House Chief of Staff 
Morgan Stanley Donald Nicolaisen 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission Chief Accountant 
Morgan Stanley Judith Miscik Central Intelligence Agency Deputy Director for Intelligence 
Morgan Stanley Alistair Darling Her Majesty's Treasury Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Cigna Jane Henney Food and Drug Administration Commissioner 
Cigna David Vitale Chicago Board of Education President 
Allstate Thomas Wilson 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of Chicago Deputy Chair 
INTL FCStone John Fowler Department of Transportation General Counsel 
American Express Charlene Barhefsky 
Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative Representative 
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Firm Name Government Agency Government Position 
American Express Anne Lauvergeon French Presidency Deputy Chief of Staff 
American Express Michael Leavitt 
Department of Health 
and Human Services Governor 
Gilead Sciences John Cogan Department of Labor Assistant Secretary for Policy 
General Dynamics Lester Lyles U.S. Air Force Vice Chief of Staff 
General Dynamics John Keane U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff 
General Dynamics James Mattis U.S. Marine Corps Commander, U.S. Central Command 
General Dynamics Rudy deLeon Department of Defense Deputy Secretary 
General Dynamics Peter Wall British Army Chief of the General Staff 
ConocoPhillips Charles Bunch Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Chairman 
ConocoPhillips Richard Armitage Department of State Deputy Secretary 
World Fuel Services John Manley Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chief Accountant 
Mondelez 
International Charles Bunch 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of Cleveland Chairman 
Exelon Nicholas Debenedictis 
Pennsylvania 
Department of 
Environmental 
Resources 
Secretary 
Exelon Anthony Anderson 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of Chicago Director 
Exelon Richard Mies U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Strategic Command 
Twentieth Century 
Fox Viet Dinh Department of Justice 
Assistant Attorney General for 
Legal Policy 
Twentieth Century 
Fox 
Robert 
Silberman Department of Defense Assistant Secretary of the Army 
Deere & Co. Michael Johanns U.S. Senate Senator (R-NE) 
Tesoro Susan Tomasky 
Federal Energy 
Regulatory 
Commission 
General Counsel 
Time Warner William Barr Department of Justice Attorney General 
Time Warner Deborah Wright 
New York Department 
of Housing 
Preservation and 
Development 
Commissioner 
Time Warner Carlos Gutierrez 
Department of 
Commerce Secretary 
Source and notes: Annual reports of listed companies. 
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